

# A TREATISE ON KNOWLEDGE

BY

A. H. SMITH

Fellow of New College, Oxford

OXFORD

AT THE CLARENDON PRESS

1943

OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS  
AMEN HOUSE, E.C. 4  
London Edinburgh Glasgow New York  
Toronto Melbourne Capetown Bombay  
Calcutta Madras  
HUMPHREY MILFORD  
PUBLISHER TO THE UNIVERSITY

PRINTED IN GREAT BRITAIN

## PREFACE

SINCE this book is intended to be a continuous discussion and not three independent essays, it may be useful to begin by indicating, very briefly, its scope. It starts from the view that when we reflect on the sensible qualities of the physical world it is difficult to avoid Berkeley's conclusion that their 'esse' is 'percipi'; and it attempts to see what problems are created by this view and whether there is any way in which they can be solved. Certain doctrines of Hume and Kant are studied because they are based, it seems, on Berkeley's teaching, and they show plainly where some of the ambiguities and difficulties lie. We may at least hope that when we have studied Hume and Kant we shall have a better understanding of some essential factors which the problem involves, even if it be thought that neither provides a solution.

The aspects of Hume's *Treatise* which are considered in Chapter I are these. Hume has the merit of seeing that Berkeley's doctrine raises questions about belief, but he shows much uncertainty in handling them. He finds that our belief in the existence of objects which we do not perceive is inconsistent with the view that their 'esse' is 'percipi', but in the first part of the *Treatise* instead of concluding that this belief is an erroneous state of consciousness he maintains that belief is not what it is generally thought to be. We should expect him to offer an account of what our consciousness would need to be if our error in regard to the physical world were realized and corrected. He does in fact offer what looks like such an account, but he offers it as an analysis of what the state of consciousness which we call belief actually is. Now it is hard to accept this way of treating the matter, and Hume himself later in the *Treatise* abandons it. He adopts the different position of allowing that belief is what we ordinarily take it to be, and seeks to explain how it is that we come to have a state of consciousness which is so much at variance with what our consciousness ought to be. Here he has laid hold of an important principle. If an account is given to us of what our consciousness should be, we ought to be dissatisfied when we discover that the consciousness which we should have contradicts our actual consciousness, unless indeed we can explain how the error of our actual consciousness is produced. So far there is something to be learnt from Hume, which is not to be found in Berkeley nor in Kant, although it was familiar

to Descartes. But when we consider his application of the principle, there are two criticisms to be made of his account. The first concerns his view of what, if Berkeley's doctrine is correct, our consciousness ought to be, the second his explanation of the way in which the supposed error of our actual consciousness arises.

The two lines of criticism are to be found, in order, in the first part of Chapter I. What is first considered is Hume's paradoxical contention that he is describing the nature of our actual consciousness; but the discussion is also intended to show that his account will not serve even as a description of what belief should be. It is open to the objection that on all views, Berkeley's included, consciousness must recognize and distinguish both its own perception and what it perceives, and that in being aware of the former it is not aware of something which is internal to consciousness in the sense that physical objects are said by Berkeley to be. The point was in some respects realized by Berkeley himself, but it has implications, not considered by him, with which much of our study not only of Hume, but also of Kant, will be concerned.

The latter part of Chapter I seeks to show how Hume's explanation of the idea of causality is related to the inconsistencies of his account of belief. If the introduction of this topic is thought to be a digression, I can only say that after the investigation of Hume's account of belief it seemed worth while to see how far its errors vitiated what he had to say on so important a subject as the origin of our idea of causality.

Chapter II is a study of Kant's doctrines. Here again it may be worth while to give a preliminary indication of the main questions discussed and of the way in which they are related.

At the outset we have to consider the question whether Kant himself distinguishes consciousness of a perception and consciousness of the content of a perception. It seems that his thought in regard to this matter is not clear, but he converges on the view that what we are conscious of is a number of perceptions having various contents, which are actually occurring or have occurred, and that this consciousness is supplemented by the imagination of other perceptions which we might have had or may have in the future. Starting from this basis he thinks that our consciousness recognizes that there is a system in the perceptions, actual and imaginary, which present themselves to it, and that the recognition of the system is in some way equivalent to consciousness of objects. In so far as this view suggests that the occurrence of the percep-

tions at the times and in the order which mark their occurrence is something of which the 'esse' is not 'percipi', it is plainly quite different from Hume's doctrine of what consciousness should be, and it seems to return to the doctrine of Berkeley. One point, however, should be noticed if we are comparing Kant and Hume. It is not clear whether Kant suggests that recognition of the system which belongs to perceptions is what our actual consciousness of objects is, or whether he suggests that it is what our consciousness should be. In this respect there is the same ambiguity in his doctrine as there is in Hume's account of belief.

The position referred to is, however, only the starting-point of Kant's doctrine. Other factors which have to be considered in relation to it are these. In the first place Kant frequently shows that he is reluctant to abandon altogether a notion of objects which is nearer to our ordinary consciousness, and recurs to the view that our perceptions and their contents are not all that exists, but that there must be something to which the contents of our perceptions refer. Secondly he holds that a system is imposed on our perceptions which is the work of our own minds, thus separating his doctrine from Berkeley's. Moreover, he holds, thirdly, that time itself, within which our perceptions have their order or system, is a form of our consciousness. Fourthly, through the consideration of the last two factors he reaches a point where he evidently wishes to distinguish two elements in consciousness or two kinds of consciousness, a consciousness which is in time and a consciousness which is the author of time. In this connexion he takes yet a further step, and influenced by the parallelism which he attributes to time and space, begins to develop a doctrine which can only mean that the two kinds of consciousness are in different relations to space and the objects which it contains. Lastly he has certain doctrines regarding the unity of our consciousness or of the self which evidently need to be taken into account if we are to consider the complex structure of his doctrine as a whole.

These then are the factors which, together with the possibility of combining them in a consistent doctrine, are considered in Chapter II. It appears when we study what Kant says that many parts of his doctrine are obscure or dubious or inconsistent with each other. Nevertheless, it seems impossible to return to a simpler way of regarding his problems or not to accept some of his contentions. What the study of Kant invites us to do, when we have determined which of his doctrines we can accept and which

we must reject, is to investigate the possibility of finding alternatives when we are dissatisfied, and to see whether there are any suppositions on which a consistent doctrine might be based. It is to this aim that, however inadequate they may be, the speculations in Chapter III are directed.

I have only to add that before writing Chapter II I had written a fuller study of Kant, which I hope will be published when circumstances permit under the title of 'Kantian Studies'. At certain points the argument of Chapter II and some of the interpretations of Kant's meaning need to be supported by the discussions in that book. Where this is so I have introduced a reference to the relevant chapters of the 'Kantian Studies'.

The references to Kant's *Critique* follow the usual system. When Hume is quoted, the references are to the pages of Selby-Bigge's edition of the *Treatise* (Clarendon Press, 1896).

A. H. S.

*October, 1942.*

## CONTENTS

I HUME'S DOCTRINE REGARDING OUR CONSCIOUSNESS OF OBJECTS	I
II KANT'S THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE	
§ 1. Consciousness and its Objects	59
§ 2. The Antithesis of the Form and Matter of Intuition	75
§ 3. Self-consciousness	95
III SPECULATIONS ON KNOWLEDGE	119
INDEX	181



# I

## HUME'S DOCTRINE REGARDING OUR CONSCIOUSNESS OF OBJECTS

IN this book we shall try first to see by means of a study of Hume and Kant what problems arise when we consider the nature of our knowledge, what contributions to their solution we can gain from these two thinkers, and where it seems that they fail. In the last chapter we shall consider whether on a theory different from that which either of them holds or by a modification of any of their doctrines it may be possible to solve some of the difficulties which they left. It will be found that the suggestions regarding the nature of our consciousness which are contained in that chapter are more directly connected with the problems considered by Kant and with his way of treating them than with the doctrines of Hume. Nevertheless their problems and doctrines are so closely related that it is desirable to begin with an examination of Hume. His habit of raising essentially important questions in a clear and provocative form may enable us, if we study him, to understand better certain problems (including those raised by Kant's doctrines) than if we were to study Kant alone.

When we ask what are Hume's doctrines regarding our consciousness of objects and turn to his *Treatise on Human Nature* for an answer, we encounter a difficulty of which he does not himself seem to be clearly aware. It seems that there are two accounts which he gives of the nature of consciousness. In the first he is concerned to show that we are not aware of anything which is external to our own consciousness or distinct or separate from it, that neither the idea of existence nor even that of external existence is an idea which can be applied to some objects of consciousness and not to others, that the distinction of the real and the imaginary requires to be reconsidered, and that it is necessary to have a new conception of that state or activity of the mind which we call 'belief'. In the second account of consciousness he recognizes that it contains an idea of that which is distinct or independent or external. He supposes that the idea is one which arises in the course of our experience and in his chapter on 'Scepticism with regard to the Senses' in Part IV endeavours to show what factors produce it. He does not consider whether the recognition that this idea attends our consciousness in any way affects

the earlier account which he has given of consciousness, although it apparently enables a meaning to be attached to distinctions which were there discarded. It is here that the difficulty lies, and if we wish to understand what Hume's doctrines are and to assess their consistency and value, it will be necessary to consider the question, which he himself neglects, of the relation of the two accounts. But in the first instance we must turn to an examination of the two accounts separately and see how far we are persuaded by the argument of each. When this has been done we shall be in a better position to consider what conclusions are suggested when the two are compared.

We may begin our consideration of the first account which eliminates the notion of external existents by recalling the following passage which occurs at the end of Part II (Sect. VI, p. 67):

'Now since nothing is ever present to the mind but perceptions, and since all ideas are derived from something antecedently present to the mind; it follows that 'tis impossible for us so much as to conceive or form an idea of any thing specifically different from ideas and impressions. Let us fix our attention out of ourselves as much as possible; let us chase our imagination to the heavens, or to the ultimate limits of the universe; we can never really advance a step beyond ourselves, nor can conceive any kind of existence, but those perceptions, which have appeared in that narrow compass. This is the universe of the imagination, nor have we any idea but what is there produced.'

It is obvious that if our universe is a universe of the imagination as Hume says, the question arises, What then is the nature of our consciousness of real objects, and what is the distinction we draw between those objects which we think are real and those we think are imaginary? We shall see that Hume's answer in effect is that there is a single feature of consciousness which marks off the real from the imaginary, and that we can say no more about our consciousness of real things than that it possesses this feature. In following the reasons he gives for this answer and examining their validity we may hope to remind ourselves of some important factors in the problem. It will perhaps appear that though his argument is complicated his conclusion is too simple, and that there are certain points which he overlooks.

Hume thinks of the problem closely in connexion with that of the nature of belief, the reason of course being that we primarily regard belief as the conviction that something is real. We can therefore begin by considering what he says on this subject. His account, however, is so paradoxical and his attempt to work it

out has so many ramifications that it is not easy to apprehend his doctrine in its various bearings. One of these ramifications is its connexion with the subject of causality. The connexion with causality arises because in Hume's view we cannot attribute existence to anything which we have not actually experienced (i.e. we cannot have the conviction that it is real or believe in it) except on the basis of the causal principle. It is tempting indeed to put in the forefront this connexion with his views on causality and to think that the essential points in his position regarding belief may be best stated with reference to his doubts concerning the causal principle. The statement would be that there is no rational basis for the principle of causality, and that accordingly when on the strength of this principle we entertain beliefs, that is, attribute reality or existence (past, present, or future) to certain particulars which have not entered our experience, we are not actuated by reason but come to think as we do merely on the strength of a feeling. If we regard Hume's doctrine in this way, we may have doubts about the possibility of thus separating belief from all basis in rational thought, but it does not seem to be a view which otherwise is difficult to follow.

There are, however, several considerations which make it clear that Hume's position (at least in the earlier part of the *Treatise*<sup>1</sup>) cannot be so summarized. We may select two. In the first place, Hume does not think that we only entertain belief when we are thinking of particulars which have not entered into our experience. When we are having either an impression or the memory of an impression, we are in a state of belief. In fact it is his doctrine that to have an impression is the most complete form of believing, memory is the nearest approximation to the complete form, and our state of mind regarding particulars outside our experience is only belief in so far as it possesses in a weaker degree the characteristic mark of the other two states. The characteristic mark is, he thinks, the *vivacity*<sup>2</sup> of the two states or perceptions; belief is nothing but their vivacity. At the conclusion of Section V of Part III of the *Treatise* he says: 'Thus it appears that the *belief* or *assent*, which always attends the memory and senses, is nothing but the vivacity of those perceptions they present; and that this alone

<sup>1</sup> For an examination of the later development of his doctrine, see below, pp. 22 et seq.

<sup>2</sup> Compare what is said on page 11 regarding Hume's use of the term 'vivacity'. The modifications of meaning there referred to do not affect our discussion at this point.

distinguishes them from the imagination. To believe is in this case to feel an immediate impression of the senses, or a repetition of that impression in the memory' (p. 86).

In the second place, the notion of attribution of existence is alien to Hume's doctrine. He deals with this question early in the *Treatise*, in Section VI of Part II, and his statements are very clear. 'There is no impression nor idea of any kind, of which we have any consciousness or memory, that is not conceived as existent; and 'tis evident that, from this consciousness the most perfect idea and assurance of *being* is derived' (p. 66). There is therefore no 'distinct impression of existence attending every impression and idea', and consequently (on Hume's view of the dependence of ideas on impressions) there is no distinct idea of existence. 'The idea of existence, then, is the very same with the idea of what we conceive to be existent.' Belief, in such a theory, cannot be the attribution of existence to some particular which might be thought of either as existent or as not existent.

There is, however, the possibility that, if the conception of existence has to be discarded in the theory of belief, another conception can be used in its place. Hume is perhaps bound to say what he does say regarding the predicate of existence, but can he not use instead the conception of 'external existence' and save himself from some of his paradoxes? He might afford to surrender the notion of attributing existence, if he could keep the notion of attributing external existence. But Hume is clear in his own mind that this solution is barred. After discussing the idea of existence, he goes on at once to say: 'A like reasoning will account for the idea of *external existence*' (id., p. 67). His grounds are contained in the passage already quoted (see p. 2 above). However much we try to attain to something external to ourselves or to conceive of something specifically different from ideas and impressions, 'we can never really advance a step beyond ourselves, nor can conceive any kind of existence, but those perceptions, which have appeared in that narrow compass'.

In the brief concluding paragraph of the same section Hume remembers that it is nevertheless difficult to deny that we have a conception of external existence, and that it will be his task to explain it. What we have here, it should be noticed, is in effect a first reference to his second account of the nature of our consciousness. He contents himself with a somewhat cryptic remark on the subject, and a reference forward to Part IV of the *Treatise*. We

shall return to this point later (see p. 22 below), but meantime it is clear that, according to Hume, a description must be found of belief which involves no reference either to existence or to external existence. It may turn out that it is difficult for him to keep wholly on the same ground when he discusses belief in the existence of body. But at any rate he thinks that the stage where belief in the existence of body is entertained is late and depends on our having earlier experience; and that it is true at least of the belief which belongs to this earlier experience that it can contain no element properly described as the attribution either of existence simply or of external existence.

So much importance is attached by Hume to this matter that when in the Appendix to the *Treatise* he summarizes his views he places it in the forefront. He argues that there is an inevitable dilemma; 'Either the belief is some new idea, such as that of *reality* or *existence*, which we join to the simple conception of an object, or it is merely a peculiar *feeling* or *sentiment*' (Appendix, p. 623). That the first view cannot be right, he thinks, is shown by two points. 'We have no abstract idea of existence, distinguishable and separable from the idea of particular objects'; and if we had, since 'the mind has the command over all its ideas, and can separate, unite, mix and vary them, as it pleases . . . it would be in a man's power to believe what he pleased' (id., pp. 623-4).

Let us now consider more closely the view, which Hume held so tenaciously, that we cannot distinguish imagination from perceptions or ideas of the so-called real by asserting that in the latter state of mind reality or existence is ascribed to the content of consciousness. We must first recognize the strength of his argument. In effect he urges (in the passage in the Appendix) that if we seek to mark off the real or existent by any particular characteristics it is always in the power of the mind to imagine any characteristics that are chosen; they thus can become the marks of what is imagined as well as of what is regarded as real, and therefore will no longer serve as marks by which the imaginary and the real are distinguished. Hume's point may be illustrated by an example. It is tempting to say that the real table at which I write has relations to other objects, to myself, and to other people which an imaginary table has not. But I can imagine the relations and thus think of the imaginary table as placed in imaginary relations which differ in no way from the relations which are thought to belong to a real table.

We must consider this position further. Hume's contention that any determinate features which we ascribe to real objects can be imitated in imagination seems to be just. Even the character which the real object has of standing in fixed relations (e.g., the relation of cause to effect) to objects which are real can be given in imagination to the imaginary object. Such a consideration seems to point in the direction of saying that the difference between consciousness of the imaginary and consciousness of the real depends not on any distinctive features of the imaginary and the real object but on the distinction in the mind's attitude towards them; the distinction to be made is that of the attitude of imagining and the attitude of believing. Now there are certain points regarding the implication of this view on which it is desirable to comment. In the first place, as regards Hume's own doctrine, doubt is cast on his statement that the difference between the imaginary and real is a difference of vivacity in our ideas. Vivacity as applied to ideas seems to suggest a character belonging to the objects of consciousness and so not quite to agree with Hume's own argument. The point is reinforced if we reflect that many ideas which we come to regard as imaginary may appear to have as much vivacity as undisputed impressions. It is true that though perhaps we can imagine anything, we cannot command vivacity at will. But if we say this, the ground for the distinction is shifting from vivacity to something else, and the suggestion seems to be that the distinction is connected with the question whether the mind feels free or bound. We shall see presently that there are passages in Hume which imply that he is himself not quite clear about the suggestions of his own terms. In the second place, there is the question what this view of the relation between the imaginary and the real implies in regard to our consciousness of the real. Hume in effect argues that since the imagination can imitate any features of reality, and the difference between the thought of the real and the thought of the imaginary is reduced to a feeling in our minds, we can only say about consciousness of the real that it is an idea marked by a feeling of vivacity. But, even if we suppose that the difference between believing and imagining is reduced to a feeling, it does not follow that the notion of reality is therefore eliminated in the analysis of our consciousness. Imagining and believing are imagining something to be real or existent and believing something to be real or existent. The notion of reality and existence is common to both states of consciousness, and the

determination of the difference between the two states does not determine, as Hume thinks it does, the account to be given of this common notion in respect of which imagination follows the example of belief. It is a mistake to regard the problem of explaining the difference between imagining and believing and the problem of analysing the elements in our thought of real objects as one and the same. If the two problems are seen to be separate, some part of Hume's argument regarding the relation of imagining and believing may be allowed to stand, even if his account of the ideas of existence and external existence is thought to be entirely mistaken. Of course it may well turn out that examination of the notion of real or existent objects will affect the account given of the difference between imagination and what Hume calls belief. To say that the problems are different is not to say that they are unrelated.

In the first place, then, we will take the notion of real or existent objects apart from the contrast with the notion of imaginary objects and consider whether there are any features of Hume's own teaching which suggest that the notion has more behind it than he thinks.

It will be best to begin by considering his account of impressions. It seems natural to think that in an impression we are conscious of two factors, the act of awareness and something of which the mind is aware; and that further, when we are aware of spatial objects, here at any rate the act of awareness and the object appear to us to differ in the very important respect that the existence of the object is not limited to the duration of the act of awareness. Any such account of the nature of impressions is rejected by Hume. In view of the arguments urged by Berkeley which bring out the difficulty of thinking that the characters of which we are conscious in a perception belong to independent objects, he supposes that the duration of these characters can only be the duration of our perceptions of them. It appears to follow that when the mind has a perception or an impression, it can only be conscious of one duration and not of two, and that it cannot have the idea of anything which remains when the impression ceases. Now in connexion with this line of thought it seems that there are two questions which need to be distinguished. In the first place there is the question whether when we reflect upon the matter we can rightly hold that objects exist which endure beyond the moment of perception. Secondly there is the question whether when we have impressions or perceptions we do in fact think (rightly or wrongly)

that we are aware of enduring objects. It is the mark of Hume's first account of consciousness which we have been considering that it pays no regard to the distinctness of these two questions. The implication of the account is that because no objects which are independent of consciousness—or, as Berkeley would say, no objects of which the *esse* is not *percipi*—present themselves to consciousness, the thought of objects which endure beyond the moment of perception is no part of our consciousness. Hume's doctrine is stated very plainly in a description which he gives in Part IV (p. 194) of the nature of our impressions. 'All impressions', he writes, 'are internal and perishing existences and appear as such.'<sup>1</sup> The important words in this connexion are that the internal and perishing existences 'appear as such'; they carry with them, Hume is insisting, no thought of enduring objects or of any objects which have a different time-determination from the impressions regarded as temporal occurrences.

In considering this description of our impressions we may begin by asking whether it is applicable also to our ideas. It seems clear that Hume would take the same view of those ideas which resemble impressions in all respects except that they have a less degree of vivacity. Whatever he may have to say about general ideas (and his chapter on abstract ideas suggests important differences between general ideas and impressions, though he does not follow them up), there is no reason to suppose that according to his doctrine the ideas of memory, for example, differ fundamentally from impressions. But it seems that he ought to have recognized that however plausible his view may be in relation to impressions it is difficult to regard the situation in the same way when we come to ideas of impressions. In the impression, he implies, what is perceived is something which belongs and appears to us to belong to the moment of perceiving. In the idea of an impression, the impression can be thought of as having occurred in the past or as something which will occur in the future; and in

<sup>1</sup> The sentence occurs, we should notice, in the chapter on 'Scepticism with regard to the Senses', in which Hume recognizes that we have the idea of independent and continuing objects, and so belongs to his second account of consciousness. We need not hesitate, however, to quote it in explaining the view which he takes of impressions in his first account, since he does not change his views in this respect. His later doctrine is that though the idea of independent and continuing objects is to be found in our consciousness, it is not present at the beginning of our experience (that is to say, it is no part of our impressions), but arises as a result of the way in which certain features of our experience gradually act upon the imagination.

such a case it seems plain that the mind distinguishes its own idea from the impression to which it is related, inasmuch as they are thought of as belonging to different moments of time. Even if it can be held that all is present, because the impression has no being outside the idea (either because its moment of existence is over or because it has not yet come to be), still it is not possible to maintain that everything of which the mind is conscious in this case 'appears' to belong to the present fleeting moment. It must be said that while the idea in which the impression is recollected or anticipated so appears, the impression which is recollected or anticipated in the idea does not. It may appear to have belonged to a past fleeting moment, but it does not appear to belong to the fleeting moment of our *present* consciousness. To say this, however, seems certainly to imply that where there is an idea of an impression a distinction is made by the mind between its consciousness and that of which it is conscious. Thus in the activity, for example, of memory, both the constituents which Hume thought could not appear in our original consciousness seem to find a place; on the one hand, a notion seems to be present of something the existence of which is placed in a different moment of time from the moment of the perception in which it is apprehended, and on the other hand, there is present, if not consciousness of personal identity, at least some notion which belongs to the fringe of self-consciousness.

It almost seems as if Hume did not really overlook this point, but was determined not to admit it; and there are doubtless many reasons why he should find it repugnant. There is something paradoxical about the matter; the impression by itself has its being in the moment when it is felt, the impression which is the content of an idea has its being in the moment of the idea; why then in regard to the impression within the idea should the mind think otherwise? Further, Hume has convinced himself that, since all our knowledge depends on impressions, the only justifiable procedure is to examine impressions, with a view to discovering what they contain, and thereafter to judge ideas in the light of this examination of impressions; the ideas can only be weaker forms of impressions, and if it is claimed that they yield more than can be found in impressions, the claim has to be disallowed. The point is critical, and merits careful consideration. Probably Hume's contention in regard to procedure should be rejected and the opposite course advocated. In general there is more to be said for

the view that since the impression taken apart from ideas is an elusive element in our experience and it is difficult to see what it contains and what it does not, it is dangerous to judge the rest of our experience by what are supposed to be the limits of impressions. The question is the more important as much modern philosophy which concerns itself with problems of perception shows a disposition to follow a line not far removed from that of Hume. In Hume's case the dangers of the method can well be seen. On the one hand, it leads him to ignore features of our experience in respect of ideas which we may think ought to be recognized. And, on the other hand, in his attempt to account for the surprising appearance of certain concepts in the mind, such as that of the independent object, it leads him to explanations which for all their subtlety and ingenuity seem to be wasted labour.

It seems fair, therefore, to say that Hume's failures suggest the advisability of trying the opposite procedure to his own. If our more complete and mature experience contains elements, by admission difficult to account for, which were not found in impressions, it is possible that in the first view of impressions these elements were overlooked and that the impressions should be examined again. Hume himself suggests the starting-point. In effect he takes the distinction between ideas which are imaginary and those which are not (such as ideas of memory), and argues that the latter are clearly more akin to impressions and must resemble them in some respect; since the distinguishing mark of the impression is vivacity, they must be separated from imaginary ideas by a greater vivacity. Now we can take Hume's point that non-imaginary ideas and impressions are akin, but instead of looking for the character of the impression in the idea, we can ask whether some of the distinguishing marks of the non-imaginary idea cannot in fact be detected in the impression. The mark which we have noticed in any idea, which is a memory of the past or an anticipation of the future, is that while the idea itself is thought to belong to the passing moment of the present, the impressions of which it is the idea are not so regarded. Is there, then, anything parallel to this in impressions? If we look carefully at Hume's *Treatise*, we find that just as he suggested the starting-point for our inquiry so, too, he suggests the answer to this question. In Section VII of Part III he is asking what is the nature of that 'operation of the mind, which forms the belief of any matter of fact', and he refers to the operation as 'an idea assented to'

(p. 629). It is plain when we compare this part of the *Treatise* with the passage from page 86 already quoted (where he speaks of 'the belief or assent which always attends the memory and senses'), that an impression has in the strongest degree, according to Hume, the character of 'an idea assented to', and we are therefore justified in taking what he says about an idea assented to as applicable no less to impressions than to ideas in the limited sense.<sup>1</sup> Now what he says about such an idea is this:

'An idea assented to *feels* different from a fictitious idea, that the fancy alone presents to us; and this different feeling I endeavour to explain by calling it a superior *force*, or *vivacity*, or *solidity*, or *firmness*, or *steadiness*. This variety of terms, which may seem so unphilosophical, is intended only to express that act of the mind, which renders realities more present to us than fictions, causes them to weigh more in our thought, and gives them a superior influence on the passions and imagination. Provided we agree about the thing, 'tis needless to dispute about the terms.' Part III, Sect. VII (Addendum, p. 629).

Incidentally we may note how difficult it is for Hume to rid himself of language suggesting that he thinks of 'force' or any of its alternatives as a feeling which accompanies the consciousness of reality; whereas his contention is that the allusion to reality is erroneous and that the difference between the state wrongfully called consciousness of reality and the state which is called fancy is constituted simply by the presence of a certain feeling in the first, which is missing in the second. But the particular point of interest in the passage is the variety of terms which Hume offers in order to indicate the nature of the feeling. We should note that the last three suggest a different point of view to that suggested by the first two; whereas 'force' and 'vivacity' are more or less appropriate to a feeling, 'solidity' seems definitely to suggest the character of an object, and when 'firmness' and 'steadiness' are associated with solidity they reinforce this suggestion. It may be taken as significant that the double point of view seems to be present in Hume's own description. The significance appears the greater, when we think of the last three terms in contrast with the descriptions which he gives elsewhere of impressions; in other contexts the impressions 'are perishing existences and appear as such'. It seems fair to ask how in respect of the same impression

<sup>1</sup> Compare also the following statement which occurs in this section: 'All the perceptions of the mind are of two kinds, viz. impressions or ideas, which differ from each other only in their different degrees of force and vivacity.'

there can be consciousness of characters so much opposed as that of 'perishing existence' and of 'solidity, firmness, and steadiness' unless we suppose that there belongs to an impression exactly that duality which Hume rejected. The implication of this part of his description is that there lies within the impression the same distinction which appeared in memory or in the anticipation of the future; that is to say, even in impressions we evidently distinguish that of which the mind is conscious and its own consciousness.

We have still to consider Hume's second account of our consciousness, in which he allows that we have the idea of distinct and continuing objects and seeks to explain how this idea arises, seeing that it is not present in our original impressions and ideas. We may, however, postpone this question for the present and return meantime to the problem of the distinction between the real and the imaginary, since the passage we have been considering is very significant in this connexion. Hume himself, as we see from what he says, regards his five alternative terms as not merely expressing the character of 'realities' or 'ideas assented to' but as distinguishing such 'realities' or 'ideas assented to' from 'a fictitious idea that the fancy alone presents to us'. But when we reflect on the various terms, it seems that here again there is a difference between the first two and the last three. As regards the last three it does not appear that they contribute to the distinction between the real and the imaginary. We have only to apply Hume's own test. The mind can form for itself objects which it imagines to be 'solid' and 'firm' and 'steady'. Again, if we take the point which we have just seen to be implied in Hume's description, we must allow that in imagination no less than in 'belief' we distinguish the mind's own consciousness and that of which the mind is conscious; we can imagine something as being in the past or in the future and in doing so we inevitably distinguish our present consciousness and what we imagine. The fact of the matter is that precisely in so far as Hume's terms are an appropriate description of characteristics ascribed by the mind to objects which it thinks of as real, they do not, according to his doctrine, serve to mark the nature of objects 'assented to' in distinction from imaginary objects. This is a simple corollary of the observation that imagination can imitate any features with which the real is endowed.

On the other hand, there is *prima facie* more reason for claiming

that the first two terms contribute to the distinction between the real and the imaginary. The test is whether they are more appropriate to the mind's attitude towards objects of consciousness and less appropriate to objects of consciousness themselves. From this point of view the term 'vivacity', as we have already noted (see p. 6 above), is not altogether satisfactory, in so far as it suggests a character of the object of consciousness. On the other hand, it may be said on behalf of Hume that he doubtless intends the expression to indicate a kind of energy in our perceiving or a certain indescribable liveliness or sharpness of quality, which seems to come properly under the head of feeling. As regards the term 'force' Hume may have in mind the 'powerfulness' or magnitude of the feeling or sensation, and perhaps also a kind of compulsion to feel in certain ways or to have certain sensations. In either case his term has at least this to commend it, that it indicates a manner of consciousness rather than a character of the object of consciousness, and so far fits his own account of what is necessary in order to distinguish consciousness of the real from consciousness of the imaginary.

We need, however, to examine further the two conceptions of the difference between the real and imaginary conveyed by the terms 'vivacity' and 'force'. In doing so we shall perhaps find that the conceptions by themselves are inadequate unless we refer again to the question of the characteristics ascribed to real objects. We must keep in mind our previous caveat that though the problems are different it is not safe to assume that they are unrelated. Above all it must be remembered that whatever criterion we find, it will not be anything which is a substitute (as Hume supposed it might be) for the notion of real objects. What we are concerned with is the difference between an imaginary idea of real objects and an idea of real objects which, in Hume's language, is 'assented to'. First, then, it should be noticed that the difficulty of taking vivacity as a criterion is that imaginary ideas (as in dreams or hallucinations) may have as much vivacity as impressions themselves and more vivacity than memory of the real or inferences regarding the real which we accept without any hesitation. For this reason we turn to Hume's other term 'force' as an alternative or perhaps as a conception which should be combined with that of vivacity. If 'force' is taken to mean powerfulness of feeling it only fills out the conception of vivacity. If, on the other hand, it means something of the nature of a

compulsion which is attached to feeling and sensation or to the recollection of them, it is a different and perhaps useful conception. If it can be combined with vivacity as a mark of the non-imaginary, then, certain objects of imagination which would otherwise present a difficulty may be distinguished from non-imaginary objects because they do not possess *both* the characters of vivacity and compulsion. Imagination, recognized as such, though often faint is not always so; but where it is vivacious it may still be held to have the mark of imagination because it is obviously a free activity of the mind, lacking any element of compulsion. The trouble, however, is that even the combined marks of vivacity and compulsion do not *always* distinguish the real from the imaginary. The particular forms of imagination which are found in dreams and hallucinations once more cause a difficulty. For in dreams and hallucinations there is not merely vivacity but the consciousness that the experience which we are having is not produced by our own will.

It seems then that Hume's conception of vivacity and force as the marks which distinguish real from imaginary experience fails to meet the case of dreams or hallucinations. But there are certain points in regard to these forms of imagination which need to be considered; they seem to have importance for the problem generally and may affect our judgement on Hume's doctrine. It should be noticed that for the most part, while the dream or hallucination continues, the objects of which the mind is conscious are not taken to be imaginary or illusory. But within this supposed real experience there may be and often is a distinction made between features which are real and other features which are imaginary. Even in the dream or state of hallucination we may suppose that we are having sensible experience of some things and imagining others, and in this as in other respects the two states may provide while they last a complete imitation of ordinary experience. On the other hand, when the state of dreaming or hallucination has ceased, its true character as a state of imagination is recognized. What these facts suggest is that the drawing of the distinction between real and imaginary experience is a primitive or original factor in consciousness, and that imagination is always thought of as an imitation of real experience and subordinate to it. In normal waking experience we are conscious of ourselves on the one hand as being in a real world and on the other as exercising a faculty of imagination the products of which imitate but do not

belong to the constituents of the real world. If our state be such that imagination occupies the whole of consciousness, it must so far reproduce or imitate the nature of ordinary consciousness that some of its contents are taken for real and the mind can still make the distinction of real and imaginary. It cannot be affirmed that the mind in all its states is able to distinguish at once that which it finally regards as real and that which it finally regards as imaginary, but it seems that in every state it has at least an implicit recognition of the difference between regarding things as real and regarding them as imaginary. We may add that because the mind immediately recognizes not only the difference between real experience and imagination but also their affinity (in respect that imagination imitates real experience), it is able to entertain the notion of mistaking the imaginary for the real. It can thus make the transition from dreaming or hallucination to a waking or normal consciousness and say to itself that what it supposed to be real was not real but imaginary.

How do these considerations bear on the difficulty which we thought was created for Hume's account by the existence of such states as dreaming and hallucination, where consciousness seems to be both vivid and attended by a sense of compulsion? It seems that there is perhaps a way in which Hume can surmount the difficulty and preserve his account. In these states, so long as they last, the objects of consciousness are taken for real. But this being so, it can be said on behalf of Hume that the states should be regarded not as states of imagination but as states of belief or assent, and therefore they are not in conflict with the view that belief or assent, as opposed to imagination, is a state of consciousness marked by vivacity and force. We must notice and avoid a source of confusion in the discussion of real and imaginary experience, which may easily lead us to be unfair to Hume. Imagination has different activities, and in this context we should clearly distinguish an activity which is engaged in constructing objects without claim to reality, and another activity the purpose of which is to extend the mind's thought of the real, so as to include more than is given in actual sensation. The latter activity belongs to the province of belief or assent, and from Hume's point of view the contrast to be drawn is that of belief or assent and mere imagining, not that of imagination and some other form of consciousness. Indeed he is ready to think that all our experience is 'imagination', as in the passage quoted at the beginning

of this chapter where he speaks of our universe as a 'universe of the imagination'. What he is concerned with is the distinction within imagination between that which is merely imagined and that which is 'assented to', or (to return to the expression which we used above) between that which is regarded as imaginary and that which is regarded as real. If we keep to this point of view, we can see the justification for ranking the content of dreams and hallucinations under the head of that which is assented to or regarded as real.

So much may well be said in defence of Hume's position. But there are other difficulties in this matter which still remain. We have to consider not merely the nature of our consciousness while the dream or hallucination continues, but our attitude towards the contents of the dream or hallucination when it has ceased. We first assent, and afterwards withhold assent. How does Hume's statement that the assent is constituted by the vivacity and force of our consciousness fit in with the subsequent withdrawal of assent? It does not seem that what is subsequently denied is the vivacity and force of the dream or hallucination. It is true that it may not appear quite so vivid or forceful in recollection as at the time of its occurrence; but this applies also to recollection of actual experience. We do not suppose the actual experiences were not vivid because they lose vividness in memory. So, too, we can remember the dream or hallucination as having been vivid; and to do so seems in no way incompatible with the recognition that it was just imagination.

There is, however, another suggestion which can be put forward in support of Hume's doctrine. It may be said that it is unfair to press the meaning of the particular expressions which he uses. His purpose in offering alternative expressions, as he indicates himself, is to make the point that there is an indescribable, but easily recognized, difference in our consciousness when we are imagining and when we are believing, or assenting. 'Vivacity' and 'force' sometimes seem to indicate features in which the difference consists, but not always. He makes the point himself in the Appendix to the *Treatise* (p. 636), where in commenting on his use of the terms 'vivacity' and 'force' he says: 'I believe there are other differences among ideas which cannot properly be comprehended under these terms. Had I said that two ideas of the same object can only be different by their different *feeling*, I should have been nearer the truth.' It is better then to say that we have

an immediate recognition of the difference without attempting to give it a name. Following this line of thought we can say that during the dream or hallucination we have the feeling of assent, whereas afterwards (with the return, so to speak, of the full tide of consciousness)<sup>1</sup> we have no more than the feeling of imagination and assent is withdrawn. Such a way of regarding the matter, however, does not really make Hume's position more intelligible. Instead it brings out the fundamental objection to his account. The change from the one state to the other is not merely a change of feeling ; it carries with it a change of thinking about the objects of consciousness and the assigning to them of a different status. We may feel differently when we imagine and when we assent, but we can see that the difference of feeling is not the whole difference if we ask what we mean when we say that we 'refuse assent' to something which we imagine. We can only answer that when we refuse assent we judge that the objects which are imagined to be real are not in fact real ; we imagine them to be real but do not believe them to be real. The fact of the matter is that whereas Hume's account purports to give the difference between imagining and believing and between the objects of each in terms of feeling, it is only plausible so long as the terms in which he describes the feeling are made to apply also to the objects of consciousness. He needs to say that when we refuse assent to the objects of imagination, we do not regard them as having vividness or force, or solidity, firmness, and steadiness. We noticed earlier (see p. 12 above) that the last three terms in particular suggest this reference to the objects of consciousness and therefore do not fit Hume's attempt to allow only a difference of feeling between imagination and assent. But when we examine the result of taking him at his word and keeping strictly to a difference of feeling, we find that his doctrine fails to accord with the facts about the nature of consciousness. We come then to the point that any account of the difference between imagining and assenting must allow that we have a conception of a difference of status between the objects of imagining and the objects of assent or belief, and that this conception of a difference of status is no other than the conception of the difference between what is real or existent and what is not. There is a case to be made for saying (with qualifications which we

<sup>1</sup> It is important always to remember that dreaming occurs when the senses are inactive or nearly so, and that hallucination is connected with some disorder of consciousness.

can consider later) that we immediately recognize the difference between imagining and perceiving (which is the clearest form of assent), but we must add that imagining and perceiving are accompanied by a different manner of thinking about the objects which are present respectively to imagination and perception.

If we take the foregoing view of the matter, certain questions present themselves. In the first place when we say that in imagining and assenting a different status is attributed to the objects of consciousness in the two cases, it may seem that we contradict one of Hume's contentions which we previously held to be valid. Hume in effect contends (see p. 5 above) that any determinate features which we ascribe to real objects can be imitated in imagination, and that in consequence the difference between the imaginary and the real cannot be expressed in terms of features belonging to the real and not to the imaginary. But though this is true, if it is interpreted in a certain way, there is another point to be borne in mind, which alters the nature of the problem. If we are aware that we are imagining it is plain that some other faculty than imagination is at work, and it can only be the faculty which judges in regard to reality and pronounces on the difference between the real and the unreal. The concurrent operation of this faculty at the time when we are aware of our own imagination is variously manifested. We are aware that the act of imagining is a reality; we are also aware of real things and distinguish them from the things which we imagine; and we pronounce the contents of our imagination to be unreal. (Where, on the other hand, the activity of imagination, as we noticed above, is employed in supplementing the features of the real which are given in sensation, we may believe that what is imagined is real) While therefore we can say with Hume, so long as we think of imagination entirely by itself, that imagination may endow its products with all the features of reality, we cannot speak in the same way of the whole state of consciousness in which we imagine and are aware that we are imagining. Our consciousness as a whole supplements its imagination of things as real with the judgement in certain cases that they are not so, and in doing this it refuses to endow them with those features which constitute our conception of reality.

We find ourselves thus brought again to ask what is the content of the notion of real existence, and we can consider how the pro-

blem is affected by the points we have recently discussed. In the consciousness which judges (or 'assents') the existence of objects which are imagined as real is denied or affirmed. Such denial or affirmation does not of course refer to the presence of the objects in the imaginative consciousness; for though it is possible that there may be mistakes of memory in regard to our past imagination, so that we think we imagined something but decide that we did not, denial (or affirmation) of this kind is a different matter from that which we are considering. If we keep to the question of what we think (distinguishing this question, as Hume in the earlier part of the *Treatise* did not, from that of the philosophical difficulties which our thought involves) it seems clear that we think there is an order of objects or contents of consciousness which includes those objects which we judge to be real, and does not include all imagined objects. The fact that imagined objects are imagined as being within this order does not run counter to this way of thinking, because their claim is not settled by imagination and it rests with the judging consciousness to uphold or reject it. But if this is what we think, we cannot say with Hume that the notion of 'being real' has no other meaning than that of being the content or object of consciousness; for there must be some other meaning which we give to the notion of reality when we hold that some objects of consciousness are real and others (the purely imaginary) are not. Can we then indicate what this meaning is, so that it can be applied to the distinction of imagination and assent as we now conceive it? We may answer this question by recalling our discussion of Hume's doctrine of the simplicity of impressions. If it is fair to say in criticism of Hume that in our impressions and ideas we in fact distinguish consciousness and the objects of consciousness—the moments of consciousness being regarded as perishing existences, while the objects of consciousness are not thought of as having an existence which is necessarily confined to the perishing moments in which we are aware of them—it is evident that we are in a position to indicate at least some part of what is implied when reality is denied to the objects of imagination. It can be said that though imagination sets before itself objects which it imagines as having an existence not confined to the moments in which they are present to consciousness, the judging or assenting faculty does not necessarily endorse the claim which imagination makes, but may decide instead that these objects are distinguished from real objects precisely because they cannot be regarded as other than existences

which perish when the moment of consciousness perishes. In Hume's account it is difficult to see how objects so vividly imagined that they are taken for real (as in dreams and hallucinations) can subsequently be regarded as unreal. But if we allow this different conception of what is contained in the notion of reality, the particular difficulty which these cases present for Hume seems to be avoided.

At this point we may properly refer to a matter in regard to which our discussion has been ambiguous. It may be asked whether the problem we have been considering is the more general problem of the consciousness of anything, as real, or the particular problem of the consciousness of real objects, by which is meant real physical objects or objects to space. The answer is that the line of reflection followed applies directly to the latter problem, but is applicable also to the former, with some modification of statement. Let us take a feeling of pain as an example of something which I regard as real though it is not a physical object. Besides being conscious of feeling pain I can imagine myself as feeling pain and I recognize immediately the difference between the two states. Now when I imagine feeling a pain, what character is there in the object of imagination (the feeling of pain) which is imagined but not believed or 'assented to'? When this question is put in regard to the physical object which is imagined as real but not accepted as real, it is possible to say that the object is imagined as outlasting the moment of imagining, but is not assented to in this character. The solution cannot be given in quite the same form with reference to the feeling. A feeling which is assented to is not thought of as outlasting the moment of consciousness of the feeling. We cannot therefore say that imagination endows it with this character which belief refuses to accept. But there is nevertheless a solution which is not far removed from the other. Equally with the other it turns on the part played by the notion of time. A pain which is assented to as real is regarded as having a determinate place in the time order; the imaginary pain is imagined as having such a place, but the claim is not assented to. Consequently when I think of the feeling of pain afterwards I give it a date in time different from the date of my consciousness of it in idea, i.e. different from the date of my present consciousness of it in memory. On the other hand, I do not afterwards remember and date the imagined feeling of pain. All I can do is to remember and date the act of imagination. In

this case then, just as in respect of the physical object, the notion of reality involves the distinction of consciousness and that of which we are conscious, a distinction which operates through certain conceptions of the relation of both to time. And as regards the further question of the difference between the real feeling and the imaginary feeling, the answer must again, as in the other case, be sought in our ability to recognize that it is one thing merely to imagine this distinction (i.e. the distinction of consciousness and that of which we are conscious) together with the relations to the time order with which it is connected, and another thing to judge it to be true or to assent to it. If this account of our notion of the reality of a feeling seems too elaborate, we must notice why a simpler account is insufficient. It may seem that, though there are objections to explaining our notion of a real physical object in terms simply of the vivacity of our impressions or ideas, these objections do not apply when we have to explain the notion of a real feeling. Is it not enough to say that the feeling which is assented to as real is simply a feeling more vividly felt than an imagined feeling? But it is a question of the implications of the expression 'assented to as real', and we see that more is implied than vividness so soon as we notice that we assent to a past and remembered feeling as real. When this happens, there need be no vividness in our present consciousness of the feeling. It may be that we must be conscious of the feeling as having been vivid, but we could not be conscious of it as *having been* vivid unless we had in mind the relations to time which we have found to be the implications of the notion of reality, and therefore of assent to reality. If it is apparent that these notions are implied in the memory of the feeling, we must hold that they belong to the original experience. It is only because we experience the feeling as standing in certain relations that we can remember it in these relations afterwards.

Whether then we have in mind real physical objects or intend a more general application of the term 'reality' which would cover also real mental states, it seems that we may disregard Hume's contention (noticed on p. 5 above) that 'we have no abstract idea of existence, distinguishable and separable from the idea of particular objects'. If it is part of his general doctrine regarding universal concepts, that doctrine itself is not one which commands assent. If he means only that no content can be found for the idea, we have already begun to see part of the content

which can be given to it. As regards his further argument that if we had such an idea 'it would be in a man's power to believe what he pleased' (since the mind can unite, mix and vary its ideas as it pleases), we have seen that the argument is due to an erroneous conception of the problem. It is true that the mind can imagine real objects as it pleases, but it does not follow that it can believe in them as it pleases. Indeed, we may notice that Hume's own doctrine in regard to the distinction between imagination and belief provides an answer to what he says. When our ideas are faint, he contends, we are imagining; when they have vivacity or force we believe. If then our idea of the existence of a given object happened to be faint, we should not be able to believe in it, however much it would please us to do so.

We now come to Hume's second account of our consciousness in which he recognizes that we in fact have the idea of distinct or independent and external existents. He does not consider whether the recognition of the presence of this idea affects his views on the idea of existence or on belief or on the distinction of the real and the imaginary, but instead he addresses himself at once to the question how the idea may be supposed to arise. We shall have to examine later the question, which he neglects, of the consistency of his views as a whole, but in the first place we will consider how he attempts to explain the origin of the idea of external existents. We may notice that there seems to be an obscure anticipation of the problem in Part II, Section VI (p. 68), where he says:

'The farthest we can go towards a conception of external objects, when supposed *specifically* different from our perceptions, is to form a relative idea of them without pretending to comprehend the related objects. Generally speaking, we do not suppose them specifically different; but only attribute to them different relations, connexions, and durations. But of this more fully hereafter.'

The concluding words plainly refer to Part IV, Section II, where under the head of 'Scepticism with regard to the Senses' he deals with the problems raised by the notion of 'the continued and distinct existence of body'. The remarks in themselves are obscure and should be read in conjunction with what he says on page 189 in the later section:

'If our senses, therefore, suggest any idea of distinct existences, they must convey the impressions as those very existences, by a kind of

fallacy and illusion. Upon this head we may observe, that all sensations are felt by the mind, such as they really are, and that when we doubt whether they present themselves as distinct objects, or as mere impressions, the difficulty is not concerning their nature, but concerning their relations and situation.'

In the earlier passage Hume is thinking of two alternatives and his meaning is probably that either we think of objects as being different from perceptions, in which case we can form no idea of the objects but can only think of them as standing in certain relations to perceptions, e.g. a causal relation; or we think of objects as being our perceptions, but our perceptions endowed with a new character so that, for example, they are now thought of as enduring and not as perishing existences. For the full statement, however, of Hume's view it is necessary, as he says, to look to Part IV.

In Part IV the general point which should be especially noticed is how clearly he now asserts that our notion of external body is connected with the thought of a character which, on his view, is incompatible with the nature of our impressions and ideas. When we think of external body we think of an identity which stands in contrast to the multiplicity of our impressions and of continuity in contrast to the perishing nature of impressions. The connexion of the two ideas of identity and continuity is explained in the interesting passage (p. 201) on the *principium individuationis* or principle of identity in which he points out that the view of any one object is not sufficient to convey the idea of identity, nor can a multiplicity of objects convey it; there must be a medium between numbers and units, and the medium can only be the idea of time or duration. The identity which we attribute to objects is thus seen to be dependent on their invariableness and uninterruptedness; in other words, we have the notion of identity only because we think of objects as continuous. All this shows that Hume is recognizing that our idea of externally existent objects is dependent on the contrast we make between the duration of objects and the moments in which we are conscious of them. It should be noticed that he only applies his remarks to the idea of external existence and overlooks what there seems to be in common in the idea of existence as applied on the one hand to external objects and on the other to internal states. (On this point reference may be made to what is said above, pp. 20-21.) Indeed he thinks that our consciousness of feelings, for example, is so far removed

from any connexion with the ideas which enter into our concepts of external existence that factors which might be supposed to constitute at least in part our consciousness of external objects are rejected because they are applicable also to feelings. Thus the possible factors of 'involuntariness of certain impressions' and 'superior force and violence' are rejected on this ground (p. 194). He does not suppose that we have any general idea of existence which needs explanation.

But keeping to the notion of external existence Hume finds difficulty enough. The crux is how to explain the origin of the thought of continued and distinct existences when we are only aware of impressions and ideas which are perishing existences and 'appear as such'. His solution, put shortly, is as follows. In the first instance through the operation of a tendency of the imagination we cease to think that certain impressions are momentary and perishing existences, as in fact they are. There is a 'fiction of the imagination' which 'almost universally takes place; and 'tis by means of it that a simple object, placed before us, and surveyed for any time without our discovering in it any interruption or variation, is able to give us a notion of identity' (p. 201). The process is carried still further when the idea of identity or continuity is entertained despite the fact of interruption in the sequence of unvarying impressions. This happens through the power of the relation of resemblance which makes the mind 'pass with facility' from one idea or impression to another. It is the constancy of certain impressions which leads us to think of them as objects with a continued existence, rather than as impressions whose existence depends upon our perceptions. 'Those mountains, and houses, and trees which lie at present under my eye, have always appeared to me in the same order; and when I lose sight of them by shutting my eyes or turning my head, I soon after find them return upon me without the least alteration' (p. 194). But there is yet a further step, depending on what Hume refers to as the 'coherence' of our impressions. His account under this head seems to contain various points which are not clearly distinguished. First there is presupposed the point that we may obtain from a series of impressions the idea of an identical object, even though the different impressions are not unvarying nor even closely resembling each other; provided that the change from each impression to the next is slight and gradual, the object of which we are thinking, though greatly changed at the end of the series, may

still be regarded as the same. The second point which Hume has in mind is that we come to think of the series of changes as being regular and necessary, or, in other words, connected with the idea of causation. 'Bodies', he says, 'often change their position and qualities, and, after a little absence or interruption, may become hardly knowable. But here 'tis observable, that even in these changes they preserve a *coherence*, and have a regular dependence on each other; which is the foundation of a kind of reasoning from causation, and produces the opinion of their continued existence' (p 195). As the account goes on it is evident that Hume is thinking not merely of the coherent changes in the qualities or nature of one and the same object, but of the regular and necessary sequences in which different objects are related to each other. The way in which the opinion of the continued existence of objects is founded on 'a kind of reasoning from causation' is that inasmuch as we suppose a certain object or state of an object is consequent on another object, we suppose on the appearance of the first the existence of the second, even though the second has not been given to us in any impression, or at least the particular state of the second which is required by the causal sequence has not been so given. In this way we explain a much more remarkable character of our experience than the mind's habit of filling in the intervals between like impressions with the supposition of a continuing object with unchanged features. We can understand how the mind supplements its experience with a whole world of objects not only previous to but concurrent with its impressions and following after them. Hume himself gives an instance, with details described in his usual vivid and telling way, which shows how far the mind carries this process (p. 196).

Now there seem to be certain difficulties in this account which it is fair to say that Hume in part sees. In the first place there is a difficulty, raised by Hume's other doctrines, in regard to the initial step which he describes. Consciousness of time, he thinks, is only given in change, and consequently it is hard to see how the notion of something enduring or persisting in time arises from the survey of an uninterrupted and unvarying object or perception. Strictly speaking we should suppose, according to this view, that such a survey is no less 'momentary' than any other perception. We are inclined to ask about Hume's 'momentary' impressions for what length of time we should think of them as enduring; but his answer would be that in themselves they have no duration at all,

inasmuch as they do not convey the notion of time. Similarly the survey of the uninterrupted and unvarying object or perception should be 'momentary' inasmuch as it can be accompanied by no consciousness of time and duration. All this Hume sees (pp. 200, 201). His solution is that though the object or perception itself is unvarying, the notion of time is given by coexistent objects which are changing while it remains the same: 'by a fiction of the imagination . . . the unchangeable object is supposed to participate of the changes of the co-existent objects, and in particular of that of our perceptions' (p. 201). But the question may be raised whether it does not seem more reasonable to suppose that if the unchangeable object is thus seen in relation to the changes of coexistent objects it will itself become divided into discrete moments and its persistence will be lost. There seems to be something like a dilemma; relation to other perceptions which vary may be expected to introduce discreteness in the unvarying perceptions, while without such relation there can be no idea of duration. In either case the notion of the enduring objects fails to be provided.

The difficulty we have been considering is connected with the extreme subjectivity of Hume's notion of time, and might be held to disappear if a different view of time were taken. But, as we shall see in the study of Kant's doctrines, there would be much else involved if a different status were accorded to the time series. However that may be, we may find in Hume's account other and perhaps more serious difficulties which are not connected with his view of time. In the first place this account of the way in which we acquire the notion of identical objects seems to presuppose that we have the notion already. Certain remarks made by Hume should be noticed in this connexion. 'That I may avoid', he says, 'all ambiguity and confusion on this head, I shall observe, that I here account for the opinions and beliefs of the vulgar with regard to the existence of body; and therefore must entirely conform myself to this manner of thinking and of expressing themselves.' A few sentences later he continues: 'In order to accommodate myself to their notions, I shall at first suppose that there is only one existence, which I shall call indifferently *object* or *perception*, according as it shall seem best to suit my purpose, understanding by both of them what any common man means by a hat, or shoe, or stone, or any other impression conveyed to him by his senses. I shall be sure to give warning when I return to a more philosophical way of speaking and thinking' (p. 202). Hume's desire to

avoid confusion meets with ill success. The trouble is that for any common man the connotation of the word 'object' includes the notion of something which, being one and the same, can be apprehended in different perceptions and may exist before the perceptions and continue after them, and in these respects the connotation is quite different from that of the word 'perception'. When therefore Hume uses the word 'object' in his account, we must recognize that there is the danger of a fallacy; and it does not seem that he avoids it. The way in which the fallacy comes about can be seen if we consider Hume's treatment of the problem connected with the ascription of identity. He says, rightly enough, that 'we cannot, in any propriety of speech, say that an object is the same with itself, unless we mean that the object existent at one time is the same with itself existent at another' (p. 201). From this point of view the problem how we come to ascribe identity may be interpreted as the problem how we come to suppose that the object which we now perceive is the same as the object which we perceived before, or why we suppose that an object now perceived is the same as an object capable of having been perceived before. It is the problem thus interpreted which Hume is seen to be answering in his account of the ascription of identity. But plainly it is presupposed that there already exists some distinction between objects and perceptions; the asking of the question itself implies that we think this to be so. If it be granted that there exist the notions of object and perception with the connotations explained above, we can ask how we come to determine the relations of objects and different perceptions, and Hume's references in this connexion to constancy and coherence contain much that is true. But he has not explained how we come to have the notion of an object, and his failure is disguised by his use of the word 'object' in describing the state of affairs which is supposed to exist before we have the notion. The common man, to whom he refers, will say that an object now perceived is numerically the same as an object perceived before, but he will not say that a present perception is numerically the same as a past perception.

The second difficulty concerns the relation of what Hume is here saying to his doctrines regarding our idea of causality. Here, as so often, he starts a line of thought which shows some part of the difficulty though not the whole. He points out with great clearness (p. 197) that though the attribution of continued

existence to objects on the basis of coherence, 'derived', as it is, 'from custom and regulated by past experience', seems to be of the same nature as our reasonings concerning causes and effects, the two are at bottom very different. What we do, according to his account, in this case, is to suppose a greater degree of coherence than any which has been experienced and to 'bestow on the objects a greater regularity than what is observed in our mere perceptions'. On the other hand, so far as the notion of causality is to be explained by habit, it is impossible that any habit should exceed the degree of regularity which belongs to a succession of perceptions. How then is it we look for greater coherence than we have actually found, or make the supposition of the continued existence of objects in order to supply the coherence which is not forthcoming in our perceptions? Hume's answer is given in a simile: 'The imagination, when set into any train of thinking, is apt to continue even when its object fails it, and like a galley put in motion by the oars, carries on its course without any more impulse' (p. 198). He reminds us at the same time that he has used the same explanation in examining the foundation of mathematics. The passage is interesting because it seems to approach the Kantian view that the mind is not simply receptive in its experience, but brings with it certain principles by which experience is judged and interpreted. But of course there is the wide difference that whereas Kant (and before him Plato) would say that these principles belong to the original working of the mind, Hume thinks that they are produced in the imagination by the course of experience. In judging the merits of the two views it is difficult to believe that in the sphere of mathematics, at any rate, Hume's position can be upheld and that such interpretative principles or ideas as the idea of equality or of a straight line or a circle can be thought to be produced in the course of experience, with a gradually increasing approximation to accuracy. And if Hume's account is unsatisfactory in this sphere, there is at least a *prima-facie* case for considering whether the rival view may not be a better explanation of other interpretative principles also, the idea of coherence being among them.

This discussion which we find in Hume may well lead us to reflect further on the bearing of what he is now saying on his view of causality. Hume has made it clear that for the purpose of his theory it is necessary to suppose that before we think of the multiplicity of enduring objects which are taken to exist outside our

perceptions, we must have had so forcible an expression of regularity in the perceptions themselves that the belief in regularity or necessary connexion makes us invent the objects. In other words, the thought of continuing objects is dependent on the prior conviction of necessary connexion which comes from the regularity of our experience. But if this is so, the question arises whether we can with the least plausibility maintain that our experience would appear to us to be regular if the thought of the objects which supplement our actual impressions were eliminated. It must be remembered that even those impressions which are given in an uninterrupted (or slightly interrupted) succession, and do not vary, will only appear to be a single impression which lasts for a longer time than impressions usually do. It seems obvious that our impressions would be, in Kant's language, a mere 'phantasmagoria' and by no means a system of orderly and regular successions such as would lead the imagination to the thought of necessary connexion. In reading Hume we should study the chapter on causality, carefully eliminating the notion of objects. If we do this and then turn to the chapter on 'Scepticism with regard to the Senses', it is surely difficult to avoid the conclusion that in explaining the idea of causality Hume presupposes that we have the idea of continuing and independent objects, and in explaining the idea of objects he presupposes that we have the idea of causality. It is only by this procedure that he lends plausibility to his contention that both these ideas are produced gradually in the course of our experience. But if no better case can be made, it looks as if one at least of the two ideas must be allowed to be primitive in our consciousness. In the end it may be necessary to go even further and to say not merely that one is primitive, but that both are so.

There are other features of interest in Hume's account. In particular there is the curious passage (p. 207) (reminding us of certain modern speculations) in which he asks the question how we can come to think that a perception has a continued existence when we are not feeling or seeing. The question is prompted by his resolute rejection of the philosophical hypothesis (which he calls 'a monstrous offspring of two principles which are contrary to each other' (p. 215)) that our perceptions either are, or are naturally thought to be, representations or images of external objects; perceptions and objects must always be regarded not as two things but as one and the same. We can, he thinks, 'satisfy ourselves in

supposing a perception to be absent from the mind without being annihilated' in the following manner:

'we may observe that what we call a *mind*, is nothing but a heap or collection of different perceptions, united together by certain relations, and supposed, though falsely, to be endowed with a perfect simplicity and identity. Now, as every perception is distinguishable from another, and may be considered as separately existent; it evidently follows, that there is no absurdity in separating any particular perception from the mind; that is, in breaking off all its relations with that connected mass of perceptions which constitute a thinking being.'

Hume has not gone far enough into the question of the unity of consciousness to make it necessary to take what he says very seriously. But we can perhaps so far agree with him as to think that there may be perceptions of which the mind is not conscious. To admit this, however, is not really to solve the problem which Hume has raised. When we think of objects which must have been existing in order to cause the state of affairs given in present experience, we do not necessarily suppose that they were objects unconsciously perceived. For it is only in a comparatively small number of such cases that we think of the objects as being so situated as to satisfy the conditions of perceptions. When I return to my room after an absence and find that the fire which had just been lighted is now a glowing mass or reduced to ashes, I do not think that the intervening stages were unconscious perceptions, because I reflect that I could not have the perceptions when I was absent from the room. If Hume says that we can think of the unconscious perceptions as not subject to the conditions and relations which apply to conscious perceptions (so that in the instance given I might be having such unconscious perceptions of the fire while I was absent from the room), this view would seem to be destructive of the idea of coherence on which his whole account is dependent. It does not then appear in this respect more than in the others which we have considered that Hume has surmounted the difficulties which attend his position. But it must at least be said for him that he has seen some of the difficulties of his idealist doctrine and the necessity of providing an answer to them.

We have seen that there are apparently two accounts of the nature of our consciousness to be found in Hume. In the one he disregards the idea of distinct or external objects, and seeks to

describe without reference to it our impressions and ideas, the distinction of the real and the imaginary, and the nature of belief. In the second he explicitly recognizes the presence of this idea in our consciousness and sets himself the task of explaining how it arises. The question which we shall now consider is whether the two accounts are distinguished and clearly related in his doctrine as a whole. We can take up the matter best by examining from this point of view the development of his theory of belief and his closely related views on the subject of causality.

In his initial view of belief Hume thinks that the most complete form of believing is to have an impression and that ideas are beliefs in so far as they approximate to the nature of impressions. He refers, however, at a later stage to some states of consciousness which might also be called belief, but do not fall under this description. In Part III, Section XI (p. 124), he tells us that it is convenient 'to distinguish human reason into three kinds, viz: that *from knowledge, from proofs and from probabilities*'.<sup>1</sup> He goes on to say, 'By knowledge, I mean the assurance arising from the comparison of ideas. By proofs, those arguments which are derived from the relation of cause and effect, and which are entirely free from doubt and uncertainty. By probability, that evidence which is still attended with uncertainty.' Further light on the distinction between the first of these states of consciousness and the other two is obtained if we refer to an earlier passage. In Section VII of Part III (p. 95) he asks the question, 'Wherein consists the difference betwixt believing and disbelieving any proposition?' and he begins his answer as follows:

'The answer is easy with regard to propositions which are proved by intuition or demonstration. In that case the person who assents not only conceives the ideas according to the proposition, but is necessarily determined to conceive them in that particular manner, either immediately or by the interposition of other ideas. Whatever is absurd is unintelligible; nor is it possible for the imagination to conceive anything contrary to a demonstration. But as, in reasonings from causation, and concerning matters of fact, this absolute necessity cannot take place, and the imagination is free to conceive both sides of the question, I still ask, *wherein consists the difference betwixt incredulity and belief?* since in both cases the conception of the idea is equally possible and requisite.'

Clearly we need take no exception to Hume's recognition that

<sup>1</sup> We need not regard here the distinction between reason from proofs and reason from probabilities. These are two forms of the second kind of belief.

there is a difference between belief in propositions to which we assent because the nature of our intelligence compels assent to them, and belief in what he calls matters of fact. We may observe in passing a point which Hume neglects, viz. that ideas, which are assented to or believed, of the first kind do not bear the mark of vivacity which is held to characterize ideas of the second kind, which are believed, if by vivacity is meant approximation to the nature of an impression. Belief in propositions which express the intelligible nature of things or of their relations, or the principles which govern them, is not a weaker form of sense perception. Even if it can be said that we have impressions (for example) of something being double of something else or impressions of the circular, the ideas of doubleness and circularity and their implications are not so related to the impressions. It would be preferable to say that here the ideas are more vivid than the impressions, in the sense at any rate that, in the language of Descartes, they are clearer and more distinct. But what we need now to consider more particularly is the way in which Hume's distinction reacts on his account of the second kind of belief. The noticeable point is that he can only describe this belief in a way which distinguishes it from the other, by introducing the reference to matters of fact or the existence of objects which he expressly eliminated in his earlier account of belief.

The point is made clear by the language of the passages already quoted in which Hume expounds the distinction of the two kinds of belief. The distinction, we see, turns directly on the reference to matters of fact in the second kind of belief. The same passages also indicate the connexion of this kind of belief with our idea of causality. It is therefore not surprising to find that the notion of existence or reality is employed throughout his account of belief which is connected with the idea of causality. We may consider the following statement in Section IX of Part III.

'Of these impressions', Hume writes, 'or ideas of the memory, we form a kind of system, comprehending whatever we remember to have been present, either to our internal perception or senses; and every particular of that system, joined to the present impressions, we are pleased to call a *reality*. But the mind stops not here. For finding that with this system of perceptions there is another connected by custom or, if you will, by the relation of cause or effect, it proceeds to the consideration of their ideas, and as it feels that 'tis in a manner necessarily determined to view these particular ideas and that the custom or relation by

which it is determined admits not the least change, it forms them into a new system, which it likewise dignifies with the title of *realities*. The first of these systems is the object of the memory and senses; the second of the judgment. 'Tis this latter principle which peoples the world and brings us acquainted with such existences as by their removal in time and place lie beyond the reach of the senses and memory. By means of it I paint the universe in my imagination and fix my attention on every part of it I please. . . . All this and everything else which I believe are nothing but ideas; though by their force and settled order, arising from custom and the relation of cause and effect, they distinguish themselves from the ideas which are merely the offspring of the imagination'<sup>1</sup> (p. 108).

The nature of the belief referred to in this passage is plainly different from that of the belief described in the earlier stage of the *Treatise* where Hume wished to eliminate the idea of existence or reality. In particular the introduction of the notion that the judgement decides which amongst our ideas should be admitted into the system of realities and which should not, is very significant. An account of belief which connects it with a reflective operation of this kind is altogether different from an account which is simply in terms of the degree of vivacity belonging to an idea. It is true that Hume has an allusion to the 'force' of the ideas believed and that force is one of his equivalents of vivacity; but it is one thing to hold that the judgement decides whether ideas belong to the system of realities or are merely imaginary by reference to their force, and another thing to say that a forceful idea is itself belief. It must be the former view which Hume implies if what he says is consistent with the rest of the passage. We should notice, too, that the force referred to is now coupled with the notion of a settled order, which is said to arise from custom and the relation of cause and effect. If Hume means that the judgement makes its decision after reflection on the settled order of its ideas, we again have something very different from the account of belief as an un-reflective state of consciousness.

When we have recognized that, apart from what he says about that form of belief which is based directly on the principles of our intelligence, Hume offers two different accounts of our belief in

<sup>1</sup> We shall return to this passage later when we follow the stages in the development of Hume's account of the belief which is connected with the idea of causality. At this stage we only need to observe the prominence which Hume gives here to the idea of reality. The conflicting strains in his thought will be examined when we consider his exposition as a whole.

matters of fact, we may ask whether anything further results from this ambiguity in his doctrine. If in the course of the *Treatise* he simply changes from one doctrine to another which seems to be better, we can ignore the earlier, and should not be prejudiced against accepting the later doctrine. But it does not seem that the matter stands thus. In his discussion of the significance and origin of the idea of causality it appears that the account which he gives of the attendant belief moves uncertainly between the doctrine which recognizes that there is present in our consciousness the idea of external existents and the doctrine which does not. Moreover, there is the further complication that part of what Hume says seems to be more appropriate to the different kind of belief which he recognizes is connected with the principles of our thinking. We must consider certain points in his account in order to see whether this general view of it is justified.

Let us first notice that in Section V of Part III which deals with 'the impressions of the senses and memory' the way in which the two are distinguished belongs unambiguously to Hume's earlier doctrine. 'Since therefore', Hume writes, 'the memory is known, neither by the order of its *complex* ideas, nor the nature of its *simple* ones; it follows that the difference betwixt it and the imagination lies in its superior force and vivacity' (p. 85). Again, later in the section: 'Thus it appears, that the *belief* or *assent*, which always attends the memory and senses, is nothing but the vivacity of those perceptions they present; and that this alone distinguishes them from the imagination. To believe is in this case to feel an immediate impression of the senses, or a repetition of that impression in the memory.'<sup>1</sup> It will be observed that there is no recognition of the point that whatever may be said of that of which we are conscious in an impression, a remembered fact does not present itself as something internal to the remembering consciousness, for the simple reason that the fact is thought to belong to one period of time and the consciousness of it to another. This is why belief in the past cannot be called, as Hume calls it, 'a repetition of an impression in the memory', and again why it is misleading to classify memory as an impression, if the nature of an impression is what Hume thinks it to be. If Hume intends anywhere to recognize a form of belief which is connected with the

<sup>1</sup> This passage was noticed before in connexion with Hume's first account of belief; it clearly belongs to the earlier doctrine, and could therefore be used to illustrate it.

thought of existents distinct from our consciousness of them, we should expect him to allow that the belief which attends memory falls under this head.

The important result which follows from this ignoring of all reference, not only in impressions, but also in memory, to an existent distinct from present consciousness, is that Hume continues to hold the view that belief or assent is nothing but the vivacity of perceptions, whether they are perceptions of the senses or perceptions of the memory. But it is noticeable that an ambiguity appears in his language. He concludes the section with the words: 'Tis merely the force and liveliness of the perception which constitutes the first act of the judgment, and lays the foundation of that reasoning which we build upon it, when we trace the relation of cause and effect.' It is difficult to see how force or liveliness can constitute an act of judgement, though it may be said to lay the foundation of judgement or of reasoning, if we draw a conclusion from it. It is this ambiguity which we shall find persisting in Hume's account of the belief connected with the idea of causality, and perhaps lending it the degree of plausibility which it possesses.

The next section (Section VI) is entitled 'Of the Inference from the Impression to the Idea', and Hume here explains that he is concerned with 'the transition from an impression present to the memory or senses to the idea of an object, which we call cause or effect'. It seems that this description can cover three points which may need explanation: how it is that when an impression is present we have a certain idea; how we come to judge that there is an object of the idea, since we may have ideas without judging that there are objects of the ideas; and how the thought arises that there is a necessary connexion between one object and another. That Hume explicitly recognizes the second question seems plain, when he writes a little later in the same section: 'The idea of cause and effect is derived from *experience*, which informs us that such particular objects, in all past instances, have been constantly conjoined with each other; and as an object similar to one of these is supposed to be immediately present in its impression, we thence presume on the existence of one similar to its usual attendant' (p. 90). But the matter becomes less plain as he proceeds. Again in the same section he speaks of the mind passing 'from the idea or impression of one object to the idea or belief of another', as if 'idea' and 'belief' were the same thing and there was no

distinction between the first and the second question. Similarly at the end of the section he says that 'we may establish this as one part of the definition of an opinion or belief, that 'tis *an idea related to or associated with a present impression*'. All reference to the thought that there is an object of the idea has been omitted from the definition which he offers. '

It is noticeable, however, that in the passage just referred to Hume only offers 'one part' of the definition of a belief. In the next section (Section VII) he undertakes immediately the task of supplying what was missing. 'The idea of an object', he explains, 'is an essential part of the belief of it, but not the whole.' For 'we conceive many things which we do not believe'. He then introduces exactly the reference which we missed before to the existence of the object: "Tis evident that all reasonings from causes or effects terminate in conclusions concerning matters of fact; that is concerning the existence of objects or of their qualities.' It seems accordingly that all is now clear again. But what follows is the complete reaffirmation of the doctrine of Part II (Section VI) regarding the idea of existence and the consequent resolution of the difference between an idea merely conceived and an idea believed into a difference of liveliness and nothing else. It appears that what was missing from the earlier definition was simply a reference to this liveliness; 'An opinion therefore or belief may be most accurately defined. *A lively idea related to or associated with a present impression*' The difficulties connected with this treatment of the idea of existence have been discussed earlier, and we need not now recur to them. What we have to observe is that Hume at this point does not admit that there are the two questions: how do we come to have a certain idea, and how do we come to judge that there is an object of the idea? The two questions are: how do we come to have a certain idea, and why is the idea lively? One important difference, we notice, is that with this change of the second question there is now no need to refer to any *judgement* which we make. The question is, why is the idea lively? not, why do we judge it to be lively? Hume therefore states that belief is a feeling. 'I confess', he says, 'that 'tis impossible to explain perfectly this feeling or manner of conception. We may make use of words, that express something near it. But its true and proper name is *belief*, which is a term that everyone sufficiently understands in common life.' In the next sentence it is true we find him still referring to the judgement: 'And in philosophy we

can go no farther than assert that it is something *felt* by the mind which distinguishes the ideas of the judgment from the fictions of the imagination.' It may fairly be said, however, that Hume is only wishing to indicate those states of consciousness which are *called* judgements as opposed to fictions of the imagination; and the whole passage should be read along with the footnote to page 96 in which he rejects the distinction between judgements and conceptions.<sup>1</sup> What we have to consider is whether he maintains this position consistently, and continues to dispense with the thought of objects distinct from our consciousness and with the judgement that they exist, or whether he reintroduces this judgement and others besides, which cannot be resolved in the way he suggests.

With this question in mind let us turn to the next section (Part III, Section VIII) which deals with the causes of belief. At the outset Hume explains that the reason why in defining belief he insists on the relation of the idea to a present impression is that the impression is responsible for producing in the idea the liveliness which is the essence of belief. 'I would', he says, 'willingly establish it as a general maxim in the science of human nature, that when any impression becomes present to us it not only transports the mind to such ideas as are related to it, but likewise communicates to them a share of its force and vivacity.' The next question is what are the relations in which the impression must stand to the idea in order that this result may be produced. Hume specifies three, resemblance, contiguity, and causation, giving instances of the operation of each. How far does his account conform to the view that belief is simply a lively idea, unmixed with reflection or with any judgement regarding the existence of

<sup>1</sup> We ought, however, to read this footnote critically. We may regard the distinction between conceptions and judgements as a distinction of the way in which the content of our consciousness is organized in each. From this point of view it may be held on good grounds that there is no fundamental distinction between the two. But if what we are thinking of is the distinction between conceiving or imagining something and judging that what we conceive or imagine exists, this is a distinction which we should not try to overcome. Hume himself recognizes the point when he writes: 'Whether we consider a single object or several; whether we dwell on these objects or run from them to others, and in whatever form or order we survey them, the act of the mind exceeds not a simple conception, and the only remarkable difference, which occurs on this occasion, is, when we join belief to the conception, and are persuaded of the truth of what we conceive.' When he says that this persuasion of the truth of what we conceive is a feeling he makes an unsupported affirmation, which is not really connected with his remarks on the distinction of conceptions and judgements.

objects? The curious feature of the account is that in all the instances which he gives belief is present before liveliness is imparted. I see the picture of an absent friend and my idea of him is enlivened by the resemblance. But I already believed in the existence of my friend. When I am a few miles from home, I am touched more nearly by the thought of it than when I am two hundred leagues distant. Again I believe in the existence of my home before I am touched more nearly by its contiguity. My devotion to a saint is enlivened if I am presented with his handiwork; his clothes and furniture (as Hume says) being regarded in that light because they were once at his disposal and were moved and affected by him. Here also, in this instance of causation, it is evidently supposed that I first believe in the saint. Let us notice another point. It is plain that I must believe in the relation in order that my idea may be enlivened. If I do not think that the portrait resembles my friend, nor that I am near home, nor that the clothes and furniture belonged to the saint, my ideas are not enlivened, or at least not directly by the present impressions. Now as regards the relations of contiguity and cause and effect I cannot believe that these relations exist between what is perceived and what is merely imagined. I can imagine that the imaginary is contiguous to the real, but I do not believe it unless I also believe that the imaginary is real. I can imagine, too, that an imagined event is caused by a real, but again I do not believe it unless I believe that the imagined event is real. It seems therefore that when the apprehension of contiguity or the relation produced by causality enlivens an idea, it is necessary that I should first believe in the idea. The same considerations do not apply to the relation of resemblance. An imaginary object can be held to resemble a real object, even though it is known to be imaginary. But here we can notice a significant point. An imaginary idea can be enlivened by an impression which resembles it. Thus my imaginary idea of a unicorn is undoubtedly enlivened when I am shown a picture of a unicorn. But the picture does not make me believe in the existence of the unicorn. When I do not believe in an idea it seems that it is enlivened by the presence of a resembling impression, but not converted into belief; when I do believe in it, again it is enlivened by the impression, but not converted into belief because it is belief already. We must conclude therefore that when Hume's own account is examined it strengthens the view that belief and the liveliness of an idea should not be identified.

After this passage Hume's argument in Section VIII takes a somewhat puzzling turn. He has so far considered what happens in our consciousness when we apprehend certain relations between an impression and the object of an idea. He now examines the effect on consciousness of a certain conjunction of past and present experiences, which have, he thinks, a connexion with the idea of causality. There is no longer any reference to our apprehension of a relation between an impression and the object of an idea. The relations which are in question are a set of relations between impressions. First there is a relation between past impressions; two past impressions must have stood in the relation of conjunction. Secondly there must have been other impressions related by resemblance to each of these impressions respectively. Thirdly the conjunctions of these other impressions must have been related by resemblance to the conjunction of the first two impressions. Fourthly there must be a present impression which resembles one member of the pairs of conjoined past impressions. When this situation is given Hume points out that along with the present impression an idea arises in our consciousness which resembles the other member in the past conjunctions of impressions. Moreover, because this idea is related to an impression it is lively and is therefore a belief. This seems to be a fair summary of the doctrine set out in the later part of Section VIII, and also in Section VI which is an anticipation of Section VIII. There is here then, we observe, no reference to the apprehension of a relation between the present impression and the idea or to a consequence which is said to follow from such apprehension. Indeed there is no relation between the two taken by themselves of which we could be conscious in the way in which we might be conscious of the relations of resemblance contiguity and cause and effect which were referred to in Hume's discussion of the cause of liveliness in an idea. The relation here between the idea and the impression can only be thought of in terms of their respective positions in the whole complex of *relata*. But this does not concern Hume, because he supposes (for the most part) that the idea and its liveliness are produced at once in the situation described. 'I conclude', he writes, 'that the belief which attends the present impression [sc. the belief in the idea which is the attendant of the present impression] and is produced by a number of past impressions and conjunctions; that this belief, I say, arises immediately without any new operation of the reason or imagination.' The mind must

presumably have been conscious at the time of the conjunctions of past impressions, but it need not when the present impression occurs reflect on the relations of its past impressions or indeed be conscious of them. Hume makes this plain in the following passage:

'A person who stops short in his journey upon meeting a river in his way, foresees the consequences of his proceeding forward; and his knowledge of these consequences is conveyed to him by past experience, which informs him of such certain conjunctions of causes and effects.'<sup>1</sup> But can we think, that on this occasion he reflects on any past experience, and calls to remembrance instances, that he has seen or heard of, in order to discover the effects of water on animal bodies? No surely; this is not the method in which he proceeds in his reasoning. The idea of sinking is so closely connected with that of water, and the idea of suffocating with that of sinking, that the mind makes the transition without the assistance of the memory. The custom operates before we have time for reflection.'

So far (if we dismiss our doubts regarding its junction with the earlier passage) the doctrine seems plain. But that is not to say that it is convincing. As an account of belief it rests on the disputable basis that a lively idea and a belief are the same. We may allow, if we will, that in such a situation as that described a lively idea resembling a past impression tends to arise, apparently without reflection on our part. But it seems by no means to be true that the lively idea is one in which we necessarily believe. We may take an instance suggested by Hume's illustration of the effect of resemblance. When I hear a latch-key turn in the door I may have a lively idea of the entry of an absent friend, if I have been accustomed to see him enter after I heard the sound of the latch-key. The idea need not be less lively because I know him to be absent; but because I know his absence the lively idea cannot be belief. It is in general to ideas which are lively but not believed that Hume's account of ideas which arise without reflection is more appropriate.

It was suggested also that the junction of Hume's account with the earlier part of the section leads to a doubt about its meaning. The doubt is whether Hume supposes that he is still dealing with the belief which arises from the idea of causality. If he does it is surprising that the account now omits the idea of causality. It seems, however, that Hume does not clearly distinguish the two

<sup>1</sup> Hume betrays a little uncertainty here. But he does not intend to say that the traveller thinks in terms of causes and effects and their relation.

cases of ideas which arise from the thought of causality and ideas which arise without it. For having given the account which we have just considered he begins to discuss certain problems connected with it; and here his explanations seem to imply a different view of what is present to consciousness in belief. We shall consider Hume's two problems in a moment, but we must first notice a significant passage which occurs when he is still discussing the way in which belief arises from custom. He has repeated that belief is a more vivid and intense conception of an idea, proceeding from its relation to a present impression, and he goes on to say: 'Thus all probable reasoning is nothing but a species of sensation. 'Tis not solely in poetry and music we must follow our taste and sentiment, but likewise in philosophy. When I am convinced of any principle, 'tis only an idea which strikes more strongly upon me. When I give the preference to one set of arguments above another, I do nothing but decide from my feeling concerning the superiority of their influence.' We ask ourselves why, if Hume thinks that the belief to which he refers is the liveliness of an idea and that in it the mind is not convinced by reasoning of any principle, he needs here to refer to the conviction of a principle and to make the dubious proposition that reasoning is nothing but a species of sensation. We may suspect that he begins to doubt whether belief can be described without reference to reflection on principles, and is preparing a second line of defence for his view that all belief is a feeling.

The suspicion is confirmed when we examine his treatment of the two problems which he finds in his own account. The statement of the first problem, with Hume's solution of it, is given in the following passage:

"Tis certain, that not only in philosophy, but even in common life, we may attain the knowledge of a particular cause merely by one experiment, provided it be made with judgement, and after a careful removal of all foreign and superfluous circumstances. Now as after one experiment of this kind, the mind, upon the appearance either of the cause or the effect, can draw an inference concerning the existence of its correlate; and as habit can never be acquired merely by one instance; it may be thought that belief cannot in this case be esteemed the effect of custom. But this difficulty will vanish, if we consider, that though we are here supposed to have had only one experiment of a particular effect; yet we have many millions to convince us of this principle; *that like objects, placed in like circumstances, will always produce like effects*, and as this principle has established itself by a sufficient custom, it bestows

an evidence and firmness on any opinion, to which it can be applied. The connexion of the ideas is not habitual after one experiment; but this connexion is comprehended under another principle, that is habitual; which brings us back to our hypothesis. In all cases we transfer our experience to instances, of which we have no experience, either *expressly* or *tacitly*, either *directly* or *indirectly*.'

It seems that Hume now refers to the way in which the mind by reflection on its experience can apprehend a principle, and allows that belief may arise through its application of the principle to a particular case. It might well be thought that this is a different origin of belief to that origin in custom which he has previously described. Nevertheless he maintains that it is the same, because the connexion of ideas, though it is not habitual after one experiment, 'is comprehended under another principle which is habitual'. It is odd to speak of a 'principle which is habitual', and Hume must refer to some habit which is more general than the habit of connecting two particular ideas. This more general habit can only be the habit of connecting ideas when their corresponding impressions have been frequently conjoined in our experience. But Hume surely should not maintain that the connecting of ideas when there has been only one conjunction of impressions is comprehended under the habit of connecting them when there has been a frequent conjunction of impressions, more especially as he says himself that a habit can never be acquired merely by one instance. There is perhaps another reason why he supposes that the problem which he has considered does not oblige him to change his view that belief is derived from the operation of custom. He tells us, as we have seen, that the principle that like objects placed in like circumstances will always produce like effects 'has established itself by a sufficient custom'. Custom here must mean the observed regularity of nature. But when we observe the regularity of nature and derive a principle from it, there is not involved an operation of custom of the kind, which Hume has previously described. Consciousness of the principle is not an idea of a particular impression frequently conjoined in the past with another particular impression, which appears to the mind in a lively form when the latter impression occurs. What is present to consciousness is an idea arising from reflection on the facts of our past experience. It may be hard to see how the facts warrant belief in the idea. But that is another question.

The second problem which Hume considers is this. It is possible

for me to have the idea that I had an impression, and to believe in this idea although the impression is forgotten. By what impression is the idea enlivened and so believed? Hume's own statement of the problem is as follows:

'It may be said that not only an impression may give rise to reasoning, but an idea may also have the same influence; especially upon my principle that *all ideas are derived from correspondent impressions*. For suppose I form at present an idea of which I have forgot the correspondent impression, I am able to conclude from this idea, that such an impression did once exist; and as this conclusion is attended with belief, it may be asked, from whence are the qualities of force and vivacity derived, which constitute this belief?'

Before we consider Hume's answer we may notice that Hume is evidently concerned once more with a general principle and with the way in which the application of the principle produces belief in particular cases. All this is at variance with the earlier part of his discussion. His answer is that what enlivens the idea that the impression once existed is the idea itself, and the following explanation is given:

'For as this idea is not here considered as the representation of any absent object, but as a real perception in the mind, of which we are intimately conscious, it must be able to bestow on whatever is related to it the same quality, call it *firmness* or *solidity* or *force* or *vivacity*, with which the mind reflects upon it, and is assured of its present existence. The idea here supplies the place of an impression and is entirely the same, so far as regards our present purpose'

The principal comment which must be made on the question and its answer is that if we distinguish between an idea of an impression and an idea that an impression existed, while it may be appropriate to speak of liveliness being imparted to the first idea, it does not seem appropriate to speak of its being imparted to the second. Hume seems to want to make the distinction and yet to retain the incompatible view that belief is a lively idea, the test of liveliness being approximation to an impression. But in the case he has been considering it seems especially hard to understand how belief in the existence of an impression can be a lively idea of the impression. For since the impression is not remembered it is without any relations to a place or date in time and is devoid of any definiteness of content, and if this is so, the idea of it cannot closely approximate to an actual impression. How far in fact Hume's ideas are on the brink of change is indicated by a remark which arises from

his distinction of the idea as a representation of an absent object and an idea as a real perception of the mind. 'In thinking of our past thoughts', he writes, 'we not only delineate out the objects of which we were thinking, but also conceive the action of the mind in the meditation, that certain *je nesçai-quoi*, of which 'tis impossible to give any definition or description, but which everyone sufficiently understands.' If he had followed this line of thought further and applied it to our consciousness more generally he might have changed much that is open to criticism in his doctrines as they stand.

If we review the course of Hume's thought about belief connected with the idea of causality, it seems that he starts with a view of our consciousness which supposes that it contains no thought of distinct and continuing objects, and that accordingly the only difference between the idea of an object of which we have no impression and the idea that the object exists is that the second idea is more lively than the first. He wishes to keep this view because he is convinced that belief is nothing but a feeling or sentiment. For the same reason he tries to eliminate from his account of belief any supposition that we are conscious of a principle and by applying it to particular experiences arrive at the belief that particular objects exist of which we have no impressions. He thinks that instead of belief being produced by the application of a principle which thought apprehends, it is produced without any reflection on our part by the repeated conjunctions of certain impressions in our experience. Since he still thinks that belief and the liveliness of an idea are the same thing, he has only to show that repeated conjunctions of impressions tend to produce a lively idea or, if we have the idea already, to enliven it. But the elimination of all that he wishes to eliminate is, as we have seen, a hard task, and the task is not fulfilled. In Section IX to which we shall now turn it appears that his difficulties culminate. Here we find that he recognizes many of the objections to which his earlier statements were liable; that he now explicitly explains belief in terms of our consciousness of a world of realities, only a part of which is apprehended by the senses or by memory; and that he no less explicitly introduces the judgement as a factor which seems to be essential in belief. Nevertheless he still maintains that belief is nothing but a lively idea related to a present impression.

Hume begins Section IX by noticing an objection which might be taken to his exposition of the nature and causes of belief. The

objection is that the three relations of resemblance, contiguity, and cause and effect are all said to enliven our ideas, and it is also said that belief is only a lively idea. It seems to follow that belief may arise not only from the relation of cause and effect, but also from those of resemblance and contiguity. But this cannot be allowed; for 'we find by experience that belief arises only from causation and that we can draw no inference from one object to another, except they be connected by this relation' (p. 107). It is clear that Hume himself thinks that the basis of the objection is sound. As he says later, 'the relation of cause and effect is requisite to persuade us of any real existence'. His answer to the objection begins with the important passage (already quoted on p. 32 above) in which he explains that the mind in its survey of the contents of consciousness distinguishes two orders, an order of realities and an order which is merely the offspring of the imagination. The first order contains not merely impressions and ideas of memory but also those ideas which the mind connects with its present and past perceptions. Hume seems to show at first a slight reluctance to admit that this order is a single system, and says that impressions and ideas of memory are formed into one system and other ideas into another. But a little later on he evidently allows that we think of a single universe containing not only existences apprehended by the senses and memory but also existences which lie beyond their reach, and he says that we are acquainted with the latter no less than the former. It is the judgement which acquaints us with existences not apprehended by the senses or memory, and the judgement is able to perform its task because ideas of such existences are 'connected by custom or if you will by the relation of cause or effect' with the system of perceptions. We must observe as regards this connexion by custom or by the relation of cause or effect that, apart from what is implied in the reference to the judgement, the language of the passage is ambiguous. It is still compatible either with the assertion that custom or the relation of cause and effect is something which affects the mind simply by enlivening its ideas of objects, or with the different assertion that the mind conceives a principle and through the application of it believes in the existence of particular existences not apprehended by the senses or the memory. But leaving this point aside for the moment we must continue to follow Hume's discussion. He next observes that if we have an idea of an object which we think is comprehended in the system of realities, an

impression related to the idea by resemblance or contiguity will enliven it. But if the idea is of an object not thought to be comprehended in the system, the resembling or contiguous impression enlivens the idea but does not produce belief.<sup>1</sup> 'A poet, no doubt,' he writes, 'will be the better able to form a strong description of the Elysian fields, that he prompts his imagination by the view of a beautiful meadow or garden; as at another time he may by his fancy place himself in the midst of these fabulous regions that by the feigned contiguity he may enliven his imagination.'<sup>2</sup>

So far it seems that Hume instead of meeting the objection that his own statements imply that belief and a lively idea are not the same, only confirms it. Not only does the connecting of belief with the thought of a system of realities introduce a new conception of it, but he himself seems to realize some of the difficulties which we found in the earlier part of his discussion (see p. 38 above). He has not, however, completed his answer and he still insists that the definition of belief as a lively idea can be maintained. His argument, which is not easy to follow, seems to be indicated by two contrasted descriptions. The one description is of ideas, which, though they resemble or are imagined to be contiguous to actual impressions, are merely feigned and not believed; the other is of ideas which are believed because they are connected with the relation of cause or effect. Of the former ideas he says:

'There is no manner of necessity for the mind to feign any resembling or contiguous objects; and if it feigns such, there is as little necessity for it always to confine itself to the same without difference or variation. And indeed such a fiction is founded on so little reason, that nothing but pure *caprice* can determine the mind to form it; and that principle being fluctuating and uncertain, 'tis impossible it can ever operate with any considerable degree of force and constancy. The mind foresees and anticipates the change, and even from the very first instant feels the looseness of its actions, and the weak hold it has of its objects' (p. 109).

Of the latter:

'The relation of cause and effect has all the opposite advantages. The objects it presents are fixed and unalterable. The impressions of the memory never change in any considerable degree, and each impression draws along with it a precise idea, which takes its place in the imagina-

<sup>1</sup> Hume's language is not very accurate, but this seems to be his meaning.

<sup>2</sup> We notice that in the instance of resemblance there is a present impression and the relation is real; in the instance of contiguity there is no present impression and the relation is feigned. Hume has not thought carefully enough about the influence of contiguity. Compare what was said on p. 38 above.

tion as something solid and real, certain and invariable. The thought is always determined to pass from the impression to the idea, and from that particular impression to that particular idea, without any choice or hesitation' (p. 110).

We observe first that the distinction between the ideas which are merely feigned and those which are believed is marked in a number of different ways. We must remember here Hume's view that belief is a feeling which we can recognize but not define, and that accordingly we may fairly use various terms some of which will designate it better to one mind, others to another. It is probable that he regards the different ways in which he marks the distinction not as an analysis of factors in belief but as equivalent expressions which signify the presence or absence of a single feeling. He does not change his view that the feeling which is present in belief and absent in mere feigning is liveliness, but he offers alternative expressions to indicate what he has in mind. We must admit in general, he thinks, that the action of the mind when it believes is stronger or more forceful or more constant or more steadily determined (if we prefer any of these expressions to 'more lively') than when it does not. But how then was it possible to allow that feigned ideas could be lively? The answer seems to be simply that we should recognize differences of degree, and say that belief is a *sufficiently* strong or forceful or constant or lively idea. This is indicated when he says that 'contiguity and resemblance have an effect much inferior to causation; but still have some effect, and augment the conviction of any opinion, and the vivacity of any conception' (p.110). He claims in conclusion that the last point is 'no inconsiderable argument for his view that belief is nothing but a lively idea related to a present impression'. Unless we interpret his position more or less as we have done it seems difficult to follow this conclusion.

If this is Hume's view, can it be defended? We must notice at any rate that it is not the same view as that which he previously maintained. He may continue to use the terms 'lively' or 'forceful' or 'solid' and the like, but whereas previously what he had in view was evidently some way in which the features of a contemplated object strike the mind, now it seems that, because he recognizes our thought of external objects, he tends to apply them to something different, namely our conviction that an object exists. Perhaps indeed it would be nearer the mark to say that Hume does not distinguish the two views, and that therefore it is easier for

him to persuade himself that his doctrine is unaltered. But it ought to be recognized that though we can say that a conviction of the existence of something is lively or forceful or unalterable and also say that we have an idea which is lively or forceful or constantly recurrent in certain circumstances, the two statements are not the same. We may have a lively conviction that something exists and yet have no very lively or forceful idea of it, just as we can have (as Hume really admits) a lively or forceful idea of something in the existence of which we have no belief, lively or otherwise. So, too, with the constancy of ideas. On the one hand, we often have a belief, which we would say was fixed and unalterable, in an idea, although we can point to no habitual recurrence of the idea in our minds; on the other hand, we know from our experience that there are ideas irrationally associated with a certain impression and recurring constantly when the impression recurs, in which we have no belief. Failure to recognize this distinction clearly seems to be one of Hume's mistakes. But connected with it is another. If the liveliness of an idea and the conviction that something exists which we are neither perceiving nor remembering, are different, we should ask whether both are produced in the same way or in different ways. Now just as Hume often reaches the point of stating or at least implying that the liveliness of an idea and belief in the existence of something are not the same, so, too, he often makes statements which suggest that they are differently produced. He recognizes three ways in which we can experience a lively idea without the operation of reflective thinking; if we have an idea of something already, the idea can be enlivened by a present impression which resembles the object of which we have the idea, or is contiguous to it, or is like impressions which have been constantly conjoined with impressions of the object in our past experience; if we do not have the idea already it is produced not in the first two of these ways but in the last. On the other hand, when he is thinking of belief in the existence of an object, his mind turns to the faculty of judgement and its reflective application of the principles of causality or the uniformity of nature. This direction of his thought is seen plainly enough in the whole notion that the mind forms for itself a *system* of realities and that its judgement whether the object of a particular idea belongs to the system or not is determined by consideration of the principles of causality. What those principles are he sets out later in the section on 'Rules by which to Judge of Causes and Effects' (Section XV). We may

notice that such a position does not preclude him from thinking that the belief that something exists may enliven our ideas, but it does seem to preclude him from asserting that the liveliness of the idea is the belief. It is because Hume follows different trains of thought and yet does not distinguish them that he persuades himself that his original doctrine regarding belief can still stand, and that he is still entitled to assert that it is essentially a feeling or a sentiment.

Having tried to see the different doctrines which are continued in Hume's various discussions of belief, we may perhaps usefully ask at this stage how far any of them justifies or makes plausible the view that belief is a feeling. His first doctrine, as we have seen, eliminates the thought of distinct or continuing or independent objects, and recognizes only a difference in our consciousness of ideas which are lively and of those which are not. This difference can be thought to be a difference of feeling. The liveliness we notice has the characteristic of feeling in the respect that it admits of degrees. Indeed it appears on examination that Hume regards the difference between an idea believed and an idea not believed as a difference of the degree in which the two exhibit a character which belongs to both. A believed idea is an idea which is *more* lively or *less* dim than an idea not believed. But when Hume allows that in belief we think of the existence of objects, and sees that a judgement is involved, he cannot have the same ground for saying that belief is a feeling. We must remember with what belief is contrasted. It is contrasted with imagining, and we surely cannot say that judging is an intensification of imagining, in much the same way as a vivid idea is an intensification of a dim idea. Nor can it be said that there are judgements believed and judgements not believed and that the two differ only in degree; for if a judgement is not believed it is not a judgement. We should not be confused here by the reflection that there may be degrees of belief. What we call a difference of degree of belief may be a difference between two judgements, one being an assertoric judgement and the other a judgement of probability. Again if belief involves a judgement there may be also a feeling attached to the judgement and the feeling may vary in degree. But this would not justify the statement that the difference between believing and imagining is one of feeling. If we need to refer to judgement in describing belief we have something over and above the difference introduced by a feeling. It seems therefore necessary for Hume to change his

ground and maintain not indeed that belief is a feeling, but that it is a judgement referring to the existence of objects which has no other basis than a feeling. We might seek to develop such a doctrine in alternative ways, and we seem in fact to find those alternatives suggested at various points in Hume's discussion. First it can be said that it is the feeling of liveliness attached to an idea which directly leads to the judgement that the object of the idea exists. The frequent dissociation of belief from the liveliness of our ideas tells strongly against this view. A second alternative is to say that the constant conjunction of impressions in our experience directly produces on the occurrence of the impression the idea of the other along with the judgement that the object of the idea exists. To say this deprives the judgement of any basis of rational reflection, but it also eliminates the feeling. The third alternative is that the judgement is formed by the reflective application of a principle (the principle of causality or necessary connexion or of the uniformity of nature) to particular cases. This alternative has still less the look of a doctrine which bases belief on feeling. But if we go a step farther and consider how the thought of the principle arises, it may be that at this point we find the justification for connecting belief with a feeling. If we can show that the principle makes its entry into our consciousness by way of nothing else than a feeling, the claim can be made that though belief is a judgement and is even a judgement resulting from rational reflection, yet its ultimate basis is nothing but a sentiment or feeling. It is this position which Hume seems finally to reach, and we find his argument for it in the section on 'The Idea of Necessary Connexion' (Part III, Section XIV). We shall conclude our inquiry into his doctrine regarding our belief in the existence of objects with the consideration of this section.

Hume's account of the idea of necessary connexion starts from the basis that since we can have no idea which is not derived from an impression, the problem is to find some impression which gives rise to the idea. If we think of two objects placed in the relation of cause and effect, we perceive only certain relations of space and time between them. But if we think of several instances, we find 'like objects always existing in like relations of contiguity and succession'. Now 'reflection on several instances only repeats the same objects; and therefore can never give rise to a new idea (sc. of the objects)'. But the repetition, though it does not change the objects, gives rise, in another direction, to a new impression and,

by that means, an idea. 'For after a frequent repetition,' I find, that upon the appearance of one of the objects, the mind is *determined* by custom to consider its usual attendant, and to consider it in a stronger light upon its relation to the first object. 'Tis this impression, then, of *determination* which affords me the idea of necessity' (p. 156). The repetition alone, he explains later, does not give rise to the idea, but must either discover or produce something new which is the source of the idea. It does not discover anything new in either of the objects, since we know no more about them through the repetition of instances, or as Hume says, 'we can draw no inference from it [the repetition] or make it a subject either of our demonstrative or probable reasonings'. It does not produce anything new in the objects; for the several instances of conjunction are entirely independent and have no influence on each other (see p. 164). But though the repetition produces nothing new in the objects, 'the observation of this resemblance produces a new impression in the mind'; for 'we immediately feel a determination of the mind to pass from one object to its usual attendant' (p. 165). 'Necessity, then, is the effect of this observation, and is nothing but an internal impression of the mind, or a determination to carry our thoughts from one object to another' (p. 165). For this determination of the mind Hume finds a parallel in mathematics which he states as follows: 'Thus as the necessity, which makes two times two equal to four, or three angles of a triangle equal to two right ones, lies only in the act of the understanding, by which we consider and compare these ideas; in like manner the necessity or power, which unites causes and effects, lies in the determination of the mind to pass from the one to the other' (p. 166). But why should the necessity which we find in the mind be considered to be a necessary connexion in the objects? Hume's answer is this: "Tis a common observation, that the mind has a great propensity to spread itself on external objects, and to conjoin with them any internal impressions, which they occasion, and which always make their appearance at the same time that those objects discover themselves to the senses' (p. 167). When he seeks for an example, we notice that he does not refer to mathematics again, and it is not clear whether he thinks that this is a case in point. The example he takes is our habit of attaching secondary qualities to objects: 'Thus as certain sounds and smells are always found to attend certain visible objects, we naturally imagine a conjunction, even in place, betwixt the objects and qualities, though the qualities be of such

a nature as to admit of no such conjunction, and really exist nowhere.' 'The same propensity', he concludes, 'is the reason why we suppose necessity and power to lie in the objects we consider, not in our mind that considers them' (p. 167).

If this can be taken as a fair summary of Hume's account, we may consider the questions which it raises. In the first place it seems that when he treats of the idea produced by past conjunctions on the occasion of a present impression he thinks of more than its liveliness. The idea to which he refers is evidently an idea that an object exists, and he also implies that it must be an idea of an object which is conceived to be in particular spatial and temporal relations to the object of the present impression. When we have such an idea we are thinking or supposing that an object which we do not perceive exists, and that the relations of contiguity and of precedence or succession between it and the object which we do perceive are the same as those between similar objects which we have known in the past. The idea so described does not include the thought that the existence of the unperceived objects in those relations to the perceived object is necessarily connected with the existence of the latter, and the problem is to decide how this thought arises. Hume's answer is that it arises from the determination of the mind to have the idea. Now there is an ambiguity here, which we should notice. We may have an idea of an existent object related to a present impression without having the belief that it exists, or we may have the idea and also the belief. Hume's words are that on the appearance of one object the mind is determined by custom 'to consider its usual attendant'. These words do not necessarily imply the presence of belief, though they do not exclude it. But in the passage where he speaks of the mind being determined on the appearance of one object 'to consider its usual attendant' he adds 'and to consider it in a stronger light'; here belief is evidently implied. Let us however first consider Hume's account on the supposition that he only postulates a determination of the mind to frame the idea of the usual attendant of a present object, and does not insist on the presence of belief. We can consider later the alternative interpretation that he postulates a determination to believe in the idea.

What is the impression of which Hume is thinking when he refers to the mind's determination to consider the usual attendant of a certain kind of object, when an instance of the object is present? One possible interpretation is that he thinks of a feeling of con-

straint which the mind experiences in connexion with the occurrence of the idea. But it is hard to see that it is natural for the mind to attach its own feeling of constraint to the object of the idea. If we say that the mind transfers its feeling to the object, we suggest that we think the object feels. But we do not have such a thought; so far from that being so it is part of our habitual thought about the distinction between the mind and physical objects that the mind feels and objects do not. The idea of a feeling being present in an effect is by no means an element in our idea of cause and effect. Further than this we should observe that the thought of a property of the object by itself is not enough to explain the idea of necessary connexion. What is involved in the idea of necessary connexion is the thought of a relation between two things. If then we are searching for an internal impression which can give rise to the idea of necessary connexion, it must be an impression not of a feeling simply but of related states of consciousness. But perhaps by giving a different interpretation of Hume's account we can allow that it provides what is required. Hume says that the mind is determined 'to pass from one object to its usual attendant'. He may mean that we become aware not merely of being constrained to have the idea of a certain object, but of being constrained to pass from the perception of one object to the thought of another. In that case what we are conscious of is not only a feeling but also a relation between two elements in our consciousness, an impression and an idea. If then we ask what the relation is of which we are conscious, the answer is 'a temporal relation of an impression and an idea with which a feeling of constraint or inevitability is united'. Now this may seem to solve the problem. For the temporal relation and the feeling together seem to constitute the idea of a necessary connexion, and if we thus are conscious of a necessary connexion between an impression and an idea, it does not seem unreasonable to suppose that we may attach this connexion to the object of the impression and the object of the idea.

There are difficulties, however, in this argument. In the first place we are still concerned with a feeling peculiar to a mind, though it is conjoined with the consciousness of a relation, and the argument does not seem to surmount the objection that it is not so natural as Hume thinks it is for the mind to attach its own feeling to physical objects. Further, if we leave aside the difficulty of connecting feeling with physical objects, it seems that the passage

from an impression to an idea which takes place within the unity of consciousness is something quite unlike causality, if by causality is meant the power of one object to affect another; and thus again we have doubts about the naturalness of the supposed transfer of the characteristics of mind to objects. This leads to another point. Hume can say that we may think of causality without reference to the idea of power. What he is concerned with when he gives an account of causality is the idea of necessary connexion, and by this is meant simply the idea that two things may be so connected that when one occurs the other necessarily occurs. Now if this be so the consciousness of constraint attached to the passage from an impression to an idea differs in an important respect from our idea of causality. We may pass to an idea from an impression and feel that we are constrained to do so, without thinking that a similar impression will always be accompanied by the passage to a similar idea, and that we shall always be similarly constrained. In other words, we can be conscious of the constraint without the thought or belief that there is a connexion between our mental states of such a kind that when one occurs the other will necessarily occur. On Hume's doctrine such a thought can only arise if we experience so many conjunctions of the impression with the passage to the idea that we feel a new determination which will make us think the impression is necessarily connected with the passage to the idea. But all this implies that the feeling of constraint experienced in the passage from an impression to an idea is not by itself sufficient to yield the specific idea of necessary connexion.

The point is important, and it seems worth while to consider what Hume himself says about our belief in a necessary connexion between two states of consciousness. Near the end of Section XIV he writes:

‘When any object is presented to us, it immediately conveys to the mind a lively idea of that object, which is usually found to attend it; and this determination of the mind forms the necessary connexion of these objects. But when we change the point of view from the objects to the perceptions; in that case the impression is to be considered as the cause, and the lively idea as the effect; and their necessary connexion is that new determination which we feel to pass from the idea of the one to that of the other. The uniting principle among our internal perceptions is as unintelligible as that among external objects, and is not known to us any other way than by experience. Now the nature and effects of experience have been already sufficiently examined and explained. It

never gives us any insight into the internal structure or operating principle of objects, but only accustoms the mind to pass from one to another' (p. 169).

There is an important implication of this statement which we should notice. Hume clearly implies that the idea of a necessary connexion of objects frequently conjoined in our experience is independent of the idea of a necessary connexion of our mental states. In order to acquire the second idea it is necessary that we should change our point of view, and a new determination of the mind is also necessary. We can put the matter in the following way. The repeated conjunction of two objects in our experience produces a determination of the mind to pass from the impression of the one to the idea of the other; so soon as the determination has been established, and on its first appearance, the mind can be conscious of it in the form of a feeling of constraint, without having to wait for several instances; and when it becomes conscious of it, it attaches it to the objects and so comes to think that they are necessarily connected. If we ask what the mind is conscious of when it is conscious of this 'determination', it must not be said that it is conscious of a necessary connexion between its own states. To be conscious of such a necessary connexion of its states, it needs a new determination. This determination must be based on repeated instances of the first determination; that is to say, what is now involved is not experience of the repeated conjunction of two objects, but the repeated conjunction of impressions (or ideas) of an object with the passage of the mind, felt to be determined, to the idea of another object. From such repeated conjunction it comes about that the mind is determined, and has the feeling of being determined, to pass from an impression or idea of the first object to the thought of a passage to the idea of the other object. The feeling of constraint which it has in passing from the impression to the thought of a passage to the associated idea is transferred to the relation between the impression and the passage, with the result that the passage is considered to be necessarily connected with the impression. This is Hume's doctrine, and it is clear from it that the internal impression which the mind is supposed to transfer to something else (whether the first or the second determination is involved) does not include the thought of there being a necessary connexion in our internal states; the first determination is changed by the transfer into the idea of a necessary connexion between objects, the second is changed into the idea of a necessary connexion

between internal states. But for reasons which have been already indicated neither the notion of the transfer of an internal impression to objects nor the notion of the metamorphosis of the idea of the impression in the process of transfer can well be accepted.

Let us now consider another aspect of Hume's account. We supposed earlier (see p. 52 above) that when he was explaining the determination of the mind and its consequences, he referred to our determination to form the idea of a particular object without necessarily believing in its existence. But on reflection it seems that his account of the origin of the idea of causality is more difficult if determination of the mind is not meant to include such a belief, although on the other hand there are also difficulties in the opposite view. The difficulty which presents itself if we do not think that the determination of the mind includes belief in the existence of the object of which the mind has an idea concerns the transition from consciousness of determination to the idea of the necessary connexion of objects. If on the occurrence of one object we find ourselves determined to believe that another object is once again conjoined with it as on previous occasions, although it is not present to perception, it seems reasonable to think that such a determination of our thought carries with it a further belief in the connexion of the objects themselves. But if all that we find is that we are determined to have an idea and are not obliged to think that the object exists, there seems to be no compelling reason why we should think that the objects are necessarily connected, when the determination of our minds is thus limited. Hume's explanation therefore seems easier if it allows that belief in the existence of the object and the idea of necessary connexion are interrelated. But difficulties arise for Hume on the other side when we consider more exactly what the relation between them is. Is it belief in the existence of the object of the idea which comes first, or the idea of necessary connexion, or do they come both together? Here we must go back to the earlier points in Hume's discussion. If belief in the existence of an unperceived object is only a lively idea, we can have such a belief apart from the idea of the necessary connexion of one kind of object with another. But we have seen that there are many objections to this view of belief and that Hume himself gradually inclines to the different view that we come to believe in the existence of an unperceived object by means of the idea of causality or the uniformity of nature. On the latter view we believe in the existence of the object of which we have an idea,

because we already have the notion of necessary connexion and apply it to the idea. But we cannot then suppose that the determination to think of the unperceived object as existent leads us to the notion of necessary connexion.

It was suggested earlier that Hume seems, although unconsciously, to be preparing for the failure of the attempt to derive belief in causality from a feeling, when in Section VIII he maintains in regard to the conviction of any principle that it is only an idea 'which strikes more strongly upon me' (see p. 41 above). We cannot but ask at the end of his account whether he has done more than bring out the point that the mind has an ineradicable conviction, of which it can offer no explanation, that there is in nature a law of causality or necessary connexion or uniformity. Of this conviction he himself says later in Part IV, Section IV:

'In order to justify myself I must distinguish in the imagination betwixt the principles which are permanent, irresistible and universal; such as the customary transition from causes to effects, and from effects to causes; and the principles which are changeable, weak and irregular; such as those which I have now taken notice of. The former are the foundation of all our thoughts and actions, so that upon their removal, human nature must immediately perish and go to ruin. The latter are neither unavoidable to mankind, nor necessary, or so much as useful in the conduct of life; but on the contrary are observed only to take place in weak minds, and being opposite to the other principles of custom and reasoning, may easily be subverted by a due contrast and opposition' (p. 225).

It is true that what he refers to is still a principle not of the understanding or reason but of the imagination. The point of so regarding it is that its presence in consciousness can be thought to be explicable by reference to the factors which affect in recognized ways the irrational side of the mind. It is, however, just the attempt to treat it in this way which seems to have failed, and we should ask ourselves whether in consequence of the failure it is not now necessary to fall back on the view that the conviction is of the understanding. But if we do so, the situation is changed. As we saw earlier (see p. 31 above) Hume himself recognizes the distinctive character of the belief in propositions to which the mind assents because it is the nature of its intelligence to do so. There is doubtless a determination of the mind involved in this species of belief, and if our belief in causality is classed with it, we can still say that the belief is determined. But the determination is

altogether different from that determination on which his account of the idea of causality has been based.

The main point, however, to which our inquiry has led is that Hume's account of the idea of causality is linked with the recognition that the mind thinks of the existence of distinct, independent, and continuing objects. Whether he could have stated it in terms of a belief in a system or order of impressions which would refer not only to the actual impressions of ourselves and others but to the possibility of impressions, is another matter. It is clear that if he had made the attempt, he still could not have retained the view that belief is nothing but the liveliness of an idea. To believe in a system of impressions is to believe in something which is distinct from the consciousness of it. But in any case Hume's thought (unlike that of Berkeley) does not move on these lines. It is the different notion of continuing objects with which he works, and the difficulties of his *Treatise* arise from his uncertainty as to the part which this notion plays in our consciousness. His account of belief, and in particular of the belief which arises from the idea of causality, is the evidence of his uncertainty and of the need for a more thorough discussion than that which he himself offers.

## II

### KANT'S THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE

IN this chapter, which concerns Kant, certain parts of his doctrine are selected for discussion, because they seem to have particular significance for the theory of knowledge. The topics which will be considered are the development of his thought on the relation of consciousness to its objects, some aspects of his doctrine regarding time and space, and lastly his views on the subject of self-consciousness. Discussion of what he says on these connected topics will be useful if we find that he has arguments which compel assent, and no less if some of his views are shown to be untenable or to involve difficulties which he fails to solve. If we can determine his successes and his failures we shall hope to have a clearer perception of some at least of the requirements which a theory of knowledge should recognize and attempt to satisfy.

#### § 1. *Consciousness and its objects*

When we considered Hume's doctrines it seemed that many of his difficulties were connected with his imperfect analysis of what is involved in an impression or an idea. In turning to Kant's theory of knowledge we shall take first certain remarks which he makes about our presentations (*Vorstellungen*) and try to see whether or not in treating of presentations he wholly escaped from the errors of Hume. We shall see the presuppositions which were in his mind at the outset if we begin by considering some points which he makes in the first-edition version of the Transcendental Deduction of the Categories. They will indicate, but not unambiguously, the measure of his affinity to Hume.

In the Transcendental Deduction (A 98, 99) Kant writes:

'Whatever may be the way in which our presentations arise, whether it be through the influence of external things or through internal causes, whether they come into being *a priori* or empirically as phenomena, in any event they belong as modifications of the mind to internal sense. Because this is their nature all our cognitions are finally subject to the formal condition of the internal sense, namely time, in which they must all be arranged, combined, and brought into relations. This is a general remark which must never be forgotten since it is the ground of everything which follows.'

In the doctrine thus emphatically asserted the points of likeness to Hume's doctrine are apparent. In the first place we notice that

when Kant asserts that all our presentations are modifications of the mind, he is saying of them what Hume says of impressions and ideas. Secondly the insistence that they occur in time recalls Hume's doctrine of the temporal flow of impressions and ideas and their perishing existence. So much agreement we see, but the two doctrines seem to diverge when Kant says that time, in which presentations are arranged, is a formal condition of the internal sense; for this means (if the view of the Aesthetic is accepted) that the presentations are a temporal flow only in the sense that the mind is thus conscious of them. What we have to consider, keeping these points in mind, is how far the difference between Kant's view of presentations and Hume's view of impressions and ideas in fact extends. For this purpose we must recur briefly to Hume.

When Hume referred to an 'impression' or an 'idea' he drew no distinction between an act of consciousness and the object or content of consciousness, and because he did not draw the distinction he used these words (or the word 'perception') to express the act of consciousness in some contexts and the object of consciousness in others. In one context, where he is taking impressions and ideas to be acts of consciousness he can say, not altogether unreasonably, that a mind is nothing but a series of impressions and ideas. It would not be plausible to say this, if he thought that impressions and ideas were the objects of consciousness, even though they were no more than internal objects. On the other hand, in another context he tells us that he proposes to use the words 'perception' and 'object' interchangeably. It is manifest that he is here using perception in the sense of 'what is perceived', and that if he meant by perception 'the act of perception' he could not suggest that it had the same meaning as the word 'object'. Nevertheless, in reflecting generally on Hume's position it is tempting to think that his failure to draw the distinction we are considering is perhaps of no great importance. It may be said that though, in treating of impressions, he does not take the act of consciousness and its object together, explicitly recognizing and distinguishing the two factors, yet in different contexts, as we have seen, he recognizes both, and provided that in each case his argument is based on the appropriate factor there is no harm done. It would, however, be a mistake to regard the matter thus. The importance of noticing the two factors involved in an impression is plain if we consider the question, of what is there consciousness when we have an impression? We ought not to be satisfied with

an answer which says simply either that there is consciousness of an act of consciousness or that there is consciousness of the object or content of the act of consciousness. It seems that we must recognize the existence of consciousness of both factors, of the act of consciousness (so that even if we do not wish to speak of self-consciousness which implies the notion of a self, we must accept the notion of an act of consciousness being conscious of itself) and of the object or content of the momentary act of consciousness.

If this is the position, failure to understand it may be prejudicial in various ways. Let us notice two. In the first place we may notice generally that if it is true that when we have an impression our state of consciousness is thus complex, it seems unlikely that notions such as those of the self and of an object are in each case to be explained, as Hume supposed, with reference to one element only in our consciousness. He ought at least to consider the possibility that when we seek to explain our notion of a self we must take into account our consciousness of objects, and that when we consider our notion of an object, we must consider the bearing of the fact that consciousness is conscious of itself. Secondly, when the two factors, consciousness of which is involved in an impression, are recognized and contrasted, the question arises whether the relation of both to consciousness is the same. Berkeley maintained that an act of consciousness is not so related to our consciousness of it that we can say its *esse* is *percipi*, and that it differs in this important respect from those objects of consciousness which we call physical. There are many consequences of this view, some of which we shall see in considering the doctrines of Kant. Berkeley himself did not develop his argument very far, but his position is better than that of Hume, who ignored it altogether.

We may return now to Kant. The passage already quoted from the Transcendental Deduction is in many ways obscure, and it seems that it is obscure precisely because Kant does not tell us whether he is thinking, when he refers to presentations, of acts of consciousness or of their objects. The first interpretation which we are inclined to give of what he says is that our consciousness takes the form of a series of acts, discrete in time. (It is this which is the basis of his contention that there must be something in the nature of consciousness which unifies the separate acts and enables consciousness to be continuous and to have a systematic content.) Regarded thus the statement that our cognitions must all be

arranged, combined, and brought into relations in time would refer to the temporal arrangement and relations which are found in the occurrence of our acts of consciousness. When we reflect, however, on this interpretation it seems to involve the following difficulty. In writing of the necessity of arranging, combining, and relating our cognitions Kant evidently refers to some operation of the mind directed on the temporally separated moments of consciousness. But if it is an operation directed on acts of consciousness, this would seem to suggest the production by the mind of some fresh arrangement of the acts of consciousness themselves. Such a view would be difficult to defend; our presentations occur in a certain order, and it does not seem that the mind can alter the order which has actually occurred or even that it needs to think of the order of occurrence as different from what it is. What it seems that Kant here has in mind is that our unifying consciousness brings together the contents of the separate acts of consciousness and makes of them a system, the time relations of which are not necessarily those of the acts of consciousness. If this is so, there are two sets of time relations to which his account refers, and they belong respectively to acts of consciousness and their contents, although he does not distinguish the two.

Let us consider a little further the results, as they appear in this passage, of Kant's failure to make his own position clear. A question which especially arises is how the points which he is making are related to his doctrine that time is the form of the inner sense. If we use the distinction between acts of consciousness and their contents or objects, and suppose that Kant is first referring to acts of consciousness, it does not seem that his insistence that acts of consciousness occur in time is dependent on the view that time is a way in which we intuit our states. Indeed it is doubtful whether Kant is here thinking of his doctrines in regard to time in their full extent. His principal concern is to point, as Hume did, to the temporal series of our presentations. He says nothing to suggest that he thinks of the complication which arises from asserting that the temporal series itself is the mind's way of regarding its object. On the other hand, as regards the contents of our momentary acts of consciousness (though he does not distinguish them as contents) he evidently holds that their time-determinations are a system worked out and imposed by the mind. But if we now ask what are the contents of consciousness to which this system is applied, the answer can only be that in the main

Kant thinks of the events of the so-called external world; and these are objects not of the internal but of the external sense. The difficulty seems to show how little Kant had elaborated or clarified his position.

We obtain more evidence of the lack of precision in Kant's doctrine if we examine the first-edition version of the Refutation of Idealism. In brief Kant is here concerned to show that in regarding the physical world as phenomenal he is not lowering its status or making it unreal. His argument is addressed to Descartes, and its substance is that the doctrine which he is defending assigns to physical objects exactly the same status as it assigns to mental states; if therefore mental states are indubitably real, as Descartes said, physical objects are in the same sense real. It may seem that he is now plainly distinguishing the act of consciousness and its content or object. But there are two main comments to be made on his position which suggest that it is unacceptable. In the first place we observe that in distinguishing an act of consciousness and an object he regards the former no less than the latter as itself an object of consciousness: and, what is more, he supposes that its form or nature is due to its being an object of consciousness; for this is what is meant by saying that it is phenomenal. But if this is so, it seems that his answer to Descartes has failed. The point made by Descartes was that it is permissible to regard all physical objects (in the absence of further argument) as contents of consciousness, the being of which is dependent on consciousness, and thereby to think that they have no better status than the objects of a dream or something imagined; but he thought also that the argument has a limit when applied to consciousness itself, since we can only make consciousness a content of consciousness by postulating further consciousness. Now Kant has turned acts of consciousness into contents of consciousness and is still investing them with the status which Descartes gave to consciousness. But Descartes could properly say that if the acts of consciousness are regarded as contents of consciousness they lose the status of being indubitably real, and that this status must be transferred to the consciousness of which they are the contents. What has happened is that Kant does not see that if he is arguing from the position of Descartes he needs to compare physical objects with the consciousness of which temporal acts of consciousness are the content, and that in this comparison they lose the status which he seeks to assign to them; the fact that he does

not think we can know the nature of this consciousness seems in no way to affect the position. Although therefore he has used the distinction of acts of consciousness and contents of consciousness, it is at least fair to say that he has not worked out all its implications.

The second comment which may be made on the argument of the first-edition Refutation concerns another important point which Kant appears not to have noticed. This argument, as we have seen, depends on establishing a parallelism between physical objects and acts of consciousness, the ground being that they are two classes of objects which both have the status of contents of consciousness, and he defines his position by saying that the first class of objects is apprehended by the external sense, the second class by the internal sense. Now if we take such states of consciousness, for example, as pains or pleasures, we may perhaps think that they constitute one class of objects, while physical objects constitute a parallel class. But if we take instead a state of perception or some other form of apprehension, the question arises whether the object perceived or apprehended by such a state of consciousness is thought to be internal to it or not. If it is thought to be internal to the state of consciousness which is itself a temporal and momentary act, it does not seem that a strict parallelism is being preserved between the physical object and the act of consciousness. The act of consciousness is internal to a consciousness which is not temporal but is the source of the temporal form of that which it contemplates, whereas the physical object though in a sense it is internal to this consciousness is internal also to the temporal act of consciousness. When we ask ourselves whether this is Kant's doctrine, we can find no clear answer. The general tenor of the first-edition Refutation suggests that the mind creates for itself a class of objects, inner states, which are temporal, and another class of objects, physical things, which are spatial, and it does not suggest that the latter are in any way comprehended in the former. But it is difficult to believe that Kant realized the points involved and held so determinate a view, and not rather that he had failed to clarify sufficiently his own ideas. Reasons for so thinking appear both from a comparison with other passages belonging to the first edition of the *Critique*, and from an examination of the version of the Refutation which he substituted in the second edition. \*

The passages in the first edition of the *Critique* which it is desirable to consider in this context belong to the Transcendental Deduction of the Categories (which has already been quoted),

the comparison of time and space in the Aesthetic, and the Second Analogy. Let us return first to the passage in the Transcendental Deduction. Here, as we have seen, when Kant refers to presentations, he does not mark the distinction of an act of consciousness and its content. But though his account is deficient in this respect, it is clear that what it involves is that external objects must be considered to be the contents of presentations. Apart from any other points this is implied by the general doctrine that the temporal determinations which we find in external objects are in some way or other connected with the fact that there is a time order of our presentations regarded as acts of consciousness. It appears then that in this section of the *Critique* Kant is by no means taking the view (which the first-edition Refutation might seem to suggest) that physical objects are directly dependent on a consciousness which is not itself temporal but is the source of time-determination.

The passage in the Aesthetic (A 34 = B 50) where Kant compares the forms of time and space looks in the same direction. Here he writes as follows:

'Time is the formal condition *a priori* of all phenomena generally. Space, as the pure form of all external intuition is confined as a condition *a priori* to external phenomena simply. On the other hand since all presentations whether they have external things or not for their objects, yet in themselves, as determinations of the mind, belong to our internal state, and this internal state falls under the formal condition of internal intuition, that is to say it belongs to time, time in consequence is a condition *a priori* of all phenomena generally, the immediate condition of internal phenomena (our souls) and the consequent and mediate condition of external phenomena also.'

In this passage Kant is evidently thinking that our attribution of time-determination to physical things is due to the fact that these things are the content of separate acts of consciousness which occur at different moments in time. His doctrine seems to be that instead of regarding the content of each act as separate and momentary, we think that we have one content which possesses the duration of the whole stretch of time in which the separate moments of consciousness occur; or again that if the contents of the successive moments of consciousness exhibit variation, we think of a single varying content, the changes of which are dated in accordance with the temporal occurrence of the acts of consciousness. In this way the time-determinations of physical objects

can be said to belong to them indirectly, or to be a transfer of the time-determinations of our internal states. The argument thus interpreted—and it is difficult to see how else it can be interpreted—presupposes that external objects are the contents, or are constituted by reflection on the contents, of our acts of consciousness.

The argument of the Second Analogy is not altogether congruous with that of the Aesthetic. The latter supposes that the time-determinations of our acts of consciousness are transferred to an object constituted from their contents. On the other hand, in the Second Analogy it is asserted that we can recognize and ought to recognize that our states of consciousness may have one order of time-determinations and their objects another. But though there is this difference in the two accounts it should not conceal from us what they have in common. We shall perhaps see the position best if we consider in a little detail a passage in A 190–I = B 235–6. The passage is as follows:

‘Now since phenomena, although they are not things in themselves, are nevertheless the sole objects given to cognition, I am bound to show what kind of connection in time belongs to the manifold in phenomena, whilst the presentation of the manifold in apprehension is always successive. For example the apprehension of the phenomenon of a house which stands before me is successive. The question arises, whether the manifold of the house is in itself also successive, and this no one would willingly allow. But so soon as I give a transcendental meaning to my conceptions of an object, the house indeed is no thing in itself, but only a phenomenon, i.e. a presentation, of which the transcendental object is unknown. What then do I understand by the question, how is the manifold connected in this phenomenon, which is not a thing in itself? Here that which lies in my successive apprehension is regarded as presentation, but the phenomenon which is given to me, despite the fact that it is no more than a complex of these presentations, is regarded as the presentations’ object, with which my conception, drawn from the presentations of apprehension, must agree.’

The first point to be noticed is that Kant here recognizes clearly that when he refers to a presentation (*Vorstellung*) he needs to distinguish between the act of consciousness and that of which there is consciousness, even though the latter be regarded as internal to the former. In his use of the term ‘Apprehension’ he evidently refers to the act of consciousness, while ‘*Vorstellung*’ in this context has the meaning of that which is apprehended. Secondly he has no hesitation in thinking that what is apprehended is the

content of the act of apprehension. Thirdly it appears that he attaches to apprehension a particular meaning which is connected with his references to what is 'given' in our experience. His doctrine is that the momentary acts of apprehension with their contents must be regarded as given, but that the mind, employing (as he explains in other passages) imagination, uses the data or manifold thus given to construct an object which is a complex of presentations actual and imagined. It is clear that what he has in mind when he thus refers to apprehension is perception or sense experience, and that he contrasts it with the consciousness, not perceptual though based on perception, which constitutes the thought of an object. The distinction, of course, bears on the way in which we think of the relation between the time-determinations of an act of consciousness and the time-determinations of its object; the object of an act of apprehension or perception is thought to have the same time-determination as the act itself, whether or not it is regarded as the content of the act, but the object of non-perceptual consciousness can be thought to have a different date from that of the consciousness of it. What Kant himself, however, says about the matter is far from being admissible. In much of the argument of the Second and Third Analogies he seems to assert that we cannot in perceiving decide the time-determination of the object perceived unless we know the rules or principles which govern the nature of the object. The beginning of this view appears in the passage we have been considering, where Kant states that no one would allow that the manifold of a house is successive, although its parts may be perceived successively. But it must be observed that since in whatever way we think about the relation of an object perceived at one moment to an object perceived at another, we do not think that the time-determination of what is perceived is different from the time-determination of the perceiving of it, succession is attributed to what is perceived no less than to the perceiving. In Kant's example when we perceive first one part of a house and then another, the two parts perceived have successive dates; thus the front of the house is perceived as it is at time  $t^1$ , the back of the house as it is at time  $t^2$ , and we do not think that the time-determination of what is perceived earlier is the same as the time-determination of what is perceived later. The simultaneity to which we refer is something different. It involves the conception that what we perceive is an object having existence before or after the perception of it, and that its state at the time

when it is perceived and at some other time of which we think is unchanged. When we see the back of the house later than the front and say that the back and the front are simultaneous, we think that the front as we saw it earlier is still existing unchanged, and it is the unseen front as it now is which is simultaneous with the back now perceived. The point of this analysis is that it seems to invalidate Kant's view that we cannot decide the time-determinations of perceived objects unless we know by what rules the objects are controlled. What the knowledge of rules enables us to decide is something different, namely, the identity or difference of objects of different perceptions, and their constant or varying states at times when they are not perceived. If this is so, we seem to be justified in making the following comment on Kant's argument. Kant thinks that consciousness of an object is consciousness of a systematic complex of presentations, perceptual and imaginary, and that without the idea of causality we cannot be conscious of an object because a complex of presentations is not taken to be systematic unless it is thought to be governed by rules or necessary principles of connexion. The facts, however, of consciousness to which he refers seem to suggest that we start with the idea of an object having objective temporal states (which are known so far as they are perceived) and then set ourselves to ask certain questions about the states of the object when it is not perceived, which we resolve with the help of the idea of causality. But this is not to think of the object as a complex of presentations.

It is not, however, necessary for us to investigate here the dubious elements of the Second Analogy. Without going further we seem entitled to say that two points have become evident: first that Kant is working on the basis that what we perceive is the content of the act of perception and that objects are constructed by thought, operating on the basis of perception; and secondly that though he distinguishes acts of consciousness and their contents he has by no means, as we see from his views on time-determination, a full insight into the problems connected with his position.

That Kant was not satisfied with his earlier analysis of a presentation and its implications is shown to some extent by his revision of the Transcendental Deduction (where, however, he is also occupied with other matters), but more particularly by the pains which he took to offer a new version of the Refutation of Idealism. At the same time he found it difficult, even in his new

account, to formulate his position, as is shown by the fact that after writing his second Refutation he not only recurs to it in his Preface to the second edition, but adds a long footnote to the Preface in which he revises part of the text of the Refutation and restates its meaning. For this reason it is necessary to be cautious in interpretation. It seems, however, on the whole that he was principally disturbed by consciousness of a failure to express properly the parallelism which he had in mind between time and space, and between internal states as the occupants of the one, and physical objects as the occupants of the other or of both. We have seen in considering the argument which he directed against Descartes in the first Refutation that he seemed to lack a clear appreciation of the fact that he implied a reference to two different kinds of consciousness, the consciousness which, according to his general position, employs the form of time and the consciousness which is itself in time. It was in consequence of this that there was a confusion which he did not see in his comparison of spatial objects and temporal states of consciousness. Spatial objects he was accustomed to think were internal to states of consciousness. If therefore our states of consciousness are taken to be strictly parallel to spatial objects, they should be regarded as internal to states of consciousness, and just as the form of space belongs to spatial objects because we are thus from time to time conscious of them, so, too, we should think that the form of time belongs to internal states because we are thus from time to time conscious of them. But when the position is stated in this way, it becomes evident that it is untenable, because time cannot be thought to be the content of states of consciousness which are themselves in time, but only of a consciousness which is not temporal. In that case the parallelism which it is sought to maintain between time and space is invalidated.

Now if we suppose that Kant became aware of this difficulty, we can see why he begins his second Refutation by insisting that we are conscious of our own existence (or, as he puts it later, of our internal experience) as determined in time,<sup>1</sup> and then connects this point with a revised account of the status which must be attributed

<sup>1</sup> It may be thought strange that this should be the starting-point of Kant's new doctrine, since what he now says seems to be in essence the same as what he said insistently in the first-edition version of the Transcendental Deduction. But it is not difficult to see that in the two contexts there is a wide difference in his point of view. In the Deduction he was interested in the temporal nature of our experience, because he thought of the way in which it affected the content of consciousness. If

to spatial objects. The sequence of his thought (which is clearest when the text is read along with the footnote to the Preface) should be carefully observed. What he first draws from our awareness of our internal states as determined in time is the externality of time itself; as he says in the Preface, 'this consciousness of my existence in time implicitly contains consciousness of a relation to something external to me'. We cannot say, if we steadily keep in mind the relation of our presentations to time, that there is actually no external time but only my presentation of external time. Such a view would make time the content of a presentation, but we cannot think this and also think that the presentation occurs in time. The transition from this reflection regarding the way in which time and our presentations are related to the view that the spatial order and its contents are also external to our presentations depends on two lines of thought. The first is Kant's general view that time and space have a like status, so that what we say about time and temporal things should also be said about space and spatial things. The second is the doctrine that all dating in time is with reference to other contents of time, that the notion of empty stretches of time is inconceivable and destructive of time-determination, that the content of time must thus be continuous, and that the only continuous content of time of which we can think is the substance of the spatial world. The grounds of this interpretation of Kant's position are set out in my *Kantian Studies* and will not be discussed here. We will leave Kant's arguments aside, and instead consider directly the implication of the difference between his earlier and his later doctrine, together with some ambiguities and difficulties which his later doctrine does not resolve.

When Kant, following in the footsteps of Hume, maintained that external objects are our presentations, or as he sometimes suggests more accurately, the content of our presentations, he was obliged to answer the question, How, if this be so, are the things which we call real any different from those contents of consciousness which we think are only imaginary? To this question he thought he could answer that they are distinguished by their necessary conformity to certain rules or principles. Reflecting then on the problem of the way in which we can have knowledge of consciousness is separated into different moments, its contents are discrete, and that is why syntheses are necessary. In the second Refutation he reflects on another matter. His problem now is, what ought we to think about the status, and the relation to other things, of consciousness itself, when we bear in mind that consciousness occurs in time.

such necessary conformity to principles, he conjoined with his answer the further doctrine that the principles themselves are necessary ways in which the mind thinks of an object which it judges to be real; he could thus say that in knowing the necessary conformity of objects to principles the mind in reality knows the necessities of its own nature, and he thought it was not unreasonable to assert that consciousness could have this knowledge of itself. We need not now consider in detail the difficulties of the doctrine that it is the nature of an object to be a system of our presentations; though we may note in passing that a foremost difficulty seems to be that the mind does not think of objects in this way. Kant himself seems implicitly to recognize the point in the ambiguous passage of the first Transcendental Deduction, where he seeks to explain the concept of a transcendental object and finds it hard to escape from the belief that objects which we recognize as such are not merely systems of presentations, but are connected with something in the order of time or space in virtue of which presentations are systematic. He does not, however, clearly see that the persistent presence in our minds of such a belief is an anomaly if we are only conscious of the contents of our presentations and of a system in which the different presentations occur or might occur. Nor does he see the formidable objections which can be brought against the doctrine that the system of presentations is conferred on them by the mind in which they are present. However that may be, it seems that Kant's doctrine is affected in all its bearings by his abandonment of the view that spatial objects are constituted by reflection on the content of our momentary presentations. When he asserts that there are certain necessities or principles which are inherent in the manner of our consciousness, and that objects must conform to these necessities or principles, his argument is based on the doctrine that objects are contents of our consciousness. If objects are rightly regarded as contents of presentations which are united by the mind into a necessary system, it seems to him to follow that objects cannot but conform to the system given to them by the mind, since they are objects only in virtue of such conformity. The doctrine is no doubt precarious, unless it is supposed that the mind controls the contents of the presentations which it unites in a system, and this the account which Kant gives of the form and matter of intuition does not allow. But whether on its own premisses the argument is satisfactory or not, the main question is how it can be retained when

spatial objects are no longer thought to be the contents of our presentations or a system of these contents. Looking back to the problem of the difference of the real from the imaginary, we must say now that the difference is to be found in the fact that whereas imaginary objects are constituted from elements which are internal to our presentations, the elements from which real objects are constituted are independent of our presentations and not internal to them. If Kant argues that even so the elements are not regarded as objects unless the mind thinks of them in certain ways which belong to the nature of our thought, two objections may be taken to this answer. First there is the difficulty (implicit, it may be believed, in his earlier doctrine, but now at any rate clearly manifest) which concerns the necessary conformity of elements independent of our consciousness to the ways in which we think about them. The second objection, which goes further, is that the whole argument for holding that the recognition of an object depends on the thought of systematic connexion is impaired if we believe that our consciousness is such that we can be aware of something which is independent of it and separate. If we can be directly aware of the external, is there the same ground that there was when we thought that everything was within our consciousness and conditioned by its nature for saying that awareness of the external can only take place when it is thought to be connected and systematic? If this objection is correct, it seems to involve the reconsideration of much that is fundamental in Kant's doctrines.

Kant's new position, however, has not yet been properly stated. We go too far if we think that he now asserts that the elements from which the mind constitutes objects are altogether independent of consciousness, for he supposes that these elements are temporal and spatial and he has not surrendered the doctrine that time and space are forms of our consciousness. The difficulty for those who think that Kant is now plainly revealed as a realist turns on this point. His doctrine is not that what is temporal or spatial is independent of consciousness, but only that it is independent of our momentary presentations. But the bearing of this doctrine is left indeterminate in the *Critique*, and it seems that Kant has not considered to what it leads nor what alteration it may necessitate in other doctrines on which he had insisted before. We can, however, see in what direction it points, and it is possible to obtain some confirmatory evidence from his later work. Since he holds that time and space are forms of the individual's intuition,

although the form is alike in every human consciousness, he tends to think of two ways in which we should regard the mind or the self of the individual or of two kinds of mind or self, and to ascribe different functions to the one and to the other. This line of thought seemed to him to be connected with the distinction, which was present in his earlier doctrine, of the noumenal and the phenomenal self. Accordingly we find in his later unpublished writings the emergence of the view that the forms of time and space emanate from the noumenal self or the self-in-itself and are internal to the consciousness of this self; neither time nor space are internal to the temporary moments of consciousness which constitute the phenomenal self, nor are the objects which they contain, although certain features of these objects, such as secondary qualities, are dependent on the conditions under which the phenomenal consciousness operates.

If we ask whether it is possible to be satisfied with the development of Kant's doctrine along these lines, it seems, when we examine it, that some serious objections are revealed. In the first place Kant is still maintaining the doctrine that there are so many times and spaces as there are individual minds (which indeed is the regular doctrine of the *Critique*), and he thereby precludes the possibility of explaining the communication of one mind with another or the sharing of common knowledge. This objection doubtless needs to be supported, but since in the following chapter we shall have occasion to consider the requisite conditions under which communication or common knowledge seems to be explicable, we shall not discuss it here<sup>1</sup>. Other objections are more particular to what is new in Kant's doctrine. They turn on a difficulty which arises when we apply the concept of the phenomenon to consciousness itself, and in discussing them we need to notice that there is ambiguity in Kant's account of what a phenomenon is. Let us consider first what he means by the contrast of noumena and phenomena when he is thinking of physical objects and not of consciousness. One meaning which he gives to the contrast is that noumena are the unknown causes which produce in us states of consciousness having particular contents; the contents of these states of consciousness, synthesized and systematized, are what we ordinarily call physical objects, and on this doctrine call pheno-

<sup>1</sup> Some points bearing on the question whether the objection is met by the doctrine of noumena are discussed in the chapter on 'The Antithesis of Noumena and Phenomena' in my *Kantian Studies*.

mena.<sup>1</sup> On such an interpretation, there is no consciousness of noumena; the mind is conscious only of its own contents and the objects of which it is conscious are held to be phenomena precisely because they have the status of contents of consciousness. (It should be observed that this view is in close connexion with Kant's initial doctrine that objects are the contents of our presentations.) The second and alternative meaning given to the contrast arises from the usual connotation of the term 'appearance'. The term suggests not that we are wholly unaware of that which appears to us, but that we are aware of it in a form different from that in which it really exists. The implication accordingly of the second meaning is that our consciousness is not such as to be confined to its own content, but is conscious of the noumenon, although the form in which it is conscious of it is determined by the nature of consciousness itself. If we now consider with reference to each of these views the question whether consciousness can be said to be phenomenal, we shall see some of the difficulties in which Kant's new doctrine is involved. If we follow the view that the phenomenal is that of which the nature is to be the content of consciousness, we should recall Berkeley's contention, which seems to be correct, that a content of consciousness as such cannot be held to be active; ideas, as he says, of which the *esse* is *percipi* are inert. A presentation, then, which is regarded as being phenomenal in this sense ceases to be properly an active consciousness, and there seems to be no meaning in asking the question whether that of which it is conscious is internal to it or external and independent. Obviously, if this be so, the same thing must be said of phenomenal consciousness generally or of the phenomenal self or mind which is regarded as a unity of phenomenal moments of consciousness. We may also note in passing the further difficulty that if we regard phenomenal consciousness as the content of noumenal consciousness, we claim to know the existence and at least something of the nature of noumenal consciousness, and this contradicts the view that we have no consciousness of noumena. The alternative view of the antithesis of noumena escapes these difficulties; but it has its own difficulty, and it makes Kant's new doctrine no more convincing. We have on this view to suppose that in being aware of the phenomenal self or consciousness we are aware of noumenal consciousness; the awareness, however, is in a form which does not belong to noumenal consciousness, but is imposed by the way in which we are conscious of it. Now the way in which we are con-

scious of it not only endows it with a temporal aspect, but also makes physical objects appear to be external to it. But the doctrine of the second Refutation does not suppose that physical objects are external to the noumenal consciousness, and accordingly, on this doctrine, the appearance of externality must be held to be a distortion of the true nature of that noumenal consciousness whose appearance we apprehend. Such a result does not seem to be a satisfactory conclusion of Kant's effort to show that spatial objects are external to our presentations and independent of them.

Nevertheless, though Kant's doctrine in the form in which he leaves it may well seem dubious, its importance should not be ignored. He has seen that we cannot but think that our acts of consciousness occur in time, that the time order extends beyond them and has other occupants, including spatial things, and that our consciousness can apprehend what occupies time besides itself. If Kant is right we must not, when we investigate the nature of our consciousness, forget its connexion with a particular part of time (and, we should doubtless add, of space), a connexion which implies that other things are external to it both in the sense that they are not its content and in the sense that they have a different location in the order of time and space. On these points we may well be reluctant to hold that Kant is wrong. On the other hand, he does not think that he can abandon the position that our consciousness of the nature of time and space is different from our consciousness of their occupants (including ourselves), and it is for this reason that his thought turns in the direction of distinguishing two kinds of self. Whether there are good reasons for what he thinks about our consciousness of time and space is the question which we must next consider. If it seems that there are, we shall need to see whether the suggestion of a division of consciousness can be formulated without recourse to Kant's doctrine of the noumenal and the phenomenal self, of which the implications seemed to be untenable.

With these points in mind we may turn our attention to his distinction of the form and matter of intuition. We shall perhaps see that reflection on the distinction itself will suggest an alternative way in which we may think that the nature of our consciousness is dual.

### *§ 2. The Antithesis of the Form and Matter of Intuition.*

The substance of the doctrine which we have now to consider is that when we are conscious of objects the mind is relating a matter, itself given, to the forms of space or of time, which are *a priori*

elements in our consciousness. It will be convenient to consider the doctrine principally in its application to space, since we thus avoid the constant reference to both space and time and it is not difficult to apply our reflections on the form of space to the form of time also.

There seems to be some room for misapprehension at the outset. We may suppose that Kant is thinking of spatial form as a sort of quality which the mind bestows on the matter of sense when any part of it is given in consciousness. Thus we can say that the mind bestows spatiality or extendedness on a given which is non-extended. If we state the position in this way we notice that a certain problem arises. If the mind bestows extension on a sensible—for example, colour—it must be extension in a particular form. The individual instance of colour must be intuited as circular or triangular or of some other particular shape. But then the question becomes insistent, why the shape should be this rather than that. There are many both of those who defend and of those who criticize Kant's doctrine who think that it may be so stated. The defenders say that the explanation of the particular form lies in the nature of the given or perhaps of the noumenal agent which is the cause of the given. The critics retort that on examination this answer implies that the mind conforms to the nature of the given or of something which is altogether independent of itself, or that the notion of a pre-arranged harmony is necessary, and that either of these implications destroys Kant's doctrine. The critics seem to have the better case in this controversy. It is significant, however, that both sides allow that Kant himself seems not to have noticed the problem. It may perhaps be suggested that he did not notice it because it does not belong to his doctrine, but arises from a misconception of it. When Kant gives his exposition of space the first point which he makes is that space is that wherein objects are disposed or placed in relation to each other; objects which I see or feel in space are in a different place to where my body is and they are in separate places from each other (A 23=B 38). The single whole of space which is a system of differentiated individual parts standing in strict geometrical relations to each other is the form of space to which any spatial object is related. It is this which must 'be the foundation' of our apprehension of a particular object. He is evidently not thinking primarily of the object's spatiality or extendedness but of the whole extent of space to which it is related, and for this reason

he is anxious to distinguish the form of space from the concept of spatiality. The way in which he conceives that the mind operates on the given is not expressed by saying that it bestows extendedness on unextended sensations, but rather by saying that it relates its extended sensations (or better, the extended content of sensation) to the whole schema of space.

There seems, however, to be an obvious objection to this statement. It is apparently being said that the spatial form of a sensible object is given without intervention or control on the part of the conscious mind, and that what the mind provides is the notion of space external to the object and of the relations between the object and this external or surrounding space. But the spatial relations of the internal parts of the object are no less controlled by geometrical principles than are its relations to surrounding space. If then, as Kant affirms, geometrical principles issue from the mind, we must come back to the point that both the form of the object and its relations to the rest of space must be the work of the mind. It is perhaps possible, however, to state the matter somewhat differently so as to avoid such a criticism.

Let us suppose, as Kant does, that consciousness of the schema of the single space is the requisite basis of the mind's apprehension of objects. (This does not mean that the mind is aware of the schema before it is sensibly conscious.) It will be proper to add the statement, though Kant does not directly say this<sup>1</sup>, that a basic element of that consciousness is the mind's power of recognizing that any part of the space schema is such as to be capable of having other qualities in addition to its geometrical qualities. Now we may say that when we have sense consciousness there are three elements in this consciousness; we are aware of a certain part of the space schema, we are aware that it is a part, i.e. that it is related to the rest of space, and we are aware that this particular part has certain other qualities than its geometrical qualities or determinations. Looking at the position thus, we can then put the question, why does this particular part of space possess the character of being, e.g., red? The part referred to, of course, like any other part of space has a shape, and in this case let us suppose that it is triangular. We notice now that our question is the reverse of the question which seemed to raise a problem for Kant's doctrine. We are not asking why a triangular shape (rather than, e.g., a circular shape) is bestowed on this particular

<sup>1</sup> Cf., however, A 156 = B 195, referred to later (p. 84 below).

redness, but we are asking instead why this particular triangular piece of space has the colour red (rather than, e.g., the colour green). It seems that the question stated in this manner does not involve the problem which the reverse question raises. The latter question suggests that the mind finds itself with a sensation of red which requires to be determined spatially, and since all space-determination is the work of the mind, the choice of the particular spatial form must be referred to the work of the mind. The difficulty is then that we are unable to allow what it seems necessary to allow, namely that the shape of the redness is part of the data of experience. The former question starts from the basis that the mind is conscious of the space schema ; there is nothing here which requires to be geometrically determined, though doubtless more and more of the infinite implications of the space schema come to be elicited by the mind. What remains to be determined is the characteristics other than geometrical of the various parts of the schema, and since there is no suggestion that this kind of determination issues from the basic nature of consciousness, there is no difficulty in saying that the actual determinations are given.

The foregoing line of thought seems to accord with a number of the points which Kant makes in the Aesthetic. For instance we may remember that when he is seeking to show how we can make the notion of the pure form of space more explicit to ourselves, he tells us to think of a process in which we gradually abstract all qualities from a corporeal object until we are left simply with extension and shape (cf. A 20, 21=B 35). What was the object is now, he evidently means, a particular area or volume of space, which is itself a determinate part of the totality of space. The basic fact is thus our consciousness of a selected part of space, which because it is selected or determinate has determinate geometrical characteristics ; and these geometrical characteristics of the particular area or volume are knowable, as are those of any other area or volume we may choose to take, in virtue of the mind's own principles of intuition. On the other hand, whatever else belongs to a particular part of space is given or comes from experience. From one point of view it seems that Kant's position is almost better described by saying that space is the matter and all qualities other than geometrical are the form or aspect which sensibility bestows on space.

We have considered one aspect of the doctrine that space is the form of our intuition, but there are still questions to be asked in

regard to it. One such question which presents itself is what contrast is implied between the matter and form of experience when it is said that the one is given and the other is not. If the matter referred to is supposed to be something outside consciousness or independent of it, we may perhaps think that this matter is given or presented to consciousness while the form, belonging as it does to the mind, represents the way in which we receive it. The form is then held to be subjective, whereas the matter has some claim to be objective, or real in a sense in which the form is not. It does not, however, accord with Kant's position to make a distinction between the form and the matter of consciousness which would controvert the view that the matter no less than the form is a state or condition of consciousness rather than something which is presented to consciousness. We therefore must not allow as any part of the connotation of the term 'given' the thought that the matter which is said to be given does not belong to consciousness equally with the form. But we may ask whether, even if it be held that matter and form both belong to consciousness, it is still not possible to make some distinction between them in respect of reality or objectivity, and whether a distinction in this respect is not conveyed when the matter is said to be given and the form not.

At first sight it seems that Kant makes no such distinction, inasmuch as his regular doctrine is that neither the matter without the form nor the form without the matter is real. There are, however, some references to space in the Analytic which seem to imply something of the kind. We may first consider a passage in § 22 of the second edition of the Transcendental Deduction where Kant writes:

'To think an object and to know an object are not the same thing. In knowledge there are two elements; first the concept whereby in general an object is thought (the category), and secondly the intuition whereby it is given, for if a corresponding intuition could not be given to the concept, it would be a thought in respect of its form, but a thought without any object, and by means of it no knowledge of any thing would be possible; since so far as my consciousness went there would be nothing and could be nothing to which my thought could be applied. Now all intuition possible to us is sensuous (Aesthetic), and therefore the thought of an object in general through a pure concept of the understanding can for us only be knowledge in so far as the concept is related to objects of the senses. Sensuous intuition is either pure intuition (space and time) or empirical intuition of that which is immediately presented as real in space and time through sensation. By means of the determination of pure intuition we can have *a priori* knowledge of

objects, (in Mathematics) but only in respect of the form which they have as phenomena; whether there are things which must be intuited in this form is not thereby established. Consequently all mathematical concepts are not in themselves knowledge except in so far as it is presupposed that there are things which can only be presented to us in accordance with the form of pure sensuous intuition' (B 146, 147).

This passage suggests a different standpoint from that of the Aesthetic. Kant seems not now to be thinking of the form of space as a totality extending beyond any particular object, a totality with which objects generally are so connected that they obtain therein their relations to each other. Instead he is thinking of it as the form which is bestowed on an object by the mind in virtue of its own mode of intuition. Because he thinks of it thus his argument is that the form has no actuality apart from the object of which it is the form. But his thought is by no means clear, and we must consider the question whether the conceptual element in consciousness as such has as its object or content anything real or actual. When the question is raised in this general form, it seems possible to say that in so far as the object of conceptual consciousness as such is a universal it is necessary, if there is to be knowledge of the actual that the conceptual consciousness should be conjoined with consciousness of an instance or instances of the universal. But such a statement would be insufficient, for the mind is conscious of an instance of a universal when it imagines an instance, though it does not claim that the instance is real. This leads to the second requisite for consciousness of the actual, namely that the instance should be given or sensibly apprehended, or should at least stand in necessary connexion with sensuous apprehension. Kant's thought seems to be on some such lines, but it introduces a number of complications. He first insists that if there is to be knowledge, concepts should be conjoined with intuition, and he thereby shows that he is thinking, to begin with, of conceptual consciousness in separation from intuition, i.e. of the categories in their most abstract form. But he indicates at the same time that more is required than connexion with the form of intuition; the intuition must be empirical intuition which comprises the manifold of sense and not only the form. So much is plain when he says that in the intuition the object is given. Now Kant might have been content with insisting that when we know an actual object there must be categories of the understanding, the form of intuition and sensation. But, in order apparently to press the point that sensation is

necessary in knowledge of an object, he maintains further that consciousness of the pure form of space is not knowledge or consciousness of anything real, and that thus mathematical concepts are not knowledge except in so far as it is presupposed that there are things which can be presented to us in accordance with the form of pure sensuous intuition. It is this doctrine that space is not itself an object of knowledge or a real object of consciousness which it is necessary to question.

In the first place let us notice that we must rule out arguments for the unreality of the form of space which are connected with our ideas of the nature of conceptual consciousness taken by itself. If the form of space were the concept of spatiality only, and if the instances of spatiality were not particular spaces but objects, it would be possible to argue that the form of space, i.e. spatiality, was not actual apart from its instances. But the form of space, as conceived by Kant himself, includes both the spatiality and the instances of it. The totality of space and all parts of space are themselves individual and the proper instances of spatiality, and it is this totality of the parts of space which is the form of space. If we think that apart from instances of spatiality the reality of the form of space cannot be allowed, it is not necessary to look to objects and say that the form of space is unreal without them. The form of space itself provides the instances. Kant fully realizes the position in the Aesthetic, but he seems to some extent to have lost sight of it in the Analytic. This is the significance of the point we noticed earlier, that he seems now to be thinking of space as a form bestowed on objects rather than as a form or schema with which objects are connected. When space is thought of as the extendedness of objects, the conceptual side of the form of space is inevitably emphasized at the expense of the notion of its individuality and the implications which its individuality carries. Before we leave this aspect of the matter we may make one further point in regard to it. We have noticed generally that the form of space itself includes (as a whole and in its parts) the instances of spatiality. In the same way it includes the instances of particularized geometrical concepts. If we think, for example, of the concepts of a circle or a triangle their proper instances are at once infinite and present anywhere in the form of space; for the form of space is such that instances of a circle or a triangle can be anywhere in it. So far from it being true that instances can only be found in objects, the qualities other than geometrical which constitute

an object are altogether irrelevant as regards the instantiation of any geometrical concept. Here again we see that if the alleged unreality of the form of space is based on the notion that geometrical concepts are not actual apart from their instances, the answer is that the instances are provided by the form of space itself.

There is a second way in which Kant's account seems to suggest misleading issues. When he is referring to the pure categories he implies that without intuition there is nothing which the mind can have as an object of consciousness. But pure intuition, he would say, is possible and has space as its object. The question here is whether the object can be regarded as real, and his answer is that space is only a real object of consciousness when the intuition is sensuous or empirical. If that is how he regards the matter, the problem of the reality of space does not seem to resemble the problem of the reality of pure concepts. The question raised is more akin to one which we might ask about the reality of imagined objects where the answer is determined by a reference to sensuous intuition. I imagine a hippogriff, but I can only say that it is real if it is given, i.e. if I have sensuous intuition of it. But can I say that space as an object of consciousness must be regarded as imaginary until I have experience of its sensuous qualities? The two cases are not parallel. The imagined hippogriff presents all the features which an object might have in reality, and it is said to be imaginary not because it is lacking in features which belong to a real object but because these features are only imagined. If pure space is regarded as imaginary it is not for the same reason, but because it is devoid of certain features possessed by that which we call a real object. But we may ask why it is necessary that space should have these features in order that it should be a real object. They are features which are necessary to a real extended body, but space is not an extended body. We may suspect that Kant is mistaking the conditions of knowing the reality of bodies for conditions of knowing the reality of space. We may perhaps go further and suggest that whereas sensuous qualities may be imaginary or real, space as an object of consciousness can only be real. Such a suggestion may sound paradoxical when we think of the space of our dreams, but it can reasonably be said that in our dreams it is not the space which is unreal but the objects which we imagine as its occupants. The case of waking imagination seems perhaps to be harder, because here we are conscious both of space with its real

spatial occupants and of certain imaginary objects which are also spatial. If the latter are spatial they must be imagined as occupying space. But can the space which they are imagined as occupying be the space which is pre-empted for real occupants? Must we not rather say that for imaginary objects there is needed an imaginary space? The answer, however, does not seem to be very difficult. Two cases should be distinguished. In the one I may imagine an object or objects substituted for those which are actually present, e.g. a pen which is better than that which I now use. Evidently in this case the space in which the imaginary object is placed is the real space of actual objects. In the second case I imagine, let us say, the landscape of *The Faerie Queene*. Here it seems that either I imagine myself looking at a scene or living in a world substituted for that which I know to be real—and if so, this case is not substantially different from the other; or else I imagine this new world as indeterminately located somewhere in the old. The latter is possible, because although I imagine the landscape as located in real space, I know that it is imaginary, not real, and therefore I relate it only imperfectly or indeterminately in my imagination to the form of space as a whole and to its actual occupants. All this is indeed a corollary to Kant's views regarding the connexion of the forms of space and time with our consciousness of reality.<sup>1</sup> To imagine anything is to imagine, but not judge, it to be real. If then the real is that which is connected with the one space and time, anything which is imagined as real must be so connected by the imagination. Such a view of imagination and its relation to the form of intuition seems accordingly to be not only possible, but to have good reasons in its favour. It has, moreover, at least the advantage that we need not multiply entities, but can say that the space in which we apprehend some real objects and some imaginary and the space in which we apprehend only imaginary objects, are all one and the same space.

We may also consider the question whether space is real apart from sensuous intuition in connexion with the nature and relations of a sensuously apprehended object. When we apprehend an object in space, its geometrical character has two aspects. On the one hand, it possesses an infinity of geometrical characteristics in respect of the relations to each other of its own parts. But it also possesses geometrical relations to the space which encloses it. Thus a part of its boundary may be convex in relation to the

<sup>1</sup> See Chapter I of my *Kantian Studies*.

object's own extension, and at the same time be an arc of a circle in relation to space external to it. No question arises in regard to the reality of the object's internal geometrical characteristics because it has also sensible qualities. But its geometrical relations to surrounding space present a difficulty if we hold that space is unreal unless it is endowed with sensible qualities. The possession by the object of these relations would seem to depend on the question whether or not the surrounding space is sensible. But it is hard to maintain that this is so or that the object does not possess relations to external space which are just as much a part of its geometrical nature as the relations of its own parts to each other, whether the external space has sensible qualities or not. The same question arises if we suppose that there is another object in the surrounding space. Here we have to ask whether the distance of the one object from the other is only a real relation if the space between the two objects has sensible qualities. Hume thought that he was bound to hold to this opinion, but his defence of it has an ill success. We seem to be entangled, however, in the difficulties of Hume's position unless we are prepared to maintain that space can be real, although it presents no sensible qualities to intuition.

If the foregoing considerations are valid we must regard it as unfortunate that Kant tended to modify the doctrine of the Aesthetic in this particular direction. We should notice, however, that in some passages of the Analytic he states a position which is less liable to objection. A different turn is given to the matter, for instance, in A 156, 157=B 195, 196. Here Kant writes;

'Space and time themselves, pure as these conceptions are of anything empirical, and certain as it is that they are presented completely *a priori* in the mind, would yet be without objective validity and without sense and significance, if their necessary employment in relation to the objects of experience were not demonstrated; indeed the presentation of them is a bare schema which always relates to the reproductive imagination, without which they would have no significance; and so it is with all concepts without distinction. The possibility of experience therefore is that which gives objective reality to all our cognitions. . . . Although therefore in regard to space generally and the shapes which productive imagination describes in it we know so much *a priori* in the way of synthetical judgments, and indeed actually need no experience for this purpose, yet this knowledge would be nothing but a busy occupation with a mere figment of the imagination if space were not to be considered as the condition of the phenomena which constitute the matter of external experience.'

Hence these synthetical judgments relate, though only mediately to possible experience or rather to the possibility of experience, and on this alone the objective validity of their synthesis is founded.'

This is a different doctrine. It does not take space as being equivalent to the concept of spatiality and maintain that because space is the conceptual form which the mind bestows on the sensible, no space is real which is without sensible qualities. What is maintained instead is that space has no importance or significance for consciousness unless it is brought into relation with sensible qualities which characterize it or (alternatively expressed) with objects which occupy it. Further, it is not implied that in order that space and its parts shall be significant every part of it should have sensible qualities in addition to its geometrical properties. All that is necessary is that every part of space should be related to possible experience. Here it seems that Kant is taking the point,<sup>1</sup> though it is not stated quite explicitly, that there is included in our *a priori* notions of space the notion that it is such as to be essentially capable of being sensibly no less than geometrically determined. There is no need to object to the doctrine that space is only significant in relation to objects, and indeed we may go further and allow that apart from the apprehension of sensible qualities somewhere in space there could be no consciousness of space. In his reference to geometry he perhaps says more than the geometer could or should allow. But the reservation to be made touches mainly the implication that sensible qualities are any more significant by themselves than geometrical determinations. Neither the former nor the latter seem to be fully significant except in relation to mind and its needs. Kant's protest against the insignificance of the abstract should be carried rather further.

We are now in a position to consider what meaning and implications must be attached to the statement that the sensible qualities of space are given whereas space itself is not. Both alike are contents of consciousness in Kant's view, and it seems that we are not entitled to say that space is less real or more subjective than the sensible qualities which characterize it. Can we say that space is a content of consciousness which is subject to the arbitrament of mind, and that sensible qualities are not? We certainly cannot say this in the sense that mind is free to be conscious of space or not, or to be conscious of it in any way that it pleases. But if we are

<sup>1</sup> See p. 77 above.

debarred from describing the distinction thus, we may begin to doubt whether any distinction is possible.

A distinction, however, is possible, and it is important to make it. Although we are not free to be conscious of space as we please, it seems that the enlargement or development of our consciousness of space and its determinations is something which the mind has in its own power, and that this power or capacity of the mind in regard to spatial consciousness is different from its capacity in regard to the sensible element in intuition. If we ask why there should be this difference we can at least connect it with a further difference. The further difference can be expressed by saying that the mind seems to apprehend intelligible principles which govern its intuition of space, and because these principles are intelligible it is able in independence of actual sensation both to enlarge its consciousness of space without limit and to become conscious of particular determinations of space and the geometrical properties which necessarily belong to them, these determinations and properties again being unlimited. We may notice that in regard to both these aspects of the form of space it is easier to think of the matter in terms of the capacity of consciousness to expand without limit than in terms of an actual infinity characterizing space as an independent entity. Kant himself insists often enough that the mind is dissatisfied with the notion of an actual space either infinitely extended or infinitely divisible. Similarly we may think that there is some difficulty in regard to the infinity of the particular determinations of space, if we are obliged to say (as suggested above—see p. 81) that everywhere in the form of space there is an infinity of different shapes. In both cases the difficulty seems to be less if we describe the infinity in terms of the unlimited capacity of the mind to develop the form of its own intuition in virtue of its comprehension of the principles by which it is controlled. Now if so much is accepted as regards our consciousness of the form of space, we may turn to the other side and consider the character of the sensuous element in consciousness.

First we observe that the enlargement or development of consciousness by way of sensation is something different from the development of the form of intuition. Additions to sensation are not procured by the unaided power of the mind to reflect on the nature of its own consciousness. There are doubtless kinds of activity by means of which the mind can put itself in a position to acquire fresh sensuous experience. It can do so by creating a new

physical situation or even by its capacity of attention or concentration, but either of these methods is different from the self-development of consciousness which we have been considering. The former method may indeed, when it is translated into idealist terms, seem to come near to a process of self-development. We have to say, for example, that when we acquire fresh sensations by opening or closing our eyes, the mind acquires these fresh sensations by the self-creation of the sensation of having the eyes open or closed. But we must notice that the points of difference are important. The sensations which we acquire by means of the activity of the self are not themselves determined by this activity. We determine the sensation of having our eyes open, but we do not determine thereby what we see. Connected with this is the further point that at no stage are sensations obtained by reflection on the mind's sensuous consciousness. I do not obtain the sensation of having my eyes open by reflection on my present sensations, nor when I have the sensation of having my eyes open do I obtain my further sensation by way of reflection on this sensation. In these respects there is no real parallel between the enlargement of my sensuous experience and the development of my consciousness of the forms of intuition.

Let us now turn, however, to another aspect of the matter. Although the sequence of our actual sensations cannot, it seems, be regarded as a self-development of consciousness parallel to the development of our knowledge of the forms of intuition, yet we must recognize that there is a genuine self-development of consciousness connected with our sensations. The situation to be considered is quite different when we include in consciousness not only consciousness of the forms of intuition and actual sensations but also ideas of the sensible which are present through the agency of the imagination. Though reflection on sensations cannot by itself produce an enlargement of sensuous experience, it can and does produce the enlargement of consciousness to include imagined sensuous experience. Further, it is important to bear in mind that although reflection effects this enlargement of consciousness only with the aid of imagination, we think that what is brought about is not merely consciousness of the imaginary but knowledge or consciousness of the real. Let us consider our consciousness of some past event of which we suppose that we have knowledge, and ask what is the nature of this consciousness and what it is that we can claim to know. We do not of course have the sensations

which constituted experience of the event for anyone who actually experienced it. But we are able by means of the joint capacities of reflective thought and of imagination to imagine what the sensations which constituted experience were or would have been for anyone having the experience. Further, we believe that the ideas which imagination gives us of the sensations constituting some actual experience in certain respects at any rate truly represent or indicate this experience. It seems even that another step is possible, and that we are entitled to say that in the case we are considering this consciousness by imagination is the only true consciousness. We ought not to suppose that such consciousness is inadequate or inferior in kind. To be conscious of the past in imagination is the only proper way of apprehending the past. Sensation is the proper way of apprehending the present, and if *per impossibile* we were to have sensations of the past it would lose its character of being past and our consciousness would be misapprehending it. We may add that the same considerations apply to the future. Just as the past as it appears in imagination is the true being of the past for present consciousness, so, too, the future as it appears in imagination is the true being of the future for present consciousness. We must notice that we have here a difference between space and time on the one hand with their strictly spatial and temporal determinations and objects and events on the other hand which have other properties. If what was said earlier (see p. 82 above) can be accepted, there is no imaginary space or time, and therefore our consciousness of them has nothing parallel to the distinction between sensation and imagination. But that does not in itself make consciousness of space and time either superior or inferior to consciousness of objects and events. Each operates in the way which is proper to it, and in thus operating each is true consciousness.

The foregoing line of thought clearly affects the antithesis of the formal and sensuous elements in consciousness and obliges us to reconsider the contrast which we drew of the one and the other. If we include imagination on the side of the sensuous element and contend that it is a proper form of consciousness of reality (thus incidentally justifying Kant's treatment of the imagination), it seems that sensuous consciousness no less than consciousness of space and time has the capacity of enlarging and developing its own content provided that it is able to know and understand the principles by which it is governed. It is on the proviso, however,

that everything turns, and it seems hard to maintain without qualification that it is fulfilled. If we ask whether we know the principles which govern the occurrence of sensuous elements in space and time, we cannot claim more than that we have beliefs rather than knowledge, that the beliefs are constantly supported by our experience, and that they should be accounted reasonable. Further it seems that even if we attributed certainty to our beliefs, what we believe does not present itself to the mind as wholly understood or as intelligible. In regard to the pattern of sensible occurrences which is expressed in a law of nature we can ask, although we do not hope for an answer, why the pattern should be such as it is, because other patterns seem to be conceivable. On the other hand, in regard to space and time, if we follow Kant's view and hold that they are not entirely reducible to mathematical formulae, it does not seem that we genuinely speculate about an alternative nature which may be attributed to them; or, if we are persuaded by modern mathematical speculation to think that this statement is unjustified, at least we can maintain that there are some principles connected with the ordinary view of space which so control the construction of alternative systems as to prevent them from being in all respects arbitrary. It is in this sense that the principles of space and time seem to possess a different order of intelligibility from that of the sensuous elements of our experience. Lastly we should notice that when we find principles in our sensuous experience, what we claim to know in being conscious of these principles is the way in which some factors of our sensuous experience presuppose or involve other factors; we do not claim to know why the factors which involve other factors themselves occur, or, if we derive them from the occurrence of yet other factors, we suppose that this derivation cannot be without a limit. If this is so the occurrences to which the principles refer, when they state that this or that follows from them, have themselves no explanation nor are they intelligible. All these are points which bear on our question, because it seems that they enable us to conceive a distinction of the form and matter of experience, and so provide a justification of the way in which Kant regards them.

There are, however, other differences to be noticed, and we may find in reflecting on them that they lead us to important considerations regarding the nature of our consciousness. We may begin with the following points. In the development of our knowledge of space and time there seem to be no limiting conditions

other than the requirement that the development should be a systematic progress, one section of our insight being connected with or being the prelude to another. Subject to this requirement there is no knowledge which the mind may not hope to command, and all its knowledge is of the same order. But sensuous consciousness is different. Here there are two forms, direct or actual sensation and consciousness in the form of imagination of what sensation has been or will be or might be; and it is not possible for the mind to range over the whole field simply by a process of self-development. Even if it were supposed to be capable of knowing completely what sensation has been or will be or might be, it still cannot command actual sensations. With what are we to connect this difference? We may notice at the outset that whereas knowledge of space or time is limited by no connexion of consciousness with a particular point in space or time, there is such a limiting connexion in sensuous consciousness. In sensation consciousness is aware of qualities or contents of space and time, but what form they take depends on the point in space and time with which consciousness apprehends itself as being connected. In imagination of sensuous experience, what is imagined is also sensation thus connected with space and time. Thus it comes about that, though the mind can always apprehend any geometrical property of space, it cannot always have a particular sensation. But we may ask whether after all this difference is very great. The limitation in regard to what sensuous experience the mind may have is part of the nature of the mind, and it would seem that if it understood the principles of its own nature it would be able to command knowledge of all the experience that it is capable of having. The fact that it cannot command sensation at a given moment is a limitation of the experience that it can have. But inasmuch as it is a limitation dependent on its own nature, it does not seem to differ from the limitations which belong to our consciousness of space. We cannot have any sort of consciousness of space, because we can only have the sort of consciousness which the nature of mind allows.

We cannot, however, be satisfied with this line of thought. An important difference is indicated when we observe that we cannot command sensation, as we can command apprehension of the nature of space or time. There is some limitation here which we must try to define, in regard to the expansion or development of consciousness, a limitation which would remain even though we

made the supposition that the mind could know fully the principles of its own nature. To see how the matter stands, we must go back to the point already made that in sensation consciousness is connected in a particular way with space and time. Consciousness is localized, temporarily determined, and thereby limited. Doubtless the conception of localized consciousness is difficult. It is difficult for the realist who thinks that the physical world is one thing and consciousness another, and that the former is spatial and the latter is not. For how are we to envisage the localization of the non-spatial? Yet he finds it natural to speak of a world which is external to us, and the expression does not seem to mean that this world is external simply to our bodies; for our bodies are included in it. It would seem to be easier to drop the notion of externality to us and think instead of a world of objects which are external to each other. But this would ignore a persistent and necessary condition to which we are subject, namely the condition that we are situated in space, that this situation in space concerns our consciousness, and that the aspect of the world in sensation and perception is intimately affected by the association of consciousness with a point in space to which the rest of space is properly external. The notion of localization of consciousness despite its difficulty seems thus to be unavoidable. The idealist also is confronted by the difficulty, although the form it takes is different. Since he regards the spatial world as the content of consciousness, he certainly does not wish to say that consciousness is in its own content. Nevertheless he cannot ignore the fact that consciousness presents itself as an object, and in its capacity of object not only forms a part of the content of consciousness, but presents itself as associated with a particular part of the order of space. We should observe that when we think about this association of perceptual consciousness with space and reflect that it is determined through its connexion with the body by the spatial order, we are reminded of what Kant says in the second Refutation of Idealism regarding the determination of our presentations in time. It seems that if we recognize that perceptual consciousness is in some way localized, we may be on the road to the conclusion that space no more than time is the content of our presentations. The argument is more direct than Kant's, although it does not follow that the complicated course which his argument takes in the Refutation is not valuable in other respects.

We shall perhaps see better the bearing and implications of the

point we have been considering if we keep to our purpose of trying to work out the distinction between sensuous consciousness and our consciousness of space or time. Comparison with the Refutation argument does not carry us further in this respect, because Kant does not there concern himself with this question. Having said that our moments of consciousness are determined in time and that therefore the time order is not contained in them, he does not ask within what consciousness the time order is contained, nor what is the relation between the consciousness which contains time and our own consciousness which is contained in time. Now in our reflections on the nature of consciousness of space on the one hand and of its contents on the other, the conclusion seems to be emerging that we have both a consciousness of space which is independent of any position in it and a consciousness which is closely connected with position in space. To be conscious in the first way is a form of consciousness which is not affected or impeded by the limitations imposed by the separate individuality of minds. The second form of consciousness seems to be essentially related to the separation of individual minds. That it is thus related can be seen if we think of a consciousness having as its content time and space and whatever determinations other than temporal and spatial belong to the time and space order, and if we suppose that such a consciousness is also manifold because, in addition to its concern with the whole, its operation is so connected with particular parts of its content that there exist forms or modes of consciousness the contents of which are limited and distinct from each other. On this supposition the fact that consciousness associates itself with a particular part of time and space or with a particular occupant of time and space is the reason for the being of individual consciousness. But when, or in so far as, consciousness is thus divided and limited, its nature is in many respects transformed. Because it is now associated with one part of time and space rather than another the rest of the time and space order is external to it in a sense in which it is not external to complete consciousness. The contents of one individual consciousness and another are not the same, because the external world for each is what it is in relation to a consciousness differently conditioned. Moreover, the conditions touching knowledge and the self-development of consciousness are different with the introduction of the condition of externality. Because consciousness is individual and limited the factors necessary for its expansion

cannot be resident in itself alone but in what is external to it. Hence it cannot command this and that element of consciousness at will, or understand fully the principles of its own experience.

We have been reflecting on two kinds of consciousness, but the point to which it is desirable to return is that both these kinds seem to be present or partly present in the consciousness of the individual. Neither kind is present in a pure or complete form. If we think of what Kant calls the pure intuition of space, we notice first that the act of intuition belongs to a particular moment in time, that what the mind can be conscious of in such a moment is limited, and that in following out the nature of space it cannot attain a single synoptic view, but in part must be content with its memory of conclusions reached in earlier trains of thought. Further, we must notice that even if what we contemplate is the pure form of space in abstraction from all properties or qualities other than geometrical determinations, there is a kind of sensible element which here also can and perhaps must be present. The kind of sensible element is this. Besides thinking of a pure volume of space in a purely geometrical way, which is not connected with our own position in space, we can also be aware of the character which such a volume possesses for consciousness which is connected with a particular spatial position. If we abstract all the qualities of a penny except its extent and geometrical shape, we can still retain the consciousness that the volume of space which is the basis of, or is occupied by, the penny's sensuous qualities is elliptical in relation to a consciousness which is associated with one point of space and round in relation to a consciousness associated with another. Not only so, but it is perhaps hard to say that the geometrical consciousness can be wholly dissociated from this consciousness which connects itself with position in space. The latter consciousness is not sensuous in the way that it contemplates sensuous qualities in the object, but at least it shares with sense consciousness the peculiarity of association with a particular position in space. These considerations regarding the manner in which the more universal kind of consciousness in ourselves is implicated with the more particular or individual kind have a bearing on a question which we might raise regarding the first of these two kinds of consciousness. The question is whether the consciousness which we have called universal is in the fullest sense identical in different individuals. If we were to think of consciousness wholly dissociated from particular relations to space

or time and tried also to think of a multiplicity of such consciousnesses the contents of which are the same, it would perhaps be hard to imagine how such indiscernibles could be held apart and remain a multiplicity. It is also hard to abandon the idea of the separation of what we call individual minds. But we may be less reluctant to say that the universal element of consciousness is one and the same in all individuals if we recognize that everywhere in the operation of the universal consciousness in individuals there are factors present which maintain the distinctions and the limitations of the individual mind.

If we turn to the other side and consider the sensuous element which exhibits what is particular and limited in consciousness, we shall similarly find a mingling or interconnexion of the two kinds of consciousness. Although the determinations of sensation are connected with a particular position in space and time with which consciousness is associated, yet the mind seems to be aware that the differences of consciousness which thus arise are not unrelated to each other. It is able, in some degree at any rate, on the basis of a particular determination of sensation to know what other determinations there will be in relation to other positions in space and time. Thus when we see an object appearing in one form we know what different appearances it will have for ourselves and others if we and they are differently situated. But to know the system of these different appearances is to have a kind of knowledge which is not sensuous nor itself dependent on a particular situation in time or space. Further, we seem to have some capacity of knowing certain general features of the nature of sensation. This is what Kant refers to in the *Anticipations of Perception*, when he insists that it is part of what we know to be the formal nature of sensation that it should exhibit degree or be continuous. Yet again it seems that we have some insight into the general nature of the sensible qualities of different objects and their relations to each other, which convinces us that there is some pattern or system in their association in time and space, though what the pattern of association is we only conjecture slowly and uncertainly with the help of experience. This peculiar conjunction of what seems certainty in regard to some aspects of the general form of sensuous experience and uncertainty and dependence on experience in regard to the particular ways in which the general form is manifested, supports the view that even in sensuous consciousness there is an element of consciousness which is not

particular but universal. Sensuous consciousness in itself is so limited that what it is conscious of is not explicable in terms of its own nature. It is the same thing to say that what it is conscious of is in large part dependent on that which is external to itself. On the other hand, it does not seem to be wholly true that what lies outside itself is wholly external and unknowable. There are indications at least of something which seems to be a capacity of passing outside the limits imposed by the nature of sensation, and thereby to belong to universal and not to particular consciousness.

One final remark should be made before we leave this part of Kant's doctrine. The importance of formulating a right account of our consciousness of time and space is manifest, if we accept Kant's view that the distinction which we draw of what is real and what is imaginary turns on our consciousness of a single time and a single space, and that we ascribe reality only to that which is judged to have determinate relations to time or to time and space. Imagination, he holds, can imitate the real, and the merely imaginary is not a content of consciousness which has no temporal nor spatial aspect; but when we say that it is unreal we are asserting that the object of our consciousness is unrelated to the order of time and space and so fails to comply with our notion of what the real must be.<sup>1</sup> If his view is correct, he rightly placed his doctrine regarding the forms of intuition in the forefront of his theory of knowledge.

### § 3. *Self-consciousness*

In considering what are Kant's doctrines in regard to self-consciousness and whether they are tenable we may start with a preliminary, and perhaps provisional, distinction. It seems that in our use of the expression 'self-consciousness' we can attach to it two meanings which are different. What we have in mind may be first the awareness which consciousness has of itself; in that case if the consciousness which thus knows itself in a single or momentary act of consciousness, the 'self' which it knows is no more than a single or momentary act. Secondly we may mean consciousness of the self in another sense, and include in the connotation of the term, as we usually do, the notion of a unity of many acts of consciousness or of something which is identical in them or to which they belong. When Kant discusses apperception or the

<sup>1</sup> For a discussion of Kant's view see my *Kantian Studies*, Chapter I.

unity of apperception what he says seems to have more connexion with the problems connected with the first meaning of self-consciousness than with those connected with the second. On the other hand, when he asks in the Paralogisms how much we can be said to know about the self, or again in the second-edition version of the Transcendental Deduction considers the problem of the unity of that which is given to our internal sense, he seems to be concerned with self-consciousness in its second meaning. Doubtless the two subjects of awareness of consciousness and awareness of the self are closely connected, but it is nevertheless useful to distinguish them and to keep the distinction in mind when we examine Kant's doctrine. We will begin with his doctrine in regard to apperception.

We can perhaps see best what is the direction of Kant's thought when he discusses apperception if we first notice a way in which his position is stated in the Paralogisms. In A 346 = B 404 he writes: 'Consciousness itself is not so much a presentation, which distinguishes a particular object, as a form of presentation generally'; and in a similar vein in A 354, where he refers to the proposition 'I think', he says of it: 'This proposition is indeed not an experience, but is the form of apperception which belongs to any experience, and is the presupposition of it, or in other words is always related to a possible cognition in general, simply as its subjective condition.' If we consider in particular the context of the second of these two remarks, we see that Kant's thought is directed first on the unity or indivisibility of any experience. What the nature of this unity is we can best apprehend by reflecting that the experience would cease to be one experience if of the many elements of its content some belonged to one consciousness and some to another. Thus it is in being the contents of one consciousness that the contents are one, and their unity can be said to be conferred on them by consciousness. So far, Kant's thought is plain, but we have still to ask in what manner this single and unifying consciousness can be conscious of itself, and it is about this question that we begin to have difficulty in determining what he thinks. That there should be this difficulty, however, will seem natural enough if we remember that Kant himself is principally occupied in the Paralogisms with a different question. He considers the view that in thinking of this single consciousness we must suppose it to be an inherent character or activity, or an effect, of something which we call the self, and he asks whether such

a view is valid. He decides that it is not, that we cannot know whether there is a substance to which consciousness belongs, or a cause of which it is the effect, and that even if we knew that there was such a cause we could not know that it was single, since a single or indivisible effect may be the effect of many causes which are combined.<sup>1</sup> We express our awareness of consciousness in the proposition 'I think', but the 'I' which the proposition contains indicates no more than the singleness which we must recognize in the consciousness itself. Reflection on consciousness thus produces no knowledge of its nature in the sense that we can understand it, but only reveals that it is itself the condition of the unity of experience. Now it can be seen that in pursuing a train of thought which is concerned to deny knowledge of that which underlies consciousness or of its conditions, Kant has become disposed even as regards consciousness to minimize what we know of it; to do so manifestly contributes to his argument that we can know nothing of its conditions. We may find here the explanation of much that is distinctive in his treatment of the problems connected with self-consciousness, although when we consider some particular points in his account we shall notice that other factors are also contributory.

Let us first recur to the passages already quoted from the Paralogisms. When Kant says that consciousness is not so much a presentation (*Vorstellung*) which distinguishes a particular object as a form of presentation generally, does he think of the activity of consciousness or of its objects, and does he regard 'the form of presentation generally' as a form of consciousness or as a form exhibited in its objects? At first sight it seems unlikely that he refers to a form belonging to consciousness. If he means this, it is not easy to interpret the implied assertion that consciousness is nothing but the form of consciousness, nor is it easy to understand the other assertion that consciousness is not an activity which distinguishes a particular object; for the distinguishing of objects seems to be an essential function of consciousness on Kant's view of consciousness no less than on any other. If, on the other hand, we suppose that when he refers to the form of presentation generally he is thinking of a form exhibited in objects we can give the following meaning to what he says. In our reflection on consciousness he suggests that we are not aware of it as an object but are aware of the form of the content of our experience.

<sup>1</sup> See A 353.

This form, according to his subsequent explanation, is a certain kind of unity which the contents possess, it belongs to the contents of our experience as such, and is the same for the contents of any experience, or at least (as he indicates in the passage which follows (A 346-7)), we must think it to be the same. It seems possible to interpret his remarks on these lines, but if this is Kant's meaning it involves the paradox that consciousness is explained as the unity of that which we are accustomed to regard as the objects or contents of consciousness.

The truth seems to be that neither of the alternative interpretations can be precisely given to Kant's words because both alike involve a distinction between the act of consciousness and its contents or objects which he himself does not clearly make.<sup>1</sup> If we try to begin from his presuppositions, we may perhaps state his view in the following way. Consciousness is a term which includes both consciousness and its contents, and apart from consciousness there is nothing which we can know, as Kant says in A 383, 'if I remove the thinking subject the whole material world must vanish', and he makes no explicit exception in favour of other minds. Since consciousness thus includes its contents, it is not undifferentiated, but is in a sense a manifold. The elements of the manifold, he supposes, are impressions and ideas, and in regard to these impressions and ideas again he does not distinguish sensibility and sensibles, nor an idea as an activity of the mind and an idea as a content of consciousness. Now when he treats of apperception or of consciousness in what he thinks is its proper sense, the point which he makes is that no single element can constitute consciousness; consciousness is a conjunction of its elements in a qualitative unity which is not a mere totality. It can be said then that consciousness is a unity of the impressions and ideas of which it consists. But Kant holds at the same time the further doctrine that the world which we experience is also a unity of our impressions and ideas, and accordingly he can develop the theme that whether it is consciousness of which we are aware or whether it is objects, it is the same unity which makes the consciousness and the objects what they are. This is the doctrine of the first edition of the Transcendental Deduction; it is expressed, for example, in A 108, where we find him saying that 'the original and necessary consciousness of the identity of oneself is at the same time a consciousness of an equally necessary unity of the synthesis

<sup>1</sup> Compare § 1 of this chapter.

of all phenomena according to concepts'. How starting from the necessity of a qualitative unity of the elements of consciousness he arrives at the necessity of concepts is an important question which we shall need to examine. But the point to be first observed is that the train of thought which connects our awareness both of consciousness and of objects with the same unity seems to be traceable to an initial view of consciousness or of an impression which does not distinguish either from its object or its content.<sup>1</sup>

In this doctrine and in the way in which Kant develops it there are difficulties which concern both its aspects. The first are those connected with the attempt to explain spatial objects as being no more than a system of impressions, the second are difficulties in the account given of consciousness especially in relation to the notion of the self. The explanation of spatial objects in terms of a system of impressions raises questions which are independent of Kant's account of the nature of the system; since some of these questions, however, will be discussed in the next chapter we can for the present leave them aside. But his view regarding the nature of the system is so closely connected with what he has to say about apperception that we should consider it before we go further. He starts, as we have seen, from the position that the objects or contents of a single experience have, in being thus related to it, a particular kind of unity; if we supposed that they ceased to be comprised in a single experience and instead were distributed in many, some in one and some in another, we should have to think that even if they remained otherwise the same they would at least lose this particular unity. That there is such a unity which is conferred by consciousness, we need not dispute, nor that without it awareness of any other kind of unity is unthinkable. But Kant appears to think that other kinds of unity are derived from the first kind or else that they are the particular forms in which it is displayed (since it is itself only the general form of consciousness) and that in consequence what is said of it must also be said of the other unities. Thus, applying this train of thought to the categories, as forms of unity, he supposes he can now say that if that which we experience were not synthesized by the mind itself in accordance with the categories there could be no experience of anything nor any awareness of consciousness. His argument, however, can hardly be accepted.

<sup>1</sup> It will be remembered that we saw something similar to this in Hume's explanation both of the self and of objects in terms of impressions. See § 1, p. 60 above.

To begin with, when we say that singleness of consciousness is necessary in order that a manifold may be apprehended and that the manifold in being the object of a single consciousness has a particular unity, such a statement is not incompatible with saying also that the manifold has a system which is not conferred on it by the apprehending consciousness. This is easily recognized if we suppose that what is apprehended is independent of consciousness. But it is no less obvious if we think that it is not independent objects but its own manifold which consciousness apprehends. It is possible to hold, as Berkeley held, that our ideas come to us in a system over which we have no control, and at the same time accept what Kant says about the need that consciousness should be single if we are to apprehend the manifold ideas and their system. But if so, Kant must offer some separate proof of the statement that all system is conferred by consciousness and he should not regard it as a mere corollary of what he has said about apperception. Indeed, his notion that there is a manifold of sense which is given implies the existence of an arrangement or order not dependent on unity of consciousness. For example, he thinks that the form of space is something of which we are conscious in virtue of the mind's own nature; on the other hand, he does not think that the sensibles which characterize this and that part of space are where they are in the space of consciousness because consciousness demands such and such a location of sensibles. But the position of the sensibles must present a particular arrangement, and we have in it an arrangement of which we cannot say that it is derived from the unity of our consciousness. Of course, Kant would say that only the necessary principles of arrangement belong to the nature of consciousness, and he would doubtless connect such a statement with the view that consciousness cannot apprehend any necessity other than that of its own nature. But to follow this train of thought is something altogether different from the attempt to derive the system of everything of which we are conscious from apperception or the bare form of unity of consciousness.

Apart, however, from his failure to prove this point there is in Kant's doctrine another difficulty which also concerns our consciousness of objects. We ordinarily suppose that though individual minds are separate, they are aware of a common world. If this view is in part abandoned and we think that what each mind perceives is the content of its own consciousness, it seems necessary at least to accept Berkeley's view that there is some system of

relations between the varying contents of one consciousness and those of another, and that it is a system of which we can be aware. But the system of relations between the contents of different consciousnesses cannot be merely the content of one of these consciousnesses. If therefore the apperception or unity of consciousness to which Kant refers is the unity of an individual experience, it is necessary to think that we can be conscious of a system which is not itself the outcome of our own apperception.

The last reflection brings us to the other side of the matter, and we must consider how Kant's doctrine is related to the notion of an individual consciousness and what difficulties it involves in this respect. We have to ask whether the apperception to which he refers is indeed that of an individual mind, and in what way, if that is so, he conceives the apperceptions of different minds to be related to each other. There are also the further questions whether in an individual mind the apperceptions are many, and on that supposition in what kind of unity if any they are conjoined. The difficulties which attend the answer to some of these questions can be seen if we consider the points which Kant makes in his discussion of the problem of personality in the first-edition version of the Third Paralogism. At the outset of this section he takes the definition of a person as that which is conscious of the numerical identity of itself at different times and he rejects as illegitimate an argument which claims to show that we are aware of personality in this sense. The argument, as he states it, is this: 'In the whole time wherein I am conscious of myself I am conscious of this time as belonging to the unity of myself, and it is one and the same thing whether I say that this whole time is in me as individual unity or I say that I am present with numerical identity in all this time' (A 362). That a paralogism is involved appears when we notice that what I think about my relation to time cannot be thought universally. Kant's own words are as follows:

'For though the identity of person is inevitably present in my own consciousness, if I regard myself from the standpoint of someone else (as the object of his external intuition) this external observer first of all places me in time, whereas in my apperception time is really present only in *me*. Accordingly though he allows that there is an *I* which accompanies all presentations at all times in *my* consciousness and with complete identity, he yet will not conclude from this the objective permanence of myself. For since the time in which the observer places me is not the time of my own but of his sensibility, it follows that the identity

which is necessarily conjoined with my consciousness is not conjoined with his, i.e. with the external intuition of myself as a subject' (A 362-3).

It is not easy to see what exactly is Kant's position. He does not suggest, nor do we expect him to do so, that it is erroneous to regard time as the content of our consciousness. But if this is so, may we not think it should lead him to the conclusion that there is nothing to which the concept of personality can be applied, and that it is unnecessary for him to argue from the relation of different consciousnesses to each other? For if consciousness is not within time, it does not possess a numerical identity at different times of which it can be conscious. Nevertheless, he does not adopt this conclusion, but instead asserts later that if the concept of personality is used with certain qualifications, it can be retained, and is indeed for practical purposes necessary and satisfactory (A 365). If we consider the argument which leads to this result it will perhaps throw light on his doctrine or at least reveal some of its ambiguities and difficulties.

Kant begins with the following statement:

'The identity of the consciousness of myself at different times is only a formal condition of my thoughts and their coherence, and does not prove the numerical identity of myself as a subject, since despite the logical identity of the I such a change might have taken place in the subject as to deprive it of its identity, though it would still be legitimate to speak of an I which in the changes of circumstance, even if they amounted to change of the Subject, could take over the thoughts of the preceding Subject and in turn hand them on to one which succeeded' (A 363).

This statement is introduced as if it repeated what Kant has previously said or at least was implicit in it, but it nevertheless makes fresh points, and they seem to show more clearly than before the nature of the problems involved in his doctrines. Before we consider, however, the passage in detail it will be well, if we wish to see the significance of what he is now saying, to remind ourselves of some general considerations in regard to the development of his thought. Hitherto he has not indicated whether or not the character and function which he attributes to apperception belong simply to consciousness or only to that second degree or level of consciousness which is exhibited when it is conscious of itself. But if our account of his references to consciousness or apperception as the form of presentation generally was correct, we can understand why he has not done so. His pre-

occupation with the question of the unity of the contents, of consciousness leads him to think of consciousness as the bare form or logical condition of this unity, and to ignore its aspect as an activity which occurs in time; and accordingly he fails to realize that there are problems connected with our consciousness of this temporal activity of consciousness. Moreover, in consequence of the same neglect of the temporal nature of consciousness, he does not distinguish the unity of a particular thought or state of consciousness and the unity of our experience as a whole. He regularly takes the proposition 'I think' as the expression of the unity which he is considering, but his discussion both in the earlier part of the Paralogisms and in the Deduction of the Categories evidently covers the unity indicated by the different proposition 'I thought, I think, and I shall think'. At the outset, however, he shows no consciousness that the second proposition, raises a fresh problem.

If with these considerations in mind we return to the passage before us, we shall expect to see that the reference to the temporal side of consciousness which is involved in Kant's definition of personality will bring him to reflections which touch nearly both the problem of our consciousness of temporal moments of consciousness and that of the unity of our experience as a whole. We may also expect to obtain in this connexion a clearer indication of what he now means by apperception. From this point of view we should particularly notice his opening reference to what he calls 'the identity of the consciousness of myself at different times' (*die Identität des Bewusstseins Meiner selbst in verschiedenen Zeiten*), which he states is 'a formal condition of my thoughts and their coherence' (*eine formale Bedingung meiner Gedanken und ihres Zusammenhangs*). Here it seems that Kant recognizes the existence both of separate activities of consciousness occurring from time to time and of an identical consciousness which is aware of them, and it also seems that apperception is the latter consciousness, since it is this which is the condition of the coherence of our thinking. But when we look more closely at what he says it can be seen that there is an ambiguity which may lead to a wide difference in the interpretation of his doctrine. If consciousness and self-consciousness (or consciousness of consciousness) are distinguished we may suppose either that self-consciousness has no part in the time-order, or that like consciousness it is distributed within it. Kant's ambiguous wording does not preclude either supposition, and we

must consider to what doctrines they respectively lead and how far these doctrines are valid. Moreover, we should keep in mind also the possibility that his real view is not either of the two alternatives but is different from both.

We may begin with the supposition that the view held by Kant is that although our separate acts of consciousness are temporal, self-consciousness is not. We shall see that such a view seems to avoid the general difficulty which we noticed (p. 102 above) in regard to his handling of the paralogism of personality. But this aspect of the matter will suggest that Kant's thought should not be so interpreted; for if the argument to which he refers is taken in a sense which makes it reasonable his contention that it is a paralogism will be defeated. Moreover, it will appear that the way in which he discusses the paralogism suggests the same conclusion. It may therefore seem in advance that if Kant is unlikely to hold the view that there is a difference in consciousness itself in respect of its relation to time, we need not interest ourselves much in this supposition. But we must remember that because Kant neglects a particular line of thought in one context it does not follow that he neglects it in all; and in any case if our purpose in studying him is to make any discoveries we can which will contribute to an understanding of the problems of knowledge, we are justified in considering an alternative view which may be better than that which he adopts.

Let us then first return to Kant's statement of the paralogism of personality. The difficulty which we had in mind earlier was that if it is thought that time is in consciousness and not consciousness in time, we are not tempted to apply the concept of personality to consciousness and to think of it as something which exists with numerical identity at different times. We should expect Kant to point this out, though to do so would indicate the unlikelihood of the paralogism being entertained. But if he thinks that self-consciousness and separate acts of consciousness are different in their nature, it may be that when he speaks of time being in me, what he thinks is not that time is in my moments of consciousness (for they are themselves in time), but that it can be said to be in that timeless consciousness which is aware of my separate acts of consciousness and gives them their temporal form. Further, inasmuch as the temporal acts of consciousness of which self-consciousness is aware are its own (since otherwise it would not be self-consciousness), it seems possible in these conditions to regard self-conscious-

ness as something which is conscious of the numerical identity of itself at different times, and thereby complies with the definition of personality. In other words, if we recognize a duality of consciousness and so avoid the exclusion from time of all consciousness, we may still be able to think of the identity of consciousness in relation to time. In favour of this view we may say, though not without qualification, that the consciousness of which the function is to survey the course and incidents of consciousness seems to differ in its nature from the moments of consciousness which it surveys and not to be related precisely as they are to time. For, on the one hand, separate moments of consciousness are not only in time, but for the most part exhibit limitations which are connected with the particular date at which they occur in time and, we may add also, with the particular location in space with which they are associated; on the other hand, the limitations of the consciousness which embraces them are less apparent and its nature in this respect more nearly resembles that which a non-individual consciousness might be conceived to possess. Of such a view the most important qualifications must be that when we apprehend self-consciousness itself we apprehend it as something which is in time, that the acts of consciousness which are the objects of self-consciousness are not wholly subject to the limitations imposed by their occurrence in time, and that consciousness and self-consciousness are so closely connected that we must be cautious in advancing any doctrine which seems to separate them. With the development, however, of this line of reflection and the difficulties which it must encounter we are not now concerned,<sup>1</sup> although it has seemed desirable to say so much in order that we may see more clearly its implications before considering how far if at all it forms a part of Kant's doctrines.

The view to which we have been referring is at least congruous with the thought of the later Refutation of Idealism in so far as it holds that separate acts of consciousness are in time while it does not surrender the position that time itself is essentially the form in which consciousness apprehends its objects. It also seems that Kant's thought is moving in the same direction when he says in the second-edition version of the Transcendental Deduction: 'Accordingly my own existence is not phenomenal (much less mere illusion), although the determination of my existence can only occur in conformity with the form of the internal sense according to the

<sup>1</sup> We shall be concerned with related topics in the following chapter, though not primarily with reference to the distinction of consciousness and self-consciousness.

way in which the manifold which I conjoin is given to internal intuition' (B 157-8). The point which the latter passage particularly suggests is that Kant is concerned with the unity of our separate moments of consciousness and that he connects it with their relation to a consciousness itself timeless which has the temporal for its content. If this is so, the meaning of apperception is not discovered when we think of a separate act of consciousness, but only when we consider the connexion of the separate acts with each other and their relation to the timeless consciousness in which they are conjoined. But although this may be what Kant thinks in these later sections of the *Critique*, he does not seem to have formed any such ideas when he gives us his account of the Paralogisms in the first edition. One reason, to which we have already referred, for supposing that this is so is that if the paralogism of personality is interpreted in the sense suggested it does not seem to be clearly a paralogism. But of course Kant may have nevertheless thought that it was. Further, it may be noticed that he might think a paralogism was involved, even though he did not reject the idea of a dual relation of consciousness to time; for we must remember that in the Paralogisms he considers not so much the problem of the unity of consciousness as the question whether we are justified in asserting the existence of a substance of which consciousness is an attribute. For these reasons it is difficult to dogmatize about his position. But when we look at the manner in which he develops his argument, it certainly seems to confirm the conclusion that he has other ideas in mind than those which we have been discussing.

Let us take first the argument which is based on the assertion that we think differently about our own consciousness and that of others. If we distinguish a consciousness contemplating from a consciousness contemplated, there is no apparent reason for saying that the latter must present itself to consciousness as something which occupies the whole of time. It is only with reference to the contemplating consciousness that the paralogism can be committed of saying that it is in all time because all time is in it. Further, when our own consciousness is contemplated we seem to regard it in the same way as we regard another consciousness. If we think that the latter has a certain duration in time and that time and events do not begin and end with it, it seems natural for us to think also in the same way about our own consciousness. Indeed, a main difficulty in Kant's argument is that he does not

recognize that, whatever be the status which we assign to time, we think that it is the same time within which the incidents of consciousness, our own and that of others alike, are determined and that their relations to it are all of the same kind. Moreover, we may notice that Kant has changed his ground inasmuch as he is in effect considering rather the question of the absolute permanence of consciousness than that of its identity at different times. Even if it were allowed that I must regard myself as existing in all time but cannot so regard others, I can still, when I place the consciousness of someone else in time, think of the identity of his consciousness at different times and so endow him with personality. From all this it appears indeed difficult to see what exactly is Kant's standpoint, but we may at least conclude that he has not in mind any precise view of a dual relationship in which our consciousness stands to time.

In the second part of Kant's argument it seems at first sight easier to see what he thinks. It will be remembered that in our general survey of his account we noticed an ambiguity at the beginning of his third paragraph (A 363). He refers to 'the identity of the consciousness of myself at different times' and says that 'it is a formal condition of my thoughts and their coherence', but he does not make it clear whether or not he recognizes self-consciousness as a distinctive function or supposes that it differs from our separate moments of consciousness in the matter of its relation to time. We have seen some reason for thinking that he does not do so, and we must consider whether the present passage confirms this view. Kant, we observe, now approaches his problem in a way which connects it with the coherence of our experience, and it is evident that when he refers to this coherence he thinks not only of the unity which marks the contents of a single moment of consciousness, but of the coherence of past, present, and future consciousness. In other words, his problem is to explore not simply the unity expressed by the formula 'I think' but also that which belongs to the different formula 'I thought, I think, and I shall think'. His answer is given in what he says about the possibility of conceiving the transfer of the thoughts of one subject to another subject, which he curiously compares (in the footnote) with the transfer from one elastic ball to another, on which it impinges, of its whole motion. In making this suggestion, he does not, of course, wish to indicate that he thinks it is necessarily true or even probable. The point which he has in mind is that we cannot claim to apprehend

any identity in the temporarily separated parts of what we call our experience; for that which seems to us to be identity in them can on a certain hypothesis be held to be something else. It is evident that he reaches this conclusion by reflecting on the fact that when I think that there is an element of identity in my past and my present experience, this thought itself belongs to the present, although its content comprises both past and present. Since past and present, when I am conscious of them, are combined in my present consciousness, it can be asserted that the identity of which I am conscious is the undisputed identity of the 'I think' which gives unity and coherence to its whole content. On this view we must suppose that when we seem to apprehend an identity in what I thought and now think, I am instead apprehending the identity of the 'I think that I thought and think'.

The argument is not one which can pass without further consideration and comment. We notice first that it begins by accepting the occurrence of separate activities of consciousness at different dates in time; for it is this which raises the question whether there is any identity to be found by means of which the separate activities are united or made coherent. (Herein it seems that Kant's standpoint is that of the first-edition version of the Transcendental Deduction where he tells us never to forget that all our cognitions are finally subject to the formal condition of the internal sense, namely time (A 98-9, quoted on p. 59 above).) In searching for an identity which can connect the separate moments of consciousness Kant must of course reject the solution that it is the 'I think' by which they are all characterized; the 'I think' is no more than the formal unity of all that is comprised in a moment of consciousness. The solution which he considers instead is that inasmuch as consciousness is an activity of a subject, it may be that there is one subject of the temporarily separated activities. The difficulty, however, is that we have no intuition of the supposed identical subject, and it is quite possible to suppose that a transfer can take place of the activity of consciousness from one subject to another, which is comparable to the transfer of motion in physical objects. But in making this comparison Kant is surely misled. When he thinks of the transfer of consciousness from one subject to another, what he has in mind is that the new subject may possess along with its consciousness of present activities of consciousness the memory or thought of past activities of consciousness which were in fact not its own but those of the

preceding subject. This is not transfer of consciousness but the occurrence of a new state of consciousness similar in all respects to the state of consciousness which would have occurred if there had not been two subjects but only one. It may be said, however, that though this is perhaps a more accurate statement of the possibility which Kant contemplates, the difference of statement does not affect his argument, for he can still maintain that since it must be admitted that, whether there is one subject or whether there are two, there is no discernible difference as regards present consciousness, we cannot claim to know that the first alternative is true and the second false. It need not be disputed that Kant may well regard the matter in this way, but there are other objections to his argument which he does not thereby avoid. Of these perhaps the most important are connected with the uncertainty or inconsistency of his views on the relations of consciousness and time, and his preoccupation with the question of a subject of consciousness.

As regards the first point, Kant's argument, as we have seen, is based on the view that the activities of consciousness occur at different dates in time, but it concludes with a supposition which in effect assigns to any past consciousness which is contemplated the status of an internal content of the contemplating consciousness. Now Kant might have argued that the latter is the right supposition and that it must supersede the view that consciousness exists at different times. He does not, however, so argue, but instead makes the temporal nature of consciousness an integral part of his conclusion, since this conclusion presupposes the existence of an earlier state of consciousness; for, in whatever way it is stated, its point is the impossibility of determining whether an earlier and a later state of consciousness belong to one and the same subject or to two. We need not be surprised by this inconsistency if we recall our earlier discussion of Kant's dubious and uncertain handling of the whole question of consciousness and time.<sup>1</sup> In respect of the interpretation of the Paralogisms it should convince us that he was far from formulating any doctrine which distinguished the functions of consciousness and self-consciousness or led us to think of different relations in which they may stand to time.

The second point to be noticed is the way in which Kant's thought is influenced by his primary interest in the question of a

<sup>1</sup> See § 1 of this chapter.

subject of consciousness. Because he thinks chiefly of the contention that the identity connecting separate moments of consciousness is that of an identical subject of consciousness he does not properly consider whether there is any identity to be found in consciousness itself. He may seem to do so when he is led to think of a transfer of consciousness, but, as we have seen, his view can only be given a reasonable interpretation if we suppose that he has in mind something which is not this. In effect he substitutes for the notion of the identity of consciousness at different times the different notion of the occurrence of a state of consciousness the content of which as regards its thought of the past is the same as if it had experienced the past. It seems to be this of which he is thinking when he suggests (in A 365) that if we take the concept of personality as referring to something of which the determinations exhibit an uninterrupted connexion through apperception, the concept in this sense is for practical purposes necessary and sufficient. If the apperception is present consciousness only we can indeed say that there is such a connexion in the content of each apperception, but on this view there is nothing which unites consciousness at one time with consciousness at another. We ought not, however, to neglect the possibility that in the different moments of consciousness itself (as distinct from a subject of consciousness) there may be a true identity. If we reflect on this question we may begin by observing that when that of which we are conscious is what we call our consciousness there is here an identity of consciousness and its object which is not to be found in consciousness of other objects, and this is true whether it is present or past consciousness of which we are conscious. But if so much is admitted, it seems to be a corollary that when we are conscious both of present and of past consciousness, these two objects of consciousness are connected in a unity unlike that of any other objects of consciousness, because the present consciousness and the past consciousness are both identical with the consciousness which apprehends them; and the same corollary can of course be applied to our consciousness of different moments of past consciousness. Nor indeed does the matter end here. In so far as self-consciousness itself is temporal and there are separate moments of self-consciousness we need not be perplexed about the way in which they are connected; for they are comprised in the unity of the rest of our consciousness if the consciousness which apprehends them recognizes their identity with itself. Furthermore, we may notice that we have

here an identity which (unlike any identity which we attribute to physical objects) does not seem to require as its necessary condition an uninterrupted duration in time. On these lines it seems that we can form a conception of a peculiar identity of individual experience which is not touched by arguments of the kind which Kant adduces.

This, however, is a subject about which more will be said in the next chapter, and for the present we must return to Kant. If we look back on that part of his account of apperception and self-consciousness which we have been examining it is hard to say that we find in it a clear or consistent doctrine. For this, it has appeared, there are perhaps two main causes. The first is that he never sufficiently regards the need to keep steadily in mind the distinction of consciousness from its objects, whether we think that its objects are internal to it or not, and the second that he scarcely regards at all the problem of reconciling his doctrine that time is the form which consciousness gives to objects with his constant assumption that consciousness occurs in time. If we remind ourselves of the way in which each of these causes appears to operate, it may enable us to see more clearly the course of Kant's thought. The influence of the first is apparent in his description of consciousness or apperception as a form of presentation generally and in certain other features of his account which seem to be connected with this description. He begins by concentrating his attention on the indisputable unity which marks the content of the 'I think', and because (as we noticed earlier) he attends only to the content of thinking and not also to thinking as something which occurs in time, he ignores the question whether the 'I think' refers to a single act of thought or to the totality of my thinking; or perhaps we should rather say he sees no significant difference between applying the notion of apperception to the 'I think' and applying it to the totality of my thinking. He seems at times to think that if the contents of my different thoughts are systematically related to each other, their coherence may be regarded as 'the form of consciousness generally' and if so the unity of my total thinking is nothing different from apperception. That the development of this argument would lead him into many difficulties is apparent if we reflect that since I am not necessarily conscious of all my past thinking I am not necessarily conscious of its unity. Kant can hardly maintain that apperception is to be found in a coherence of which I am not conscious; and if he thinks that apperception

comes when I am conscious of the coherence of my thinking, he returns to the position that apperception belongs to present consciousness, with the added difficulty caused by the implication that the unity which we apprehend is not conferred by apperception but belonged to our thoughts before we were conscious of their unity. Nevertheless it is probable that even when he sees that the occurrence of consciousness at different moments of time raises questions in regard to the unity of our experience, he is apt to lose sight of the difficulty or to think that it is solved by the ambiguous notion of the form of consciousness. It will be remembered that we asked in connexion with his discussion of the paralogism of personality whether or not he there thought that consciousness in all its aspects was in the same relation to time. The difficulty of obtaining a clear answer may in part be due to the fact that even in this discussion he tends to revert to the view that, if questions are asked about the unity of different moments of individual consciousness, no more is needed than to refer to the general coherence of the content of experience, without inquiring how the acts of consciousness which constitute experience are related one to the other.

The second main cause, which contributes as we have said to the difficulty and obscurity of Kant's account, is his failure to explain how he relates his doctrine that time is the form in which consciousness apprehends its objects to the problems which arise because consciousness is held to be temporal. The failure does not seem to be a matter for surprise if we remember how in the first Refutation of Idealism and other passages connected with the same topic he thinks that states of consciousness and objects in space have the same status because they are both internal to consciousness, while at the same time he says nothing about the consciousness of which they are the objects. But it may enable us to understand better the direction of his thought if we reflect on a factor which perhaps explains why there is this omission. Because everything of which we are conscious is determined in time, and time is the only way in which we are conscious, he calls all objects of consciousness phenomenal, in order to indicate that their nature is to be in consciousness or to appear to it. It happens, however, that when he uses the term phenomenon or appearance he thinks that it implies a correlate. The correlate of which he thinks, because he is influenced by the ordinary connotation of the term appearance, is that which exists but does not appear to consciousness, and he thereby recurs to the antithesis of the phenomenal

and the noumenal. But he ought to have considered whether the noumenal thus conceived is the true correlate of the phenomenal in the sense that it is something of which we are bound to think when we say that objects are phenomenal. If he had reflected on this question, he might have seen reason to doubt whether it was so ; for what the term 'phenomenon' first and immediately implies is the existence of a consciousness to which it appears or (if we wish to speak more accurately) of which it is the content. Reflection on those lines is bound to raise the problem, ignored by Kant, of the nature, status, and knowability of the consciousness with reference to which we are justified in thinking that the objects which we apprehend are phenomena. He ignores it because instead of thinking of this consciousness he thinks of noumena, and whether he supposes that the noumenon is that of which phenomena are the appearances or whether he regards it as the cause of phenomena, in either case his thought is deflected from the other problem. In the first Refutation of Idealism, as we have seen, what is in question is the status of physical objects ; and since Kant does not consider the consciousness in relation to which objects are thought to be phenomena, he is able to conclude that all our states of consciousness are phenomenal and that accordingly physical objects and consciousness are on the same level. In the Paralogisms which deal with the notion of the self, the problem which arises is that of the unity of our experience. Here also Kant starts from the position that all our states of consciousness are phenomenal, and since he has to reject the notion that we know a noumenal self which holds them together, he discovers in them no real unity. He does not ask himself whether, if there is a consciousness of which phenomena are the content and it is the nature of consciousness to know itself, it is right to say that the consciousness which is not phenomenal is wholly unknowable. It is at least possible that here we have a factor the consideration of which might contribute to the understanding of that unity in our experience for which Kant found no adequate explanation.

In the foregoing discussion, apart from a reference to one passage in the second-edition version of the Transcendental Deduction, we have considered only the earlier form of Kant's doctrine regarding self-consciousness, and it would seem natural to turn now to what he says in the later versions both of the Paralogisms and of the Transcendental Deduction. We shall, however, content ourselves here with a brief reference to each, beginning with the Paralogisms.

In general Kant does not seem to change his doctrine in the second version of the Paralogisms. His argument still turns on the question whether we can make any statements about the self as a subject to which states of consciousness belong, but he now thinks it is enough to say that since we have no intuition of such a subject and accordingly the categories cannot apply to it, it is not something of which we can have knowledge. He therefore omits the detailed arguments of the first edition, including the discussion in the paralogism of personality. But there is one passage which needs to be noticed, because it is a sign of the beginning at least of a change in his thought. In B 422 he writes, 'Thus too the subject in which the presentation of time has originally its ground, cannot for that very reason determine its own existence in time'; and in a footnote to the same passage he adds:

'The proposition "I think" indicates an undetermined empirical intuition, that is, perception (thus proving that sensation which belongs to sensibility lies at the basis of the reference to existence in this proposition), but it precedes experience, which must determine the object of perception through the categories in relation to time, and existence is here not a category, since a category is not related to an undetermined given object but only to an object of which we have a conception and with regard to which we desire to know whether or not it exists apart from this conception. An undetermined perception signifies here only something real that has been given, although only to thought in general, and accordingly it does not signify a phenomenon nor again a thing in itself (noumenon) but something which in fact exists and is designated as such in the proposition "I think".'

The passage is not easy to follow, but Kant's meaning seems to be this. If there is thinking, the thinking must have some sensible content which it is determining in accordance with time and the categories, and this content thus treated provides the existents (in the sense indicated by the category of existence) of which thought thinks, nor is the proposition 'I think' affirmed, unless there is thinking thus engaged with sensibles; it is in this sense that sensation lies at the basis of the affirmation that I think. But thinking must still be distinguished from that about which it thinks (although it must be thought of in relation to it since to determine undetermined sensibles belongs to the essence of thinking), and because it is not itself determined but determining it cannot be said to exist in the way in which the objects of thought exist, i.e., as determined in time by the categories; for it is itself the source of

time and of the categories. Accordingly it is not a phenomenon since it is not determined in time by the categories, nor is it a noumenon since we know that it really exists. The important point to be noticed is that here Kant seems to recognize that if we affirm that objects are phenomena in the sense that they are the contents of consciousness and are determined by consciousness, we can only do so because we have knowledge of consciousness and its function. The implications, however, of thus regarding our knowledge of consciousness seem to be at variance with much of his earlier doctrine, and we need to ask how far he shows any tendency to recast it.

Despite the passage we have considered it does not seem that either in the new version of the Paralogisms or in that of the Transcendental Deduction is there any fundamental change of Kant's position. There are, however, two connected elements of the doctrine of the Transcendental Deduction which we will consider both because they help to elucidate his views, and because they give rise to certain reflections which seem to be important in relation to his problems. The first is Kant's tendency to think that he can solve the problems connected with our knowledge of a consciousness which is not temporal but is the source of time by saying that when we reflect on this consciousness we are bound to regard it as temporal and it is therefore, in respect of being an object of consciousness, phenomenal. We can see that there is this line of thought in the passage (quoted on p. 105 above) where Kant says, 'My own existence is not phenomenal (much less mere illusion) although the determination of my existence can only occur in conformity with the form of the internal sense according to the way in which the manifold which I conjoin is given in internal intuition' (B 157-8). Now it seems that Kant is here making a point, the validity of which we must admit. If we are to hold that time is not intelligible unless it is thought to be the content of consciousness and that we therefore have to think of a timelessly active consciousness, of which the temporal is the content, we find that we are trying to conceive something which we cannot in truth conceive; for our notion of activity contradicts that of timelessness and we think that an active and creative consciousness must bring more and more into being, adding successively the new to that which was before. It seems to be true not indeed that the consciousness which contains time is wholly unknown or noumenal, but that we necessarily misconceive or distort its nature when we think of it in terms

of time, and that here there is a limit of our understanding and something which is not explicable. But although so much should be said in favour of Kant's doctrine, there is nevertheless another aspect of the matter. If individual consciousnesses are real (and it is hard to think that they are not) it is not evident that they can be held to contain time or that what is said of the consciousness to which time belongs can be said of them. Indeed, not to connect an individual consciousness with time would seem to involve the omission of part of its essential nature and to ignore its difference from a consciousness which is timeless because it is universal. It is this problem which Kant seems to disregard when he is content to say that the temporal aspect of our consciousness is phenomenal and nothing more.

The other element which should be noticed in the doctrine of the later Deduction is connected with the first. Having decided that our consciousness, as we know it, is phenomenal, Kant follows a fresh line of reflection which may be thought to bear on the question of the unity which we attribute to consciousness in its different moments. The general point which he makes is that since states of consciousness and objects are equally phenomenal the unity which there is in consciousness must be of the same kind and have the same origin as the unity which belongs to objects. The doctrine is worked out in § 24 of the Deduction and is summarized by a statement in B 156 where he says: 'Consequently we must arrange the determinations of the inner sense, as phenomena, in time exactly in the same way as we arrange the determinations of the external sense in space.' Clearly this view is related to much in his earlier doctrine; notably to his insistence on the parallelism of spatial objects and states of consciousness and to the point which he constantly makes in the Paralogisms (e.g. A 386) that things and consciousness are homogeneous. But in the earlier doctrine both the considerations from which he started and the conclusions which he wished to establish were different. He was then considering the resemblance of the matter provided by the internal and by the external sense on which the mind operates, and his aim was to show that things were neither more nor less real than consciousness and to suggest that the homogeneity of things with states of consciousness made easier certain problems in regard to our consciousness of objects and in regard also to the relation of mind and body. In the later doctrine of the Deduction he thinks instead of the way in which the mind handles the matter

of consciousness, spatial and non-spatial alike, and concludes that just as we attribute to this handling by the mind the form and system of objects, so too we must attribute to it the form and system of our states of consciousness. It appears then that we have here a fresh way of regarding the kind of unity which belongs to consciousness, and we should consider whether it throws light on the problems with which we have been concerned. It may seem to us on reflection that the contention that the mind is related to its own states of consciousness as it is to spatial objects obscures a feature of self-consciousness which is more important than any other, and that in other respects also the doctrine presents grave difficulties.

What the new doctrine obscures is that the mind in being conscious of physical objects does not identify itself with them, whereas it recognizes an identity of itself as determining (to use Kant's language) with the determined states of past and present consciousness which it contemplates. But if we recognize that there is this difference, we must recognize also that the consciousness of identity does not result from the function of arranging; for the mind, according to Kant, arranges physical objects, but it does not, on that account, attribute to itself and them the kind of identity which it attributes to itself and its own states of consciousness. The conclusion then seems to be suggested that the identity of itself and its states which consciousness apprehends is immediate and underived, and that it is to this immediate consciousness of identity that we should look if we wish to explain the unity of what we call the self. If this conclusion is right, it seems that the development which we find in the second Deduction does not help us in the solution of the problems involved. Moreover, there are other reasons making it unacceptable, some of which we may notice. In the first place it seems to commit us directly to the dubious view that the categories which we apply to objects, including our notions in regard to the nature of causality, are applicable in the same way and in the same sense to states of consciousness. Again it ignores the difficulty that our arrangement of objects, according to Kant's own account, is based on given states of sensibility (the manifold of sense) and is indeed a rearrangement of this given which is effected by the imagination. If the work of arranging our states of consciousness exactly resembles that of arranging objects, we should be able to point to given conditions of consciousness of which it could be

said that the states of consciousness which we apprehend are the rearrangement; and this it seems difficult to do. Further, it may well be doubted whether we can think of a comparable function of the imagination in the two cases. In our consciousness of a physical object we supplement what is given by imagining other features and aspects of it which we think exist, although we are not sensuously conscious of them. It does not seem that our consciousness of a state of consciousness is in the same way supplemented or completed by the imagination of other features than those which the state of consciousness directly presents.

The points which we have considered do not encourage us to think that the later Transcendental Deduction provides a solution of the problems connected with self-consciousness. Nevertheless, it may well seem that we have not sufficiently examined its complicated argument and that a wholly disproportionate attention has been paid to passages of the *Critique* which Kant subsequently cancelled. Some justification, however, may be offered for this procedure. Our primary purpose has not been to interpret Kant's doctrines in detail and in order but to see how he contributes to the understanding of the problems which are raised when we consider the nature of our knowledge, what points he makes which we are bound to regard, and what difficulties he leaves unsolved. If in what he first wrote he seems to put his problems in the clearest light, there is here a reason for the particular study of those passages. The reader who still thinks that more should be said in support of the view that the problems are not finally solved in the second edition of the *Critique* may be referred to what I have written elsewhere on the Transcendental Deduction.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> See my *Kantian Studies*

### III

#### SPECULATIONS ON KNOWLEDGE

WE have considered and tried to understand a number of Kant's doctrines, and we have found that the task is not easy. In his handling of any topic his thought is always complex and the elements of which it is composed are often inconsistent. But more than most writers he performs the invaluable service of assembling a wide range of the factors which are relevant to his problems, and where his doctrines are wrong they nevertheless bring to light difficulties which require to be met or conditions which any solution must satisfy. If then we cannot accept, as it stands, his doctrine regarding our consciousness of objects and of the self nor indeed find that he has any one consistent doctrine, we can at least try to bring together in a different way the factors on which he rightly insists and see whether some of his difficulties may be avoided. In making the attempt we shall bear in mind that one of the most important points which we may learn from Kant is that the problem of the nature of the object cannot be separated from our view of the nature of the self. We shall accordingly connect our discussion of the object with the task of determining what view we should take of the individual self and its relation to a consciousness which is not simply that of the individual.

We may begin with the acceptance of two of Kant's doctrines: the first, that a single time and a single space are the basis of all of which we are conscious, and the second, that it is the essential nature of time and of space that they should be the content of consciousness and nothing else. To this we must join the assertion, however difficult it may be, that they are at once the content of a single and universal consciousness and also of our own individual consciousness and of other individual consciousnesses, and that, in being so, time and space do not become many times and spaces but remain a single and identical time and space. What is involved in such an assertion as regards the relation of universal and individual consciousness we shall consider as we proceed. For the moment we must attend to certain other implications of these doctrines. When it is said that time and space are the basis of that of which we are conscious, the view seems to be thereby precluded that we can be conscious of something apart from its relations to time and space and thereafter determine what its relations to them may be.

Again the contention that time and space are the content of consciousness precludes the view that, when we are conscious, some of the elements of which we are conscious are internal to consciousness but that time and space are not, and that accordingly we connect the existence of the internal elements with an external time and space or something which belongs thereto. Furthermore, it seems to be necessary on this view to hold that consciousness must think that time and space are such as to be capable of exhibiting other qualities or determinations than those which are purely temporal or geometrical, or in other words that they are capable of containing events and objects. So much is implied in saying that they are the basis of our consciousness and that what else enters into consciousness is apprehended as belonging to them.

If consciousness contains time and space it appears to be a contradiction to say that it can be itself contained within them. Nevertheless, when we think of the nature of individual consciousness it seems necessary to maintain the contradiction, since our consciousness operates in time, and is associated with location in space. We must accordingly consider whether it is possible to regard the matter in any way which makes the contradiction seem less difficult. Let us begin with the thought of a consciousness which conceives time and space as its own content and conceives also certain distributed properties which it attributes to this temporal and spatial content. There is no apparent difficulty in supposing properties thus attributed by consciousness to this and that part of time and space which are not otherwise related to consciousness than in being its content. These are the properties or entities which we think of as being physical or material. But we may also suppose, though this is more difficult, that consciousness conceives itself also as being associated with various parts of the time and space order. In surveying the properties or entities distributed in time and space we may make a threefold division. First there are those which have been referred to as physical or material. Secondly, belonging to or located in this and that part of the time and space conceived by consciousness or located in different spacial parts successively there are the properties or powers or objects (we can use any of these terms provisionally) which we call animate bodies. These are temporal and spatial entities which differ from the first class in two respects. Though many of their properties are physical or material they are subject to different laws and conditions of movement and change, of coming into being

and ceasing to be, from those of so-called physical objects. Further, they combine with physical or material properties certain forms of consciousness. These forms of consciousness when they occur are located in both time and space, and are in the same positions as those in which the physical properties are. The most obvious forms of consciousness which are thus located in parts of time and space characterized by the presence of the physical properties of animate bodies are physical pleasures and pains. It seems necessary to admit that the ache of a tooth, for instance, is consciousness thus localized. Such consciousness does not seem to be aware of anything; it is localized pain in an animate body and is not consciousness in any other sense. The question then arises how we should regard its relation to the consciousness which contains time and space. But before considering this aspect of the matter we must refer to the third division of the entities distributed in time and space. Not only do we think that physical pleasures and pains and other feelings are localized in parts of time and space where these physical bodies which we call animate occur, but we also think that the form of consciousness which is consciousness of something is connected with certain of these animate bodies, and in being so connected is itself localized in time and space. It is at this point that we meet with the difficulty with which we began. What such consciousness apprehends is the time and space order of which it is itself a part; but the time and space order instead of being an external object is said to be within the consciousness itself. This is not, however, the only difficulty. We have also been regarding time and space and all that characterizes them, including animate bodies and the particular consciousnesses which are connected with such bodies, as comprised within the content of a single consciousness. But the notion of a consciousness which is also the content of another consciousness seems to run counter to the whole notion of consciousness. This is what Berkeley realized when he reflected that the *esse* of inert and senseless things might be *percipi*, but not so the *esse* of spirits or consciousness. The double difficulty seems to be formidable. We may remember, however, that the presence of two difficulties does not always aggravate a problem, and that taken together they may even suggest a possible solution. Let us consider whether it may be so in the present instance.

We may begin with the second of the two difficulties. The problem is to see whether there is any intelligible sense in which we

can think of one consciousness as comprised within the content of another. It is perhaps possible to obtain some light on this problem if we think first not of the relation of individual consciousness to that single consciousness, within which we suppose that everything was comprised, but of the relation of the form of consciousness, of which physical pleasure or pain is an example, to an individual consciousness which knows or apprehends and can be regarded as a self. When a self is conscious of a pain located in some part of its body, it seems legitimate, and perhaps necessary, to think that there is involved a certain duality of consciousness in which two forms of consciousness participate. What the apprehending consciousness is aware of is a form of consciousness with a definite location. It does not think of itself, in so far as it apprehends the pain, as having the same location as the pain. It would be nearer the mark to say that its own location is the whole body, whereas the pain is in a particular part of the body. Even this is not satisfactory, because in some way the apprehending consciousness seems not to be in space at all, although it is associated with a spatial body. It may be said, however, that the facts are being described wrongly, and that the pain is a character of the apprehending consciousness; what is localized is a physical condition—a disorder in some part of the body—and the apprehension of this condition is painful. But such a description does not seem to be appropriate. It would apply to a case where a man was aware that his limb had been mangled and felt, perhaps, regret or annoyance but no physical pain. It does not apply when he is aware of pain in his limb. We come back therefore to the view that in this case we have something like two consciousnesses in regard to which we must say that they are differently located or perhaps that one has no location at all. Nevertheless, the consciousnesses are not separate; for the pain which the man feels is his pain, and what he is aware of is not the pain of another consciousness. It should perhaps be held, however, that these considerations do not show that the pain consciousness is the *content* of the consciousness which is at the level of awareness or knowledge. Against this it may be said that pain is not properly pain unless there is a consciousness, distinct from the pain, which is aware of it, and that it is through this awareness of it that pain exists. It might at the same time be conceded that consciousness can only exist as the content of consciousness on the condition that the containing and the contained consciousness are not separate. It still remains true that another

consciousness than mine cannot exist as the content of my consciousness. But for our purpose the question whether one form of consciousness may be regarded as the content of another, or is better described as a distinguishable element within the total consciousness, does not seem to be of great importance. The important point is that we should recognize that forms of consciousness which are not similarly localized or forms of consciousness, one of which is localized while the other is not, may be thought to be united, in some way or another, in a single consciousness. (It may be suggested, in passing, that consideration of the phenomena of dual personality might perhaps lead us to a like result.) The general conclusion to be drawn is that on the question of the unity of different consciousnesses we should keep our minds open for the consideration of various possibilities.

These reflections may make us less sceptical of the view that a single consciousness which contains time and space and everything else can be thought to comprise in itself or in its content other forms of consciousness. Moreover, the course of our discussion has perhaps made it seem less strange to think that the contained consciousness can have temporal and spatial determinations while the containing consciousness has not. But we must remember that it seemed to be a necessary condition of such a conception that the whole consciousness and those which are comprised within it should be thought to be in some sense a unity. To think thus, however, is to hold that the nature of individual minds is essentially dual. For, on the one hand, every individual mind is thought to be comprised within a single or universal consciousness and in a limited degree to be this consciousness, and on the other hand it is thought to be distinct from other individual minds, because each is associated with its own particular place or series of places in the scheme of time and space and with particular conditions which are attached thereto. When we consider the difficulties by which various theories of knowledge which work on a different basis are attended, it seems that it is at least worth while to use this hypothesis and see whether it can offer a solution of any of our problems.

Let us start then from the position that individual minds apprehend a common time and space, that, as Kant contends, they understand the nature of this time and space order and can enlarge at will their consciousness of it and of the essential properties belonging to it, because it is the content of their consciousness and not external to them; and that they also understand the capacity

of the time and space order not merely to have temporal and geometrical properties but also to have other properties or to furnish location to occupants. All this they are able to do in virtue of the identical consciousness which they possess or share. It should not be assumed that such a statement completes the table of what is apprehended by individual minds in virtue of their identity. But we may leave it for the present and begin to consider the aspect of individual consciousness in which it is limited and particular. In the first place we may notice that this aspect of its dual nature begins to show itself in certain relations of the individual consciousness to the time and space order taken by itself, without any reference to the occupants of time and space. (The point is one to which reference was made earlier—see the discussion in § 2 of Chapter II—but we may recur to it again.) If we think of a cube as a geometer conceives it, i.e. as a volume of space with spatial determinations and no other physical properties, it seems that in that case the way in which we are conscious of it is not connected with the location of our consciousness at any particular point in space. On the other hand, we can also think of its appearance in perspective from any given point external to it. If we do so, it seems that we are apprehending what the geometrical shape is for consciousness when consciousness is associated with this or that spatial position, and we have here the emergence of the aspect of individual consciousness as a localized consciousness. (The case we have taken is that of visual consciousness, but where visual sense or imagination is lacking there may be something parallel to visual perspective in the imagination of the direction of the movements which would be necessary in order to compass the geometrical shape. The matter, however, is difficult and obscure, and the parallelism cannot be pressed.) We must not be tempted to say that consciousness of what the perspective of a spatial volume is from a certain point in space is no more than the apprehension of the geometrical relations between the shape of the volume and the point in question, and that therefore we are still dealing with geometrical consciousness which, according to our previous contention, is not localized. Being conscious of the geometrical relations of a spatial volume to my body or to a part of it is not the same thing as being conscious of the look of the volume when it is seen from a certain point in space. If we recognize the distinction it seems that in order to see how the volume looks from a point in space it is still necessary that consciousness should associate itself with the point. At the same time

we can and should maintain that the perspective is dependent on the geometrical relations; and because we apprehend this dependence and, further, seem to find it intelligible, we can be conscious of what the perspective must be apart from actual sensuous experience. It is in this respect that we must perhaps recognize a difference between localized consciousness of shape and localized consciousness of other qualities which we attribute to objects. The point will, however, be clearer when we have discussed our consciousness of these other qualities. It is to this discussion that we must now turn.

When we think not merely of time and space but of their occupants, we are conscious, as we have observed earlier, of two kinds of occupants which seem in some respects to be subject to the same laws but in others to be different. These two kinds are physical bodies, which are only physical, and physical bodies which are also animate. The latter besides possessing other special characteristics are capable (though perhaps only in conjunction with an apprehending mind) of being associated with the location of that particular form of localized consciousness which we call feeling. Further, the individual mind is conscious that it is itself in some way associated with an animate body and that there are other individual minds which are similarly associated with other bodies. The effect of this consciousness of association with a body temporally and spatially determined is not only that the individual mind thinks of its body as an occupant of the time and space order but also that its apprehension of other occupants is connected with the location of its own body. Whereas on the one side of its nature it apprehends time and space as the content of its consciousness and therefore it is not within them nor is its apprehension directed from any point in time or space, on the other side its apprehension is that of a consciousness subject to particular limitations imposed by the function of apprehending what belongs to the temporal and spatial order from a location within it. What these particular limitations are, or what is the nature of the content of a consciousness thus limited, is the problem now to be considered.

The limitations attached to a consciousness of which the operations occur in time and are associated with location in space seem at the first glance to be of two kinds. On the one hand, the association of consciousness with a particular time and place appears to limit what it sensuously apprehend at any moment. On the

other hand, it seems that this association affects the character of what is apprehended when sensuous apprehension takes place; and the question is raised whether the real nature of the object is apprehended at all. The first point seems to be the easier, but in fact it is difficult to state it exactly and any account of it must introduce concepts which cannot be explained without raising the second of the two problems. We can see this if we consider the time element. What we are at first disposed to say is that a consciousness operating at a certain moment can only be sensuously conscious of what is existing or occurring at that moment. We can remember or imagine what has existed at a different time, but not sensuously apprehend it. But yet we hold that a star which we may now be seeing may long ago have ceased to exist, and to say this seems to contradict our statement. We can indeed modify the original form of the statement and say that if the conditions of perceiving an object from a certain point in space are such that the state of the object at time  $t^1$  is perceptible at this point of space at time  $t^2$  the state of the object at time  $t^1$  is not perceptible at the same point at time  $t^3$ , although its state at  $t^1$  may be remembered or imagined at time  $t^3$ . But such a statement indicates that when we consider the time relation between the act of perception and the object perceived we must have in mind other factors than the time relation itself. The presence of these other factors, however, is bound to lead us to the second question, whether the character of what is perceived is not affected by the conditions of perception. We may then find ourselves inclined to distinguish between the object as it is and its appearance, and arrive at some such statement as that the activity of perception and the appearance of the object must exist at the same time, even if the perception and the object need not. When we come to this point it is plain that we must consider our other question. It would be easy to show that we should encounter similar complications if we attempted to make any propositions regarding the degree of proximity in space which might be held to be a condition of the sensuous apprehension of an object.

We must remind ourselves that the problem to be considered is what nature and what relations to the mind we are to attribute to objects which present themselves to consciousness as occupants of the time and space order, and that this statement of the problem must be read as having the following implications. Time and space are real because they are a basic content of all consciousness,

because they override the divisions of consciousness, and because there is nothing of which they can be said to be the appearances. The question then is whether the same thing can be said of the occupants of time and space, or whether some of the points of the statement can be allowed in regard to one aspect of them but not in regard to another; and a particular question is whether a distinction of appearance and reality can be applied to them and, if so, in what sense. At the outset we can say that if it is not taken to be a bar to the reality of time and space that they are the content of consciousness, we must allow that this holds also of their occupants. But we can still think that they have a different status within consciousness from that of time and space, because all that has been said of time and space cannot be said of them. To begin with, it seems to be generally allowed that most of the sensible qualities which appear to our consciousness to exist in this or that area of space at a particular time are closely dependent on the association of the consciousness which apprehends them with an animate body located in some other place. The dependence indeed is so close that the sensible qualities which an individual consciousness determined in a particular way in time and space apprehends seem to be the content of this consciousness and of no other. If it is so, the reality of the qualities is not, like the reality of time and space, such as to override or overcome the divisions of one consciousness from another. Nevertheless, certain statements can apparently be made in regard to them which are entirely intelligible to another consciousness than that which apprehends them, since they are statements which concern their relation to that which is genuinely common to both consciousnesses. Thus a consciousness which apprehends the qualities can indicate to a consciousness which does not apprehend them at what time they exist and where they are. Again, not only the consciousness apprehending the qualities but another consciousness can be aware of the temporal and spatial relations existing between the first consciousness (or the body with which it is associated) and the time and place of the quality it apprehends. (There are some points in the last statement which will need to be clarified later.) Further, when the volume of space which the qualities occupy is known, it can be known in what shape they will be present to the consciousness apprehending them if—all other conditions remaining the same—it changes its location to another point in space; and this again, it should be noticed, is

knowledge which is open to another consciousness than that which apprehends the qualities. Yet again we should probably be inclined to say with certain reservations that the sensible qualities which are present to a particular consciousness under certain conditions would be present to any other consciousness under precisely the same conditions; if we can know this to be true, it can only be knowledge which belongs to what is common in different consciousnesses. Finally, and in connexion with the last point, we think when we apprehend sensible qualities located in a particular place that this is a reason for believing that other minds connected with bodies which are situated not very differently from our own are also apprehending sensible qualities in the same place. Such a belief clearly implies a claim to know far more about sensible qualities than the fact of their presence in our own consciousness; it is no less than a claim to know the conditions in which they appear in any consciousness, and to know this, if it can be known, is to know what is clearly not the mere content of an individual consciousness or of that aspect of an individual consciousness in which its operations are limited by connexion with a particular location in time and space.

There is much, however, in these statements which needs further consideration. Throughout in referring to the way in which consciousness is localized we have been thinking of its connexion with that kind of occupant of space which we call an animate body. But at the same time in considering what we are aware of as occupying this or that part of the time and space order we have proceeded on the basis that we are aware of sensible qualities. Further, we have supposed that the sensible qualities apprehended by an individual consciousness are so essentially dependent on its temporal and spatial determinations (or those of the body with which it is associated) that we must regard the qualities as the content of the individual consciousness and of no other. But, if that is so, we must apply these considerations to the animate body. The animate body accordingly has to be regarded as no more than certain sensible qualities which are the content of the individual consciousness, and can no longer be taken to be a common content of consciousness in the way that we hold time and space to be. It is obvious that difficulties then arise in regard to the statements which were alleged to be generally intelligible despite the fact that sensible qualities belong to the content of the individual consciousness. These were statements regarding the

location in time and space of other consciousnesses and of the sensibles of which they were aware at a particular time. Now it seems to be true that if one consciousness can know enough of the nature of consciousness to conceive the existence of other consciousnesses than its own, and if it can know its own location in the time and space order and the location of its sensibles, the idea will be intelligible to it that other consciousnesses should have different locations in the same time and space order and that they also should apprehend sensibles. The question, however, is not merely whether we can understand an idea but how we can know a fact. If we ask ourselves about our knowledge of other consciousnesses than our own, it seems that we know where they are located through our apprehension of their bodies, and that we know where they are conscious of sensibles as being through indications which they can give by means of their bodies. But our knowledge (if we have it) does not seem to be explicable in this way if we have to admit that we do not perceive their bodies, and that what we take to be their bodies are only sensibles private to our own consciousness.

We must, however, avoid the hasty conclusion that these difficulties cannot be overcome without supposing that there are occupants of the time and space order which are not merely the internal contents of individual consciousnesses. It seems that we might perhaps think of the matter in the following way. We can at least begin with the proposition that the individual consciousness is aware of its own position in time and space or—if we prefer to put it so—of the points in time and space from which or in relation to which it apprehends the rest of the time and space order. We can next recognize that certain sensible qualities are always apparent to our own consciousness in that part of space with which the operation of our consciousness is known (and known directly) to be connected. Again we recognize as regards sensible qualities apparent to our consciousness elsewhere in space that their occurrence has some relation to the situation in time and space of our consciousness and of the sensibles which we call our body. At the same time we cannot say that the presence to our consciousness of particular sensible qualities at particular points in time and space is necessitated solely by the position of our consciousness and the bodily sensibles associated with it. For in that case they would always be present in certain situations of our consciousness and the bodily sensibles, but we do not find that

they are always present in these situations. Now it is open to us to give to these facts of consciousness an interpretation in some respects not unlike that which we read in Berkeley. We can say that there is some agency which controls, or regulates in a system, the appearance at particular times of sensibles in our consciousness and their association in our consciousness with this or that part of the space which is common to all consciousness. Thus the constant association of the sensibles which we call our body with the place from or in relation to which we apprehend the rest of space and the sensibles located in it is one part of the system. It does not seem to be absolutely necessary on this view to suppose that the agency which controls the appearance of sensibles in our consciousness should be in the places where the sensibles appear or should operate through non-sensible occupants of these places. But we must not consider the matter solely from the point of view of the intelligibility of the system of sensibles in our own consciousness. There is also the question whether on the suppositions we have made the fact that one consciousness can have knowledge regarding the occurrence of sensibles in another consciousness is equally intelligible. It seems possible that even this point might be met. In considering the problem we should begin by noticing carefully that if we say that sensibles only reside in an individual consciousness and are therefore private to the individual consciousness, it does not follow that the system of their occurrence is the private content of that consciousness. The system of the occurrence of sensibles is not itself a sensible, and there is therefore in principle nothing which precludes one consciousness from knowing that sensibles occur for another consciousness at certain times and places in the time and space order which is common to both. Such a general answer, however, does not dispense us from the necessity of asking in what way it is possible to arrive at this knowledge. As to this it seems legitimate to think that it is possible if we consider the following factors. We must suppose first that the individual consciousness is aware not only of itself but also of the nature of individual consciousness, so that it can have the notion of other individual consciousnesses connected like itself with times and places in the time and space order which they all alike apprehend. Secondly, if it is the nature of the individual consciousness to think that the sensibles of which it is conscious are not haphazard but disposed in a system, and moreover that other consciousnesses also apprehend sensibles and that the relations

between the sensibles of different consciousnesses are systematic, it is not unreasonable that it should proceed to certain conclusions regarding the character of the system. It may conclude on the one hand that it is part of the system of its own sensibles that since it has sensibles of a particular kind appearing where it is itself located it will also have sensibles of a like kind appearing where other consciousnesses are located. On the other hand, it may conclude that since it is a necessity of its own nature that it should be conscious of sensibles where it is itself located, it is also a necessity of other consciousnesses that they should be conscious of like sensibles where they are located. If the system is what the individual consciousness thus takes it to be, it will accordingly know through its own sensibles where other minds are located and it will know that they will be aware of certain kinds of sensibles. Furthermore, it will naturally advance to the view that where and when other sensibles than those which we call our bodies are present to one consciousness, similar sensibles will in certain circumstances be present to other consciousnesses. And again it will seem intelligible that one consciousness should with the help of its body (by pointing or the like) be able to indicate to another consciousness that it apprehends sensibles at a particular place, even when the other consciousness is itself conscious of no sensible there.

Perhaps on some such lines as the above we might dispense with the notion that there are any occupants of the time and space order other than individual minds and the sensibles which are private to each mind, and yet suppose it possible that one mind should be able to have some knowledge about the occurrence of sensibles in another mind. We shall see later that there are reasons for being dissatisfied with such a position, but we may admit that the general line of thought does not seem irrational. It may be objected, however, that if we make this admission, we surrender a point on which great stress is laid in my *Kantian Studies*, particularly in the discussion of the concept of the noumenon in the last chapter. It is argued there that the concept of an unknowable reality or realities which are the basis of the phenomenal experiences of separate minds does not solve the problem of the intercommunication of these minds. But it seems that when we introduce the concept of an unknown agency which co-ordinates the sensibles appearing to different minds, we have recurred to the concept which was elsewhere rejected, and now suggest that it is workable. The two concepts, however, are not really the same

and belong to different lines of thought. The concept of an unknown co-ordinating agency is in effect that of a predetermined harmony of the private contents of separate minds, which is the doctrine of occasionalism. The argument which uses the concept rests not on the thought of the existence of the agent but on the thought of the system which is effected. If we wished, we could stop short with the thought of the system and not raise the question whether there was or was not an agent which effected it. The concept of the noumenon, on the other hand, has its rise in the thought of a public object which different minds all apprehend, and those who entertain it are reluctant to dispense with every relic of the thought of the public object. Accordingly when it seems that more and more of what is present to the individual consciousness must be regarded as private to it, it is sought to assign the functions of the public object to objects which, if they are not public and known, at least resemble public objects in being independent existents. It is supposed that the problem of the intercommunication of different minds is rendered less difficult if it is held that there are existents, albeit unknown, which are the causes of what is privately present to different minds, and it is also supposed that it is possible to retain the concept of appearance and say that although we do not know the independent realities themselves we at least know their appearances. It was against these latter suppositions that our previous argument was directed and not against the different doctrine of a predetermined harmony or system of private experiences. That Kant himself thought his own position was different is shown by the general objection which he takes to any doctrine involving the idea of what he calls 'preformation'.<sup>1</sup>

The foregoing reflections bear on our estimate of the position which we have been considering. If it is held that time and space are public but the sensibles which we apprehend as their occupants are private, and if the problem of the intercommunication of different minds in regard to sensibles is thought to be solved by the supposition of a predetermined system of sensibles, it seems that two lines of thought are in a certain degree combined. No place is given to the doctrine of a predetermined system in respect of our consciousness of time and space, but it is found necessary to apply it to our consciousness of sensibles. But if only the basic scheme of time and space is left as that which is genuinely common to all

<sup>1</sup> Cf the passage at the end of the second-edition *Deduction of the Categories*, B 167, 168.

consciousness, there seems to be little reason why we should not go the whole way with the idea of a pre-established system and regard the times and spaces of each individual consciousness as we regard their sensibles. There are no added difficulties, it seems, if we say that our sensibles and those of others are correlated in the different times and spaces which are private to each one of us, and such a doctrine has the look of being simpler and more consistent than one which assigns time and space but none of their occupants to universal consciousness. Indeed, we may go further and remind ourselves that though we have found it necessary for the purpose of analysis and exposition (as Kant did also) to treat of time and space as if they were objects or contents of consciousness by themselves, it is difficult to think of an actual consciousness with so abstract a content. This in itself is a reason for being dissatisfied with a doctrine which insists on a marked distinction between the status of the time and space order and that of any occupants which it may have. There is something then to be said for the view that we should either accept a thorough application of the idea of a pre-established system or else try to revise the doctrine we have been considering in regard to the private nature of the occupants of time and space. In considering the alternatives let us begin with a few reflections on the difficulties of the first.

It is not apparent that there are inconsistencies or contradictions in a doctrine of the pre-established harmony of sensibles. The objection to it is of a different order, but perhaps is none the less valid. It can be stated in the general form that the doctrine implies an arrangement of the conditions of consciousness of such a kind that we only know what the universe really is by entertaining beliefs which are untrue. If this is correct, it seems to invest the universe with an air of deceit, and even if we do not hold the theological views of Descartes we can share his objection to any doctrine which has this effect. Let us consider whether the alleged implication of the doctrine does indeed belong to it. To begin with we may notice the following feature of the position which it invites us to suppose. We can ask ourselves how our experience would stand if we imagined that the system laid down for the occurrence of our experiences continued but all other minds and their experiences were annihilated. The answer seems to be that our experiences would continue to be of the same kind as before and we should not know that there was any change. We should think as before that certain of our sensibles were the bodies belonging to

other minds and that the movements and sounds which were included in these sensibles were means which the other minds were using in order to communicate with us. We should find ourselves continuing to respond and to receive, as we thought, yet further communications, and of the fundamental change which had taken place no sign or warning would penetrate to our deluded consciousness. It may, however, be said that it is essential to the idea of a pre-established harmony of experiences that one part of the system should not be supposed to be destructible without the destruction of the whole, and that it is unfair to connect with a theory a supposition which it would regard as impossible. Such a line of comment is often valid, but here it is beside the mark, since the only point of the supposition is to make more evident the isolation of one mind from another which the doctrine asserts. Now if this isolation is recognized, we must consider more closely the way in which the mind is thought to escape from the limitations thereby imposed. To recall what was said earlier (p. 130), it seemed that the individual mind in knowing itself might be held to know the nature of an individual mind and so be able to conceive the idea of other minds. There is no apparent reason for withdrawing from this position. But what followed is more doubtful. It was suggested that the mind might proceed from the consciousness of its own association with certain sensibles to connect other sensibles of a like kind with other minds. We need to ask whether it seems likely that we should take this step if we were clearly aware that what we perceived was internal to our own consciousness. We may speak of connecting certain sensibles with other minds, but it is not at all evident of what kind of connexion we should be thinking if we regarded them strictly as our own sensibles. The truth seems to be that the thought of the connexion is rendered easy by certain ideas which we have in regard to what we perceive, none of which are warranted if the doctrine of the pre-established harmony of sensibles is correct. We do not ordinarily think that what we perceive by means of the senses is wholly internal to our own consciousness. We think when we perceive a sensible object, which we do not regard as being subjected to change, that something continues to exist in the place where we perceived it even after we have ceased to be conscious of it. With this in mind we think of our body as being associated with our own consciousness, but not in the way of being internal to consciousness. The body is rather regarded as a condition under which the individual consciousness operates, and

this does not fit the view that it is a content of that consciousness. So we prefer to say, for example, that our body belongs to us. Further, we think that we control our body so as to bring into existence new states or positions of it or of its parts, and that this control of the sensibles which constitute our body is something quite different from bringing sensibles into existence by the mere fact of being conscious of them. Yet again, we think that the way in which we control our bodies is limited by laws of causation which govern the movements and behaviour of physical sensibles, and we find it hard to dissociate our thought of these laws of causation from the thought that they are operating in sensibles at times when the sensibles are not present to our consciousness. It seems to be through the influence of such ideas that, dissociating sensibles from our own consciousness, we are able to think that certain of them are connected with other minds. Just as we say that our body belongs to us, we say that other bodies belong to other minds, and because we believe that other minds control their bodies as we do ours we can think that the movements and behaviour of the sensibles which we call the body of someone else indicate states of the consciousness which controls it. But none of these ideas consort with the doctrine of a pre-established harmony of sensibles. The basis of the doctrine is that there is nothing besides the sensibles of individual minds and the single agency which regulates them in a system. The continuity of sensibles or of anything which is connected with particular sensibles is thereby excluded and with it a part of what constitutes the ordinary idea of causality. Further, the idea of the control of sensibles by individual minds seems to be essentially irreconcilable with the idea of the pre-established system. Yet unless we have these ideas it is difficult to see how we come to think that we are aware of other minds and of the experiences which they are having. One thing indeed may be said in answer to this line of thought. It may be said that the design itself which harmonizes the experiences of individual minds includes the presence in these minds of the ideas which we have been discussing. It includes them, we may suppose, for the express purpose of enabling each individual mind to have the consciousness of the existence of other minds which it would not otherwise attain; and it is thus by our fictions that we come nearest to the truth. It does not seem, however, that we need greatly concern ourselves with this answer. The air of deceit (as we said earlier) with which the whole system is thereby invested is such as would induce distrust

of our reason if we felt bound to accept it, and to make us more likely, in default of alternatives, to resort to scepticism than to belief.

We may pause here for a moment and consider the course which our discussion has taken. We began by supposing that time and space must be regarded as the content of consciousness but not as the content of merely individual consciousness, because the latter supposition would lead to the view that there were as many times and spaces as there were different minds. But to hold that time and space are a content of consciousness and yet identical for all consciousnesses seemed to imply the necessity of thinking that the individual mind was in some way dual and that on the one side of its nature it was not discernible from the single consciousness of which the single time and space order was the content, on the other side it was separate and limited and itself involved, as regards the character of its consciousness, in a form of association with particular periods of time and places in space. A particular status was thus assigned to time and space in relation to consciousness, and the question arose whether a similar status could be assigned to their physical occupants. It seemed that there were reasons for thinking that the sensibles which appeared to consciousness as occupants of time and space belonged to each consciousness in its individual and limited aspect and were therefore private to it. But such a view at once raises the problem how we can be supposed to attain consciousness of the experiences of other minds, and we have just found that the line of thought which employs the supposition of a pre-established harmony of sensibles does not seem to solve it. This need not disappoint us. It is noticeable that the doctrine of a pre-established harmony does not seem to be one which is naturally allied with the ideas regarding time and space and the nature of consciousness which we began by maintaining, and this of itself suggests that if we attach importance to these ideas we should do better to seek a solution with which they would be more closely connected.

In considering whether there are occupants of time and space having a like status to that which has been ascribed to time and space themselves, we should regard the following points as relevant. The first has already been touched on, but we may examine it in a little more detail. The abstract nature of time and space makes it difficult for us to think of them apart from occupants, and we want to think of occupants which genuinely belong to them. It is true

that we can think that each individual consciousness uses them for the location of its own sensibles, but this does not quite meet the demand that the time and space order as the content of consciousness generally should in that capacity have its own occupants. Further, if we are disposed to admit that the sensibles of individual minds are the only occupants we should recognize that the evanescence which marks them ensures no permanency of occupation. We may recall here Kant's argument in the later Refutation of Idealism that our thought necessarily includes the concept of a permanent in its consciousness of time. In a way it might be sufficient to answer Kant by saying that space itself fills the required role in being the complement of time, but the general difficulty of entertaining the notion of abstract time and space is not removed by the complementary nature of the two abstractions. The point on which these considerations seem to converge is this. We have said that it belongs to the nature of the identical consciousness in individual minds that it should be aware of a single time and space, and we have also said that it must recognize that this time and space is such as to be capable of having occupants. The question now is whether we should not be justified if we went further and said that in virtue of the same nature of consciousness we must think it necessary that there should be occupants of the time and space order. There seems to be at least a case for accepting this view if other considerations point in the same direction.

The second point follows on the first. If consciousness in being aware of time and space is also aware that they have occupants, it may be asked whether there can be this awareness in advance of experience. If we answer, as it seems we must, that it only attends on experience, we must consider how our consciousness that there are occupants of time and space is conjoined with the factors constituting experience. Now it seems that the first and most natural movement of thought is to regard anything which exhibits itself in consciousness with temporal and spatial characteristics, as an occupant of time and space having the same status as time and space themselves. In other words, before the reflective operations of thought begin, the effect on our consciousness of the thought that there are occupants of time and space, knowable by mind as such, will be that we think of our own sensibles as occupants of this kind. It is only on reflection and analysis that we begin to think otherwise, it is not difficult to imagine a state

in which we might think that even our own pains were open to the inspection of others, and it is the philosophers who first reach the conclusion that our spatial sensibles are private. At this point, however, in our reflections we may begin to have doubts. It seems once more that we are approaching the view that there are deceptions practised on the human mind, although it may be that they are for its own advantage. But the position differs in various respects from that which was discussed earlier. One difference which is plain is that on the suppositions made the mind is not deceived in holding that there are occupants of time and space which are not just the private content of different consciousnesses. Again, when it has been allowed that these occupants are in some measure independent of individual consciousness, the notion that they can have a continuity of existence, which otherwise would not be possible is not ruled out, nor are all the elements which enter into our notion of causality ruled out. Lastly, if we are disposed to say that we are at least deceived in thinking that our sensibles are these occupants, we should reserve judgement on this question until we have considered in what kind of relation to them our sensibles may stand.

Before we take up the last question let us recall here one of the points to which reference was made when we were discussing the objections to the theory of a pre-established system of sensibles. It touches a particular reason for being dissatisfied with the view that the only occupants of the time and space order are the sensibles which seem on reflection to be private to each individual consciousness. We should ordinarily think that certain states and positions of our body and its component parts were conditions of our perceiving other objects and had an effect on what precisely was perceived. It is possible to translate the description of the situation into terms of sensibles and say that there is a fixed correlation between the sensibles which we call our body and other sensibles which we call objects external to our bodies. But we must observe that the mind associated with a body is able to control its body and thereby to affect its perception of other objects, and that this control of the body does not seem to us to be a control of certain of our sensibles (the sensibles of our body) with which the other sensibles which we perceive are immediately correlated. It seems rather to be the control of certain conditions, located in the space with which consciousness is associated, which affect the perceptions we have of our body just as much as they

affect the perceptions we have of other things. We distinguish, that is to say, the conditions of sensibles from the sensibles themselves. We shall certainly be disposed to make the same distinction in regard to other things besides our bodies, but the special relation in which our consciousness stands to our body seems to enforce the distinction more directly and obviously.

If we are prepared to allow at least provisional validity to the conviction that the occupants of the time and space order are not confined to the private sensibles of our own and other consciousnesses, we can turn to the question of the relation between these other occupants and our sensibles. The first point concerns their spatial relation. It is important to recognize clearly that there is nothing to debar us from holding that the other occupants can be where our sensibles are. This follows from the position that there is only one and the same space for all consciousness or for any consciousnesses or for any elements or aspects of consciousness. On such a view there can be no question of supposing that private sensibles belong to private spaces, nor of trying to imagine how there can be correlations between private spaces and a space which is not private, or correlations between the spatial determinations of what is in a private space and the spatial determinations of what is in a different space. But to say that other occupants of space and our own sensibles are in the same space is not yet to say that they can be at the same point of space at the same time. We shall consider this question more closely in a moment when we come to ask whether we can here apply the concept of appearance and reality, but meantime we can be content to say that there is no evident reason for regarding the presence of an occupant at a certain point in space as incompatible with the presence there also of a sensible. We think that some of our sensibles are such as to prevent us having other sensibles of the same kind at the same time and place; thus we cannot see red and green at the same time in the same place. Further, we may think of a non-sensible occupant in such a way as to regard it as exclusive of another. But there is no apparent relation of exclusion between non-sensible and sensible occupants of space as such, and we can thus return to the statement that we are not debarred from holding that other occupants can be where our sensibles are. Can we go on to say that it is reasonable to think our sensibles indicate that where they are there are other occupants? We may here take up again the point which was referred to in the last paragraph. It is reasonable,

when we have been led to regard the objects of our senses as private sensibles, to make a distinction in respect of our bodies between sensibles and conditions of sensibles and to suppose that, when for instance we make a bodily movement, we are controlling not the sensibles directly but the conditions of the sensibles. It is also reasonable to think that what we are controlling is where the control is, and accordingly to think that the conditions of the sensibles which we call our body belong to the space with which our individual consciousness is associated. But since we are directly conscious that the bodily sensibles are in the part of space with which our consciousness is associated, it is fair to conclude that the conditions of the bodily sensibles belong to the place where we are conscious that the bodily sensibles are. If so, we can extend this view to cover other sensibles than those which we call our body, and hold that these other sensibles, too, are where their conditions are. But at the same time we must notice that apparently we cannot hold that sensibles are always and necessarily where their conditions are. For when we see our body in a mirror we are conscious of the visual sensibles of our body being in a different place from that with which our consciousness and the conditions of our bodily sensibles are associated.

It is obvious that the last point is connected with factors which we have not yet considered. If we think of sensibles (as opposed to other occupants, which there may be, of space) and more particularly of sensibles connected with sight, it is apparent both that there is some interdependence or connexion of our bodily sensibles and those which we regard as external objects, and that these two sets of sensibles are connected with yet other sensibles. In order that we may see objects it is not only necessary that our bodily sensibles should be such and such, but also that there should be certain sensibles of atmosphere and light. If now we transfer our attention to the other occupants of space, the existence of which we think is the condition of the occurrence of sensibles, we seem to be entitled to suppose that these occupants are threefold, being connected respectively with our bodily sensibles, with the sensibles of the object perceived, and with the sensibles which are not the sensibles of the object but are necessary occurrents in relation to them. But if these various conditions exist, it does not seem in general unintelligible that the spatial position of the sensibles which we connect with an object should be so affected by the third set of conditions that they may be where we do not think

the object is. We habitually recognize such a situation when, seeing ourselves in a mirror, we say either that the space occupied by the mirror appears to be occupied by our body, or that our body appears to be in the space where the mirror is.

What has been said leads directly to the question whether we can here employ the concept of appearance and express the relation between sensibles and the occupants of space which are their conditions as the relation between the appearance of a thing and the thing itself. To answer this question we must consider certain ways in which we use the concept of appearance and ask how they would apply to the position we are conceiving or what difficulties they involve. To begin with we often contrast a thing and its appearance when both the thing and its appearance are thought of in terms of sensibles. When we say that a circular disk appears to be elliptical if our view of it is not from the front but from the side, we may be taken to contrast one sensible with another, the front view with the side view. If we then hold that the one sensible is what the thing is and the other what it appears to be, we seem bound to encounter difficulties. The doctrine clearly implies that the thing is what it is apart from our consciousness of it. But here there is the general difficulty that if we conceive what it is in terms of sensibles we are conceiving it in terms of something which is not properly thinkable except in connexion with our consciousness or with another individual consciousness. Let us suppose, however, that we waive this difficulty and hold that the sensible form of the thing is conceivable as existing apart from our consciousness. In that case we have still to determine what nature or status we should assign to the sensibles which we call the thing's appearance. It is possible to say that in the instance of the disk we regard the elliptical shape as appearance because we think it is not the thing's own sensible form, but is rather something in our consciousness which is caused by the thing and the conditions of our perception. It must, however, be with some reluctance that we explain the appearance of a thing as an effect which the thing causes; for we do not normally regard an effect as the appearance of that which causes it. It is an indication of this that we say that a thing appears such and such, not that it causes such and such an appearance. On the other hand, it should in fairness be allowed that if we refer to causation in such a connexion it is causation in the special sense appropriate to the relation between an object and the consciousness which perceives it, and

it has not the connotation belonging to the causation of one object by another. But this line of thought would lead us to say that the thing was the object apart from consciousness and that the appearance was the object as perceived. In that case we could not contrast the perceiving of the object as it is with the perceiving of the object as it appears, because perceiving makes all that is perceived appearance. If at this point it is asserted that what we call appearance is connected with consciousness of something other than the object, it will no longer be possible to claim that the appearance is an effect of a thing and of the conditions of consciousness only in the sense in which being perceived is an effect produced by the thing which is perceived. The appearance regarded as an effect must be admitted to be like other effects at least in the respect that it is taken to be something which is other than its causes. Not only do we then encounter the general objection to regarding an appearance as a kind of effect of the thing of which it is said to be an appearance, but there is also the further difficulty of determining the grounds on which we distinguish sensibles which we call appearances from those which we do not. We may be inclined to think that when we see the disk as an ellipse we are seeing it wrongly and we therefore call the elliptical shape appearance or the apparent shape of the disk. But it seems clear on reflection that to see the disk as an ellipse is the right or normal way of seeing it from the side, just as to see it as a circle is the right or normal way of seeing it from the front. If we say that the latter shape more closely resembles the real shape than the former we are in fact treating both sensibles as appearances and simply making a distinction between those appearances which resemble the thing more and those which resemble it less.

These considerations could be followed out in further detail, but enough has perhaps been said to show that there are difficulties in giving a satisfactory account of the concept of appearance if we try to connect it simply with a difference between some sensibles and others. But this is not the only line which can be taken. There is another which is not only in itself, it may be, more intelligible but also more likely to consort with our other conclusions. It is that suggested by the contrast not between one sensible shape and another but between a shape which is thinkable or intelligible and a shape which is sensible. The thinkable shape is comprised in the relations, apprehended by the understanding, which exist between the parts of an object occupying a particular volume of space; its

sensible shapes are the various sensibles presented for sight or touch. If this distinction is adopted, the former can be regarded as the shape of the object, the latter as the appearances of its shape; or putting the matter more generally, we can say that what we apprehend by thought is the thing itself, what we sense is its appearances. Now it seems that such a position might be connected with a doctrine which held that the thing itself, though not its sensibles or appearances, could exist independently of consciousness. To hold this, however, would involve a separation of the thing and its appearances (since the latter are allowed to be subjective while the former are not), and it seems that we should recur to the view that the appearances are some sort of effect produced in consciousness by the thing. The objections to such a view we have just discussed. They are avoided if we are able to hold that the intelligible object is contained in the consciousness apprehending it no less than are the appearances which it offers to sense. The crux in understanding the concept of appearance is to see how it is possible to maintain, as it seems desirable to maintain, the unity of what the thing is and of what it appears. If both are placed within consciousness, and if they are connected with the distinction of the intelligible and the sensible, their unity seems to be understandable. For the statement that what is understood is also what is sensed seems in itself not to be difficult. Difficulty only arises if the sensible and the intelligible are supposed to belong to different orders of being, the order of consciousness and its contents and the order of an external world independent of consciousness.

Before we proceed further we should note one or two corollaries of this position. We notice first that the same result as regards the unity of the thing and its appearances would be obtained if instead of placing both the thing and its sensibles within consciousness both were made external to consciousness. The former alternative has to be preferred on the ground that there are valid objections to thinking of sensibles as independent of consciousness. Secondly, it seems that we must begin to be doubtful whether the appearances are any less real than the thing of which they are appearances. There are differences to be marked which we shall consider later, but we shall hardly wish to say that the appearances of a thing are illusory or that they are what the thing is not. The last point leads to another. It is not impossible to combine with the account of appearance which we have been discussing the recognition of a subsidiary or derivative sense of the word, so long as it is seen to be

a different sense. We saw earlier the difficulties of explaining the concept of appearance in terms of the comparison of some sensibles with others. But we may still recognize a use of the word based on such a comparison, which has a connexion with the idea of illusion or unreality. The bentness of the straight stick, when it is seen in water, is thought to be apparent (or illusory) in a sense in which its straightness is not, when it is seen out of the water. But if we reflect further on the matter, it seems that this contrast is itself dependent on the distinction between the sensible and the intelligible. There is nothing erroneous or illusory in having the sensible of a line which is bent, if the stick is in water. It is only in a misunderstanding of the intelligible shape of the stick, to which its sensible appearance may give rise, that there can be error or illusion. If we wish to recognize a particular application of the word 'appearance', when it is used of sensibles, which may, or are likely to, produce a misunderstanding of the nature of the object, there is no reason why we should not do so. We tend to apply this usage to the stick in water, because the conditions of refraction of light are not always understood or may not be known to be present. We do not habitually apply it to the elliptical sensibles of a penny, because there is no likelihood of our coming to think when we see the ellipses that the penny is not round. But of course there is no difference of principle in the two cases.

We have now to consider how this way of interpreting the concept of appearance fits the views which we have been led to take of the nature of our consciousness of the time and space order, and of its occupants and sensibles. In general we shall be disposed to think that the permanent occupants of time and space are the intelligible objects of consciousness, that they have a like status to that of the time and space order itself, and that they are that of which sensibles can be called the appearances. Further, the distinction between the permanent occupants of the time and space order and their sensibles, or between things and their appearances, is to be connected with the dual nature of our consciousness. The unity of things and sensibles is possible because they are both contents of the consciousness which apprehends them; they could not have the kind of unity which we attribute to them if it were necessary to hold that the things were not contained in the consciousness to which the sensibles belong. Their distinction, on the other hand, is possible because consciousness itself is not simple. The distinguishing marks of the intelligible objects of consciousness,

over and above their intelligibility, are that they are the common objects of different individual consciousnesses and that they are relatively permanent, whereas their sensible appearances are private or confined to the moments in which they are present in an individual mind. In these respects and in this contrast with sensibles their status resembles that of time and space and can be expressed in the same way. As was said of time and space, so also it must be said of an intelligible object, that it is at once the content of a single and universal consciousness and also of many individual consciousnesses, and that in being so it does not become many but remains single and identical. We have seen that the presupposition of any such statement is that individual consciousnesses, despite their separation, are in some respect or other identical.

Keeping this general position in mind, we must consider some particular difficulties which present themselves when we reflect on the nature of intelligible objects and their relation to sensibles. The main difficulty is how to answer the question in what respect the objects which we have called intelligible objects are in fact intelligible. It should be observed that when we were considering whether the antithesis of a thing and its appearance might not be connected with that of the intelligible and the sensible, the illustration taken was one which does not seem quite to serve our present purpose. What we considered was the difference between the geometrical shape of an object and its apparent or sensible shape. But it is hard not to allow that if the geometrical shape which is thought of is the geometrical shape of an object and not merely of a volume of space it must be conceived in terms of sensibles. It seems that if we think for instance of a solid cube, we conceive a cubical volume of space occupied throughout by certain sensibles. The space occupied is not thought to be a sensible or many sensibles, but the occupant is. This might be taken to imply that the space is intelligible but not its occupant. We need not, however, say this; for the occupant of a space possesses the intelligible spatial relations of the space which it occupies. The difficulty is not in saying that the sensible occupants of a space are not merely sensible but also intelligible. It is rather in saying that the space, of which we think, is occupied by sensibles. When indeed we see a plane surface of a certain shape, we can maintain that we apprehend an area of space occupied by sensibles and that the geometrical relations of these sensibles are intelligible to us. But when we think of a solid cube, the case is different. If we hold that

sensibles do not exist apart from sensuous consciousness, we cannot assert that the cubical volume of space to which we refer is occupied by sensibles, since we have not sensuous consciousness of the whole of that which we think occupies it. What then are we to think? We may be tempted to revise our view radically, and suppose that all we can assert is that a certain series of sensibles is possible, and in certain circumstances necessary, and that these sensibles belong in respect of their location to the space of which we think. But to suppose this is to suppose that when we seem to be aware of objects there is nothing except time and space and a system of sensibles which are private to each individual consciousness. The objections to this view we have discussed, and they seem to make it untenable. When we refer to intelligible objects which are occupants of the time and space order, it is not enough to think that these intelligible objects are no more than the intelligible nature of sensibles or the intelligible principles which govern their occurrence. They must be thought to be intelligible entities the whole nature of which is not comprised in the system of the sensibles which are their appearances

But to insist on these points does not resolve the difficulty of determining what sort of nature we are to attribute to those intelligible objects which we suppose are occupants of the time and space order. There is one way of describing them which we may consider. We may perhaps make use of the notion of a system of sensibles connected with a certain volume of space in the following way. We can suppose that the volume of space connected with a system of sensibles is occupied by something, not sensible, but intelligible, and that it is of this occupant of the space where they appear that the sensibles are the appearances. If so much can be said of it, it will at any rate as an occupant of a certain space have itself the intelligibility of the spatial relations of the space which it is known to occupy. We should get back thus to the notion of a geometrical object, which though not sensible (our sensibles being its appearances) was yet an object and not merely a volume of space. Now there may be something to be said for this way of regarding the matter, but there is a difficulty about it which we should consider. The difficulty arises from the fact that we conceive different systems of sensibles in the same object-containing space, and this seems to throw doubt on the conclusion that the intelligible object occupies exactly the space which we think exhibits, or provides location for, a particular system of sensibles.

Thus when we think about some object which we normally regard as solid, we may conceive its sensibles either in the manner referred to in the last paragraph or as the scientist conceives them. By the scientist the solid is resolved into a space occupied here and there by atoms or ions, the total area of occupation being far less than that which is unoccupied. If the latter conception is accepted, it seems natural to conclude that though the alternative conception of the supposed solid object may correctly describe a system of sensibles capable of occurring under certain specified conditions, yet there is no intelligible object occupying the whole volume of space which the system of sensibles is imagined to occupy. On the other hand, the conclusion does not seem to be inevitable. It can presumably be said that even if the solid is resolved into the sensibles of an imagined system of dispersed atoms, it is not necessary to think that the intervals between atoms have no occupant because it is not occupied by anything to which the sensibles of atoms can be attributed. Space may be a plenum, as many have supposed, though what fills it we do not know. If it is a plenum, we can say that there is always an intelligible 'somewhat' co-extensive with the space of any system of sensibles which we may conceive. It must be admitted, however, that simply to say that there is something occupying any space with which we connect sensibles does not contribute much to the intelligibility of the so-called intelligible object. The significance even of its spatial volume, which we have claimed as part of its intelligibility, does not amount to much unless we can assert that the spatial volume marks the boundaries of a set of qualities, serving to distinguish what occupies a particular part of space as opposed to what occupies another part. But it is doubtful if we are entitled to assert with confidence that the spatial boundaries of any distinctive system of sensibles exactly corresponds with the boundaries of a distinctive part of the intelligible content of space.

It seems that there is some difficulty regarding the intelligibility of the occupants of space so far as they are distinguished from the sensibles which are associated with our apprehension of them. In this connexion it is desirable to consider certain points regarding the relation between the individual consciousness and the intelligibility of the object. When reference is made to the intelligibility of the object, one thing which may be meant is what an individual consciousness, which is conscious of objects, understands in regard to them. Another thing which may be meant is not what a

particular consciousness understands, but what there is to be understood. If we think of the first meaning, we can ask the question whether all individual consciousness can or must conceive the nature of the objects about which they think in the same way. The answer to this question seems to be that we must suppose there is something common in the way in which each consciousness thinks of objects, but that, since thought develops in reflection or the process of thinking, what is intelligible to various consciousnesses will be at a different level for one consciousness and another. From this point of view we must say that the intelligibility of objects in the second sense is something which is not apprehended in full by any individual consciousness. Something of its nature is apprehended by each consciousness, because all consciousness is dual and not merely individual, and more may be apprehended by reflection. But the fact that the individual consciousness has the nature and limitations which we have discussed earlier implies that only a part of what is intelligible to universal consciousness will be intelligible to it. We must not therefore approach the examination of what the nature of objects is for thought on the basis either that this nature is completely discoverable or that we have only to consider what is present in the thought of every consciousness. We must start with the latter and work out its implications so far as we can. Let us review in this light some of the points on which we have already reflected.

We may first take it to be a fundamental feature of our consciousness that we think that the external objects of which we are conscious are objects of which others, too, may be conscious, and also that we think we may be conscious of the same object at different times and that others may be conscious of it at the same time as we are or at different times. It is obvious that what is thus ascribed to the object is not something of which we are sensibly conscious but something of which we think. In other words, what we are conscious of is the intelligible nature of the object, and our consciousness itself in this respect is not that part of our consciousness which is determined and limited by our association with a particular location in time and space. So much we can say without hesitation when we seek to explain the statement that we are conscious of intelligible objects. But difficulties arise when we become aware of the nature of sensibles. Until we have this awareness we are content to think that the characters referred to can be attributed to objects as they appear to sensuous

consciousness. When reflection shows that sensibles are both private to individual consciousness and momentary, and cannot be what we first thought them to be, it is inevitable that the way in which we think about objects should be revised. But for any revision the condition remains that we should be able to think that what we are conscious of can have a duration extending beyond the moments in which we apprehend it, and that others also can be conscious of it. To this we should add that we should also be able to think that objects not only endure but change, that their changes are continuous, and that they are governed by principles or exhibit a system. If it be asked why in formulating any account of the objects of consciousness it is necessary that these conditions should be observed, the answer in accordance with the general position which we have been considering will be that the conditions belong to the consciousness which is identical in all consciousnesses and that it is by this consciousness that objects themselves are constituted. It is because we have to think of these conditions that we cannot be content with the account, which we are first disposed to accept, so soon as we realize what the nature of sensibles is. To reduce objects to a system of sensibles is a natural and immediate outcome of this realization, but though it may in part satisfy the condition that objects must be thought to exhibit a system, it satisfies none of the others. Accordingly it becomes necessary to think that in apprehending sensibles we do not only apprehend sensibles and the principles or system governing their occurrence but something else. One alternative, when this point is reached, is to suppose that the object is one thing and the sensibles another, and that we arrive at our consciousness of the former through some process of inference. But it seems impossible either to give any sufficient explanation of the nature of the inference or to be satisfied with an account of our consciousness of an object which holds that it is conscious of two objects which are separate. There is, however, another alternative. Consciousness contains also the obscure notion of the thing and its appearances, and it seems to be this notion with which reflection needs to concern itself. Its analysis has been the subject of our recent discussion, and has seemed to suggest certain conclusions. They are that the concept of appearance should be connected with the antithesis of the sensible and the intelligible, that the unity of the thing and its appearances is essential to the concept, and that the required unity can only be intelligibly maintained if we suppose

that both the thing and the appearances fall within the unity of consciousness and further that the thing is temporal and spatial as its appearances are.

When we thus consider the course which reflection on the nature of objects may take there are some points which seem to emerge. In the first place, it seems that the nature of objects is not represented in our consciousness by a fixed or final concept, though there are certain elements in our thought about their nature which are permanent and necessary. In the second place, if we ask what the object is apart from its appearances or what the intelligible is apart from sensibles, it is doubtful whether we can hope to do much more than point to those permanent and necessary elements in our thought to which we have referred. But what can be said of the object without reference to its sensibles does not comprise all that belongs to its intelligible nature. We have already noticed that the order or system which is apprehended in sensibles is not itself sensible but intelligible. When once it has been recognized that the whole nature of the object cannot be thought to be comprised in its sensibles, there is no objection to including in its intelligible nature whatever system we think belongs to its sensibles. Indeed, it is necessary to do so if we are to indicate rightly what is meant by the intelligible nature of the object, and without reference to this aspect of its intelligibility it would not seem possible to understand the character of the explanations of science.

It is worth while to give a little consideration to this last matter, since it will elucidate what we should think about the intelligibility of objects. It seems that in the last resort the explanations or hypotheses offered by science of the nature of objects must necessarily be conceived in terms of the systematic relations in time and space of imagined sensibles. Further, if it is supposed that the imagined sensibles cannot actually be experienced, they must be thought to stand in such necessary relations to sensibles which can be experienced, that the truth of the explanation or hypothesis is capable of being verified. This general statement will serve at the outset, but there are some points connected with it which should be considered. It may at any rate be claimed that such a way of regarding the answers of science to questions about the nature of physical things enables us to see that there need be no incompatibility of the doctrines of science with the statements we ordinarily make about things of which we have sensible experience. Our ordinary statements concern the sensible appear-

ances of things under certain conditions and may be entirely correct in regard to them, the statements of science concern different sensible appearances of things under other conditions, and the two need not contradict each other. But a difficulty may nevertheless be felt regarding the relation of the two kinds of statements. We are certainly disposed to say that the doctrines of science render the nature of objects more intelligible to us, but if science and our ordinary account of things concern different sets of sensibles we may ask why this should be so. The answer, of course, is that the two sets of sensibles are not disconnected and that therefore an account of the system of the one may explain the system of the other; for instance it seems easy to understand how changes which we perceive in things are explained by changes in their molecular structure. There may be held to be more difficulty in the statement that it is in terms of sensibles that science formulates its concepts. One objection may be that it would be nearer the mark to say that they are formulated in terms of thinkable entities of which sensibles actual or imagined are conceived as the results on manifestations. But we may ask whether these thinkable entities are or are not assigned durations, positions in space, movements, degrees of resistance or attraction, and the like, which are all determinate. If determinate predicates formulated on these lines are assigned to them, it is hard to say that they are not being conceived with the help of the imagination of sensibles. If, on the other hand, the thinkable entities are not thus determinately conceived, we cannot say that the scientific explanation or hypothesis is in terms of these entities. It must so far as it is scientific be in terms of something determinately conceived and formulated, and it will be necessary to have recourse to the system of sensibles in order to satisfy this requirement. This is by no means to say that the notion of the thinkable entities plays no part in the justification of the scientific account, since all that is being maintained is that the scientific explanation is not in terms of them. We are apt indeed to think that science is more abstracted from sensibles than it really is. If we search for a reason it is perhaps to be found in the fact that the systematic relations between sensibles are susceptible to and require the most abstract mathematical formulation. But we should not on that account fail to recognize that since the relations are between sensibles the sensibles must enter into the scientific conception. The other objection to the statement that we should regard the explanations of

science as being ultimately conceived in terms of sensibles is of a different kind. It must be allowed that the sensibles conceived by science are not necessarily thought to be capable of being actually experienced, and the question may legitimately be asked what validity can belong to an explanation which is in terms of that which is not held to exist. It should be observed that this difficulty is not really different from that of conceiving an object in terms of sensibles which might be experienced but are not. But it is more sharply seen when it is thought that the sensibles never exist and even that it is impossible that they should. It is here that we obtain confirmation for the view that the notion of thinkable entities other than sensibles is required for the justification of scientific explanations no less than for those of common sense. The explanation in terms of sensibles is only justified because it is the way in which we imagine ourselves as sensuously conscious of that of which we think. The situation is seen clearly enough when we reflect on the continuity of duration or change which we attribute to things. Continuity of sensibles is fictitious, but we can be justified in imagining a continuity of sensibles if we recognize that we are thinking of the character of something of which we cannot be conscious without imagining ourselves to be conscious of it sensuously. When we put the matter to ourselves in this way we may notice that the more reflective processes of our thought still have an affinity to that initial stage at which we think objects exist as they appear to us whether we are sensuously conscious of them or not. What has supervened is the recognition of certain fictions and at the same time the justification of them on the ground that they are in a measure approximations to the truth.

The last remarks serve to remind us of the factor of imagination in our consciousness of objects. It is desirable to recur once more to this topic, recalling some of the considerations which we have had before us, more particularly in § 2 of Chapter II, and adding some others, with the aim of determining how the imagination should be regarded in relation to the general position which we have discussed. We must begin by drawing a distinction between the work of the imagination in our consciousness of that which we take to be real, and its work in constructing objects which are not regarded as other than imaginary. In the one case we think that what we imagine exists as we imagine it, in the

other we think that it does not exist at all. It is the former case which we have chiefly to consider, since our concern is with our consciousness of the real, and one question we shall ask is whether it has the nature usually attributed to imagination and should bear its name. But it will be necessary to keep both states of consciousness in mind if the nature of each can be made clearer by contrast with the other. When we try to express what imagination is, we may think of Kant's description of it as 'the faculty of having an object before the mind in intuition even *without its presence*' (das Vermögen einen Gegenstand auch *ohne dessen Gegenwart* in der Anschauung vorzustellen—B 151). But there is much which is not clear in this statement. In the first place, the notion of the presence of an object needs explanation. If we are conscious of the object in imagining it, it is in that sense present to our consciousness. In another sense, however, it may be said not to be present. It may be so situated in space in relation to ourselves that we cannot have sensuous consciousness of it, or its existence may belong to a different date in time to the date of our consciousness so that again our consciousness of it cannot be sensuous. This line of thought would seem to suggest not that in imagination we fail to be conscious of the object but that we are conscious of it in a different way from that of sensuous consciousness. On the other hand, when we ask what is meant by the ability to have the object before the mind in intuition despite its absence, the suggestion seems to be that since the object is absent, what we have before the mind is something other than the object. We thus have the notion of a mental image which has spatial characteristics and is endowed by the mind with location in time and space, or, as Kant puts it, is before the mind in intuition, and it is this mental image of which we suppose that we are conscious. We need not here discuss what Kant himself thought or which view suits his doctrines better. Our task is rather to see how we should interpret the matter in the light of our other conclusions.

Let us consider how we should regard the contention that we cannot apprehend the object itself if we are not sensuously conscious of it. It seems plain that such a contention agrees only with the view that in being conscious of an object we are conscious of no more than a collection of sensibles now existing. It does not agree with a view which would allow the object to be a succession of sensibles, because we cannot be said to be sensuously conscious of past sensibles. Nor again does it agree with a view which makes

the object a system of possible sensibles; for certainly possible sensibles are not something of which we are sensuously conscious. Still less can we accept it if we hold that the object of which we are conscious is more even than a system of possible sensibles or that it has an intelligible nature apprehended by our intelligence, and characterized by a permanence, continuity, and independence of individual consciousness which no sensible can possess. In accordance with any of these last views it is necessary to think that we can be conscious of something of which we are not conscious sensuously. We are then inclined to take a further step. What we are not sensuously conscious of we suppose we apprehend by thought or intelligence or understanding, and the understanding is not here engaged, as Kant held, simply with a universal or a concept but is apprehending a particular existent. But recognizing this we must reflect, as we did earlier, that even if there are limitations belonging to the intelligence or understanding of the individual mind, they are not the same limitations as those which belong to its sensuous consciousness. In its sensuous operation consciousness is associated with a particular location in time and space, and it is necessary that the object should be in certain temporal and spatial relations to the consciousness as thus located. This is what is meant by the necessity that the object should be present. When it is not sensuous consciousness but the understanding which is involved we can be conscious of an object wherever we are and whether or not the object is now existing.

These remarks, however, only touch part of the problem whether and, if so, in what way we can be conscious of an object of which we have no sensuous consciousness. As we saw earlier it is hard to think of consciousness of an object, into which no consciousness of sensibles enters. It is not enough to say that the intelligible nature of an object is apprehended by the understanding, and that the understanding is not limited by the conditions of sensuous consciousness. If in apprehending the object we cannot dispense with sensibles, the question arises how without sensuous consciousness we can be conscious of sensibles. Now it seems that we are bound to recognize that the mind has the capacity of a non-sensuous consciousness of sensibles. We can think of three forms of such consciousness. In memory we are conscious of sensibles which have been part of our own past experience, and memory is not sensuous consciousness nor is it subject to its limitations. We are also conscious of sensibles which we believe that other minds than our own

are experiencing or have experienced. Lastly we are conscious of sensibles which might be or might have been present to some consciousness or other in certain conditions, despite the non-fulfilment of the conditions. Neither of the last two forms of consciousness, any more than the first, is a form of sensuous consciousness. Our task will be to examine these three forms, and in considering their nature to see whether we understand them better if we regard them as operations of the imagination, or whether they should be regarded as being different from imagination in the ordinary sense of the term.

Beginning with memory we can see that it is not sensuous consciousness because it does not depend on those temporal and spatial relations of the object of our consciousness to our body and its operations which sensuous consciousness requires. Nevertheless, it cannot be contended that in memory the object of consciousness is necessarily either intelligible or such as to be an object of consciousness generally. If I remember a sensation of colour or a feeling of heat, that which I am now conscious of is not more intelligible than the sensation or feeling which I had at the time when I was sensuously conscious, and it is not something of which any one else can be conscious in the way that I am; no one else can remember my sensation or feeling. Here then we have a state of consciousness describable as non-sensuous consciousness of a sensible which despite the fact that it is non-sensuous must not be classed with states of consciousness of which the objects are intelligible and common to all consciousness. There seems, however, to be no valid objection to our recognizing this form of consciousness along with the other forms, and what has been said of it may perhaps serve as a description of one kind of memory. The description, however, does not seem to apply to all the forms of memory, and even as regards the particular form which it covers needs some qualification. Not all memory seems to be of sensibles. We can remember thinking or desiring this or that, but the thought or desire which is remembered is not a sensible. It may be true that such an object of memory as a thought or desire is not remembered without an accompanying memory of certain sensibles; for when we remember we assign that which we remember at least approximately to some period in time, and it may not be easy to do this if all memory of sensibles is eliminated. Nevertheless, it remains true that in the instance of which we are thinking something is remembered which is not a sensible, even if sensibles are remembered at

the same time. But something of the same sort seems to hold also in regard to the other instance of memory which we were first considering.<sup>6</sup> We ought to ask ourselves whether in fact we normally remember sensibles in dissociation from everything else. When we consider the point it seems that in most cases we remember sensibles as objects or features of objects, and that when now and again we remember something more subjective such as a feeling of heat or a smell it is at least remembered in connexion with objects which are also remembered. Now so far as it is the existence of an object that is remembered, we must notice that this is something of which even in the original apprehension we were non-sensuously conscious. There need not therefore be so wide a difference here between present and past apprehension, as there is between present and past consciousness of sensibles. What is never sensuously apprehended can as well be apprehended when it is past in relation to our consciousness as when it is present. There is accordingly no temptation to suppose with reference to this element in what we remember that when we remember we apprehend not the object which we formerly apprehended but an image of it. What this analysis provisionally suggests is that in memory we are conscious again of an object of which we were once conscious, and as regards its sensibles also apprehend again what we once apprehended sensuously, but now in a form of consciousness which is non-sensuous. If this be so we can now decide whether memory should be regarded as an operation of the imagination. The answer does not seem to be in doubt. If imagination is taken to be a form of consciousness, the object or content of which is wholly internal to the present moment of consciousness and neither has nor had any being independent of it, it seems plain that memory is not imagination.

When we turn to the two other forms in which we seem to have non-sensuous consciousness of sensibles we may be inclined to think that one of them is easier to understand than the other. In being aware of sensibles which others experience, we hold that these sensibles exist and that therefore there is something of which we *can* be aware. On the other hand, when we are conscious of sensibles which would exist or would have existed in certain circumstances, it seems that that of which we are conscious neither has nor has had any existence since the conditions of its existence have not been fulfilled. But the first form of consciousness cannot in truth claim to be free from the difficulties of the second. The reason is this. We cannot maintain that we have direct consciousness of

sensibles existing in the minds of others, since such a view would be contrary to the private and individual nature of sensibles; but we can maintain that because we are aware what sensibles must exist for a consciousness such as our own under certain conditions and are also aware that from time to time the conditions are fulfilled for such a consciousness, we can know what sensibles are present in the experience of a given mind. In other words, unless we are prepared to defend the view that when we are conscious what sensibles must exist under what conditions we are conscious of something which is not merely the content of our own individual consciousness, it is difficult to see how we can be aware of the existence of sensibles in the minds of others. We ought therefore to consider the second form of consciousness to which we have been referring before the first, and if we are satisfied in regard to it, it seems that we need not feel a difficulty about the other.

The state of consciousness of which we have to think is consciousness of the existence of an object, but it is not accompanied by sensuous consciousness of the sensibles which we should experience if, for instance, we saw or touched it; so far the state is one which resembles memory, but it is not memory because the object of which we are conscious is not an object of which we remember having had sensuous experience. Thus I can be conscious of objects or events which belong to the past and were never experienced by me or which are in the present but so situated that I cannot apprehend them by sense. I cannot think of them without thinking of sensibles. What then is the nature of the thought or consciousness of the sensibles without which I cannot apprehend such objects? It cannot be said that I am conscious, though now non-sensuously, of sensibles which I once apprehended sensuously as belonging to the objects, and therefore it seems that the account to be given must be different from the account which we gave of memory. It seems natural to say that if the sensibles of which I am conscious are not actual or are not sensibles which exist or have existed, what I am conscious of is something which has no being apart from my individual consciousness and is therefore in the proper sense imaginary. But we must hesitate about such an answer. I may judge that my consciousness is right, and in so judging I must suppose that my consciousness is operating as consciousness ought to operate. In connexion with the same thought I suppose that others may be conscious of that of which I am conscious and I claim that their consciousness should be the same as

mine. But if this is so it means that even as regards the sensibles which enter into the content of my consciousness I do not think that they are such as to belong to my individual consciousness alone.

Is there any sense in which we can say that we apprehend something real when we apprehend these unrealized sensibles of which we have been thinking? There is an answer to this question which we may consider at the outset. It may be suggested that though the sensibles have not formed part of the sensuous experience of any individual mind, they belong or have belonged to the sensuous side of a consciousness which is not individual. It seems, however, on reflection, that the whole account of sensuous consciousness which we have been led to adopt is incompatible with such a view. Sensuous consciousness, so it seems, is essentially consciousness associated with an occupant of space at a certain time (the animate body), and is so determined and limited by this association that it is individual and not universal. It may perhaps be said that consciousness which is not individual can conceive an animate body at any point in space and thereby apprehend the sensibles which the consciousness of such a body will have in relation to the other occupants of space. If this means that the non-individual mind apprehends the sensibles which the consciousness of a particular animate body (which does not exist) would have if it existed, the state of consciousness of the non-individual mind is comparable to that of our minds when we apprehend what sensibles would be present to consciousness if certain conditions were fulfilled. But this state of consciousness is not sensuous consciousness of sensibles, and therefore we cannot say that real sensibles and imaginary sensibles (neither being sensuously apprehended by us) are distinguishable because the former are objects of sensuous consciousness in the universal or supra-individual mind. It is not possible to avoid this conclusion by maintaining that what is conceived by such a mind is *ipso facto* real or actual, or, in other words, that when this mind conceives a body and its experiences the body exists and its experiences exist. The reason why such a view cannot be held is that it would at once make reality unintelligible. It is intelligible to hold that if an animate body were now in the space where, e.g., a block of stone is, it would have such and such sensations; it is not intelligible to think of the body and the stone as existing in the same place at the same time. In this way the necessity that reality should be intelligible inevitably precludes the

idea that a supra-individual mind can create or enjoy at will any sensuous consciousness which it chooses to conceive.

If we are dissatisfied, as it seems we must be, with this answer to the problem of unrealized sensibles, we must consider whether there is any other. It may perhaps be suggested that what is present to our consciousness should rather be described as imaginary sensibles which we know that we should judge to be real under certain conditions. But in offering such a description we should realize the points of distinction which it implies between such sensibles and the objects or constructions of the mere imagination. The judgement which is referred to connects the sensibles of which we are non-sensuously conscious with the thought of an order or system of sensibles. Further it seems, if our earlier argument was valid, that a system in which sensibles alone, actual or potential, are connected apart from the notion of thinkable or intelligible objects is not itself intelligible. The sensibles therefore of which we think are thought to be in strict connexion with entities which are apprehended as actual and not as imaginary. But if we hold that the unrealized sensibles of which we are conscious are thus connected with what we know to be real and are dictated by our knowledge of the real, they are clearly distinguishable from those objects of consciousness which we think are products of the mere imagination. If both alike are to be called imaginary, we should follow Kant in saying that the first are related to that particular function of consciousness which he distinguishes under the title of 'the productive imagination'. The title at least carries with it the implication that the objects of which such imagination is conscious have a different status from objects which are merely imaginary. To these considerations we must add another. The judgement with which our consciousness of the sensibles is connected implies not only that the way in which we are being conscious is a necessity of our own consciousness, but also that it is a way in which other minds should be conscious, if they are conscious of that of which we are thinking. But, if so, we must say that what is operative here in consciousness is that part of the individual mind which is more than the possession of the individual alone.

We may on these counts be disposed to see whether we can put the matter to ourselves in a way which would still further dissociate the consciousness which we have in mind from ordinary imagination. We can perhaps do so, if we use the concept of appearance which we discussed earlier. We cannot say that the sensibles of

which we are conscious are those of which we should have been conscious if we had been sensuously conscious of the object. Therefore we are not apprehending the appearance of the object as it would be for sensuous consciousness. Nor are we apprehending the appearance which something once sensuously apprehended has now for a present consciousness which is not sensuous. The last description is one which applies rather to memory. But we can say that what we are apprehending is the sensibles which constitute the appearance to present non-sensuous consciousness of a past object which at the time had no appearance because there was no individual consciousness to which it appeared. (If it had an appearance to non-individual consciousness, it would not, for the reasons suggested above, be the appearance appropriate to the sensuous consciousness of an individual mind.) If we can so regard our consciousness of the sensibles which we now apprehend, it seems that what we apprehend is a real appearance of the object. It is not its appearance for sensuous consciousness, but it is its appropriate appearance, or what its appearance should be, for any consciousness apprehending it under the conditions of non-sensuous consciousness. But if we take this view we should notice that our answer is different from that which was previously suggested. We are not now holding that the sensibles which we apprehend are imaginary sensibles which we should judge to be real under certain conditions. It seems indeed that such an account is not satisfactory. Imaginary sensibles are not the same as sensuously apprehended sensibles, and therefore it is not right in any circumstances or under any conditions to judge that what we are now apprehending is a number of sensuously apprehended sensibles. It would be better to say that the imaginary sensibles resemble sensibles which we should judge to be real if the conditions were fulfilled for their appearance to sensuous consciousness. But in the first place it does not seem that there is this comparison in our thought of one kind of sensible with another, and in the second place the problem remains what kind of object is present to consciousness when we think, without sensuous consciousness, of the sensibles which would appear under certain specified conditions to sensuous consciousness. If we can dissociate our consciousness of the sensibles of which we think from imagination as ordinarily conceived, we seem to avoid these difficulties. But in any case whichever is the view which we decide to take, we can hold to what has been said about the relation of our state of consciousness to the ways in which it is necessary that the mind should think.

Whether now we should continue to describe the kind of consciousness with which we have been concerned as imagination is a matter of nomenclature. If we speak of all non-sensuous consciousness of sensibles (apart from memory) as imagination, it can still be called imagination. The only point of importance is that it should be distinguished from the imagination of which we regard the objects as purely imaginary or fictitious.

The corollary which seems to emerge from these considerations is that we should think of a double nature which belongs to sensibles themselves. Sensibles as the content of sensuous consciousness belong to the individual mind which thus apprehends them. But besides having sensuous consciousness of sensibles it is possible to think of sensibles. When I have sensuous consciousness I can think of the system of the sensibles of which I am conscious and in doing so I am apprehending sensibles in a way which is not sensuous. A sensible so apprehended, or this part of the nature of a sensible, is something which is no longer the private possession of an individual mind. I can be aware in this manner of sensuous experience which others are having and they can be aware of my sensuous experience. I cannot of course have sensuous consciousness of the sensibles of which someone else is conscious sensuously, but what I am conscious of non-sensuously is the same sensible of which another mind is conscious sensuously. There is in the nature of the sensible a duality answering to the duality in the nature of the individual consciousness. From this point of view it may be noticed that the statement made earlier that 'no one else can remember my sensation' means not that others cannot be conscious that I had a sensation and of what kind it was, but that they cannot be conscious of my sensation as one of which they were conscious sensuously. Because sensibles as thinkable objects which are known through our understanding of the intelligible nature of things are not private to a single mind, communication between one mind and another is alone possible.

At this point, however, it may be remembered and objected that in an earlier chapter (Chapter I) when we were discussing Hume's doctrines, it was thought that the distinction between the real and the purely imaginary (or at least the recognition of the distinction) could not be wholly explained by reference to what was orderly or systematic in our experience and what was not. It seems that now we come back to the explanation which was then regarded as insufficient. But the matter can perhaps be elucidated if we notice

that there are two questions involved in the contrast between consciousness which is mere imagination and consciousness which is not. There is the question of the contrast between mere imagination and non-sensuous consciousness of sensibles which are not properly described as imaginary, and the different question of the contrast between mere imagination and sensuous consciousness. It is the former contrast with which we have been here concerned, it is the latter which was discussed in connexion with Hume. What was then said about the immediacy of our recognition of the distinction between sensuous consciousness and imagination may be allowed to stand. When, however, we have seen that there are two questions involved in the distinction of imagination from the rest of our consciousness, we must consider whether there is not something common to the character of both non-sensuous consciousness of the real and sensuous consciousness which concerns the distinction of both from imagination. We have said of non-sensuous consciousness of the real that it is distinguished by belonging to what is necessary in consciousness or by belonging to the nature of consciousness generally. Now we cannot indeed say without qualification or explanation that sensuous consciousness belongs to the nature of consciousness generally. On the contrary, it has appeared that it is individual and private, associated with a particular animate body and limited by connexion with particular positions in time and space. Nevertheless, as we have also seen, it is not without relation to what is universal and necessary in consciousness, and even in sensuous consciousness there is awareness of such a relation. Even when we think that what we apprehend in sensuous consciousness is the content of our own individual mind and is not identical with that which is apprehended by another mind, we also think the occurrence of this content is regulated by its connexion with something which is not thus limited. In this sense we may say that consciousness of something more than that which belongs to the individual mind as such (or to mind in its individual nature) is always and necessarily conjoined with sensuous consciousness, and that such consciousness is the basis of the communication of one mind with another. As we have remarked earlier, it is this factor in consciousness which lies behind the disposition to regard the sense contents of the mind not as private (which they are) but as the features of a public object apprehensible by any mind. It is a factor which reflection on the nature of the sensible cannot remove, although such reflection must lead to a

different formulation of the nature of consciousness and its objects. Not the least of Hume's mistakes is his failure to recognize this aspect of our sensibility. But having said so much we may allow that, though we must think that our sensuous consciousness is regulated by what is external to it, we do not recognize the distinction between sensuous conscious and imagination by detecting a system in the former which is absent in the latter. Hume is right in so far as he thinks that the recognition is more immediate than this. On the other hand, when we turn to the way in which we distinguish our thought about the real (or our non-sensuous consciousness of it) from mere imagination, it is clear that the apprehension of the system to which our consciousness conforms is an essential element in our ability to make the distinction. It is a second grave error in Hume that thinking, as he does, of nothing but the comparison of sensuous consciousness and imagination, he misconceives altogether the nature of our beliefs or judgements about the real, and seeks to explain them in terms of a supposed approximation to the unanalysable character ('vividness' or whatever else it may be termed) which is the mark of our sensibility. There is indeed one kind of non-sensuous consciousness of real sensibles to which some such line of thought may be applied. If we hold that in memory there is direct non-sensuous consciousness of our past sensibles, it may seem to be the mark of memory that it should be nearer to sensuous consciousness than any other sort of consciousness which is non-sensuous, and so far something like Hume's description may be thought to fit it. But, at most, it is memory alone that the description seems to fit, and even so it does not bear on the nature of imagination because memory, as we have noticed, is consciousness of the real and as such is not imagination in the proper sense.

There is one addition which should be made to this account of our non-sensuous consciousness of sensibles and of the distinctions which we should find within it. When we have seen the nature of the distinction we should recognize the interplay of imagination (in the sense of mere imagination) and the other forms. Such imagination is clearly impossible without memory and some consciousness of the general nature of the real. It is equally clear that our consciousness of real things or events which we do not sensuously apprehend is mixed with mere imagination. When we think of a past event, for instance, there must be a measure of imagination of sensibles for which we do not claim validity. In large part we only claim to know as regards the sensible aspect of that of which we

are conscious that it was of the order which our imagination represents. When, to take Hume's instance, we claim to know that Caesar was murdered in the Capitol, we do not claim validity for the particular sensibles which imagination may attribute to this event. We may add that we are in the main content not even to imagine the sensibles but to substitute the imagination of symbols which will do their work. But if we say this, we should realize that it raises the difficulty of seeing how we can employ a symbol without being conscious of that which it symbolizes. When we reflect on this difficulty we come back once more to the necessity of allowing that in some way we are conscious, though not sensuously, of what is real and not imaginary, of actual objects and events and of the sensibles which are appropriate to them.

We have now considered various aspects of our consciousness, both of that consciousness which we think is related to the real and of that other kind which we call mere imagination. It will perhaps be useful now to consider briefly how the points which we have noticed will affect our answer to certain questions habitually raised about our consciousness of what we call physical objects. Our consideration can be brief because some points will be a summary of what has already been said, others an application.

Of these questions the first relates to what may be called the displacement of the sensibles which belong to objects; a typical case is Plato's example of the straight stick which appears to be bent when part of it is in water. It is sometimes said that as regards the part which appears to be displaced we cannot be seeing the object, because what we are seeing is not where the object is. But our earlier discussion of the concept of appearance (see p. 141 above et seq.) suggests that this way of stating the matter is unsatisfactory. It implies that there is another form of sensible existing elsewhere and that it is this form of sensible which we should be seeing if we were seeing the object itself. The objection to such an implication is that if in the conditions specified we were seeing this other form of sensible we should certainly not be seeing the object in question, because, granted the conditions, the object must be seen as we see it. The course of all our inquiry has pointed to the view that a sensible is not something which has an isolated existence (whether in consciousness or outside it), but is necessarily conjoined with other factors, and that those factors belong to consciousness, though not all to the consciousness of the individual

percipient. Where a sensible is depends on the disposition of certain factors belonging to supra-individual consciousness, i.e the factors which we refer to when we speak of our bodies, the object of perception, and other objects such as light or sound or bodies by which light or sound is affected. Since a sensible is connected with all these factors there seems to be no compelling reason why we should think of the position assigned to it in consciousness as always and necessarily coincident with the position assigned to the object of which it is said to be the sensible manifestation. In general, no doubt, we think of the sensibles of an object as being where the object is. But if we are pressed to give the grounds for our conviction it does not seem altogether easy to do so,<sup>1</sup> and so far from it being obvious that the sensibles and the object must always coincide in position, we may well hold that our thought of the spatial relations of the object and its sensibles is essentially subject to reconsideration and revision.

The same considerations apply to such a problem as that of the apparent duplication of an object in perception. In the previous case when we recognized that there were many factors with which the position of a sensible was connected, we took one of these factors to be the body of the percipient which was itself spatially determined. But we must remember also that an animate body has parts each of which has its distinct spatial determination. Thus when we reflect on the position of visual sensibles we cannot think of the organ of sight as a single undifferentiated factor. There is in general nothing strange in holding that the visual sensibles of an object must have one position in our consciousness in relation to one of our eyes, a different position in relation to the other, and a different position again when the separate functions of both are combined in a single function. The more usual condition of sight is either that one eye alone is operating or that both are operating in a single function. But if both operate without combining their functions, the existence in this case of two similar sensibles with a spatial interval between them seems to be in no way puzzling or surprising. The details of the mechanism of sight may supplement but need not conflict with this description of the situation in its simplest terms. Difficulties only arise if we allow ourselves to suppose that the location of the object of which we think must necessarily be the same as the location of the sensibles which we see.

<sup>1</sup> Compare the earlier discussion, which touched this point, on p. 139 et seq.

How we should regard the presence in consciousness of so-called 'after-images' is a dubious matter. On the whole it seems that these after-images should be classed neither with objects non-sensuously apprehended (such as remembered objects) nor with imaginary objects, but with sensibles. They differ from the objects of consciousness belonging to the first two classes because their presence depends on the object having been sensuously present at a point of time which has preceded their occurrence by not more than a certain interval. Further, their location seems to be definitely related to the location with reference to the percipient of the object previously seen. If I turn my head the after-image moves so as to remain in the same line of vision and at the same distance. It seems that what we are conscious of is a sensible of the object which is neither coincident with the object in space nor now contemporaneous with it, but nevertheless is dependent on a particular spatial and temporal relation of the object to the organ of perception. Once again, however, we may say that the facts do not seem strange or incongruous if we hold the view that the sensibles of an object are not necessarily where the object is and add further that they are not necessarily contemporaneous with the object. As regards the last point, when we consider the part played by light in visual perception it seems that strictly speaking we must think that visual sensibles are never exactly contemporaneous with the state of the object to which our vision is related. If so, though the particular time relation between the object and the sensibles which we call after-images arises in a different situation, we can on general grounds think that there is no real difficulty about the time factor.

Another question is that of the distinction between primary and secondary qualities. The line of thought already followed suggests that this distinction can be regarded in a somewhat different way from that in which it is ordinarily regarded. Ordinarily the distinction is first made on the basis that certain sensible qualities belong to the object and exist in it apart from any consciousness of them, whereas other qualities only exist in so far as they are present to consciousness and accordingly they must be reckoned to be 'mental' or 'subjective'. But with the recognition that all qualities of objects are somehow connected with consciousness and dependent upon it the distinction is held to disappear; and when it has disappeared the object itself, in the sense of something which is different from the perceived sensibles attributed to it in

the form of qualities, is no longer taken into account. But if we hold to the view that there are both sensibles and objects, the situation must be reconsidered and differently interpreted. In the first place it is necessary to remember that there are two kinds of objects involved, those which are purely physical and animate bodies, which are physical but also peculiarly associated with individual consciousness. Objects of the latter class possess the same qualities as purely physical objects, but in addition there belong to them qualities which do not belong to the other. A physical pain is an obvious example of a quality which can belong to an animate body but not to a purely physical object. We must not think that the pain is simply a state of the consciousness with which the body is associated and only belongs to the body in that sense. The pain is localized in the body (or in a particular part of it) and is apprehended as something which characterizes the body itself. Now it appears on reflection that other qualities also which we are at first inclined to attribute to purely physical objects (such as heat, taste, smell) similarly belong not to them but only to the animate bodies with which consciousness is associated. Berkeley pointed out their resemblance to physical pleasure or pain, when he contended that, e.g., heat should be regarded not as a quality of an object producing a sensation of pleasure or pain but as a particular form of pleasant or painful sensation. But what this line of thought suggests is something different from the question whether some sensible qualities cannot exist independently of consciousness while others can. The answer may be given that no sensible exists independently of consciousness and yet there is a significant difference between some sensibles and others. The difference is that already indicated, i.e. that some sensibles are properly regarded as belonging to physical objects while others belong only to the smaller class of physical objects which we call animate bodies. Primary qualities may be considered to be in the first class, secondary qualities in the second with the exception that colour which is usually reckoned as a secondary quality would take its place as primary. If the distinction is drawn on these lines it should be noticed that it perhaps carries with it a further distinction of the manner of our consciousness of the two kinds of qualities. The factors present when we are conscious of a primary sensible are a condition of the object to which the sensible is attached and a condition of the body of the percipient. When we are conscious of a secondary sensible it does

not seem that there are these two factors. Consciousness of a sensible such as pain or warmth implies a condition of the body of the sentient subject, but not at the same time a condition of something else, that is of an organ of sense. It seems as if we should say that the secondary sensibles of the body are not themselves apprehended by an organ of sense. When, for example, we have a feeling of heat through contact with an object, we can say that by the organ of touch we apprehend certain sensibles of the object, but it is not by touch that we apprehend heat. If this is so, it may lead us on to the further point that in a certain sense separate minds have less apprehension of a common object in their consciousness of secondary qualities than they have when they are conscious of primary qualities. I can apprehend what an object looks like to someone else by seeing it myself. I cannot apprehend how someone else feels his body by feeling his body myself; if I apprehend his feeling it is only by the feeling of my own body. The point is one which must be made with some reserve, and it cannot be allowed to carry the implication that sensibles of objects are not private to the percipient of them. Nevertheless, it seems that there is a distinction which should not be overlooked. In regard to physical objects I am aware of the sensibles of which others are conscious through the relation of these sensibles to the same object to which my sensibles are related. This is a different matter from being aware of the bodily feelings of others through the relation of my feelings to another body (my own) and not through the relation of my feelings to their bodies. We need not, however, in the present context pursue these questions further. The main point is how in general we should treat the distinction between primary and secondary qualities. It seems worth while to consider the possibilities of an approach to the problem on the lines indicated.

The questions we have been considering are all questions the answers to which depend on our way of regarding the nature of sensibles. There are other questions which should be sharply distinguished from them and require a different treatment. They relate to the cases where we seem to be conscious of sensibles but where there are no objects which we are sensuously apprehending. It seems necessary to say that what we are concerned with in such cases is not sensuous consciousness but imagination, and that the objects of consciousness are not sensibles. The objects of which we are conscious in ordinary imagination or in states of hallucination or in dreaming do not require to be introduced into an account of

the nature of sensibles, and only confusion follows if they are treated as if they were sensibles. It was indeed one purpose of our recent discussion of imagination to make this point clear (see pp. 152 et seq. above). The problem which imagination here raises is not that of seeing in what respects the natures of sensibles and of imaginary sensibles are distinct, but rather of seeing how there comes to be confusion in assigning an object of consciousness to the one class or the other and in what ways, if there is doubt or confusion, we resolve it. This is a problem which we have considered from time to time in various aspects. We need not recur to it now if we are satisfied that it deals with a matter which not really affects our discussion of the nature of sensibles.

There are two other topics to which we may now refer in concluding these reflections. They are the question of self-consciousness and, closely connected with it, the question of our consciousness of other selves. We have touched on them from time to time, but when we did so our discussion was in the main incidental to the inquiry into our consciousness of objects. It is worth while to consider them briefly for their own sakes and see what answers seem to be most in accord with the lines of thought which we have been following.

In approaching the question of self-consciousness, we may first consider the notion of being conscious of consciousness. About the notion itself it does not seem that we need find any particular difficulty. It is part of what we inevitably think about consciousness that consciousness has a content or object and that in being conscious of its content or object consciousness is also conscious of itself. But when we have said this we must notice that there are two different forms which we may attribute to awareness of consciousness. If we think of a consciousness of which everything temporal and spatial is the content, we cannot hold that such consciousness is aware of itself as temporarily or spatially determined. On the other hand, if we think of the individual consciousness, it seems that it must be aware of itself as something which not only is temporarily determined but also is connected with a body located in space. To say this may seem to run counter to what has been said about the universal or non-individual consciousness. But when it is said that the individual consciousness is partly universal, this does not mean that there exist forms or states of the consciousness of the individual which are in all

respects identical with universal consciousness. The point of identity is that in its universal aspect the individual consciousness becomes independent of a particular location in time and space in the sense that the objects which it apprehends are not affected by its own particular temporal and spatial determinations. It is conscious of the temporal and spatial as if it were itself outside time and space,<sup>1</sup> and it is also conscious of them as if time and space were forms proceeding from its own nature. In these respects its function is that of a timeless consciousness limited by spatial associations. But even in this aspect the consciousness of the individual, though it is identified with the universal consciousness in the way in which it regards the objects of consciousness, still retains its particularity in the way in which it regards itself. The consciousness of which it is aware is not a timeless consciousness but one which is occurring in time and is also connected with a body in space. It is important to keep this initial point in mind if we are considering the nature of our consciousness of the self. It seems that in the individual (whether we are thinking of the universal side of consciousness or the particular) awareness of consciousness is necessarily connected with the thought of something temporarily determined and standing in a particular relation to the order of things in space. It is because the consciousness of which the individual is aware is thus limited that we can see here one factor in the consciousness of what we call the self. For in being aware of consciousness as temporarily and spatially determined we are aware of it as one existent among others. To this we must add that there seems to be immediately involved in this awareness of the existence of a particular consciousness the recognition that the existent of which we are aware is not necessarily unique but that there may be other instances of it.

The last point needs further elucidation. When it is said that in awareness of consciousness the existent of which we are aware is recognized to be something of which there may be other instances, two meanings may be given to this statement. It may be meant

<sup>1</sup> This must be said subject to the reservation that the universal aspect of the individual consciousness which we are trying to describe does not occur in complete separation from the particular aspect. Even as regards the content of consciousness (apart from what we think about consciousness itself), so far as we think of the content in sensuous terms our thought depends on sensuous experience and, though we think universally, is affected by the limitations of sensuous experience. We cannot but think of an object partly in terms of the various ways in which under different conditions it would appear to sensuous consciousness.

that the moment of consciousness of which I think that there may be other instances is what I call my act of consciousness and that in being conscious now I recognize that I may be conscious at another time. Or it may be meant that in being aware of my moment or act of consciousness I recognize that there may be moments or acts of consciousness which are not mine. Which of these statements should we make? The answer is that we should make both; but since the reference to 'my' consciousness has introduced a reference to awareness of the self, as something more than awareness of consciousness, we must pursue the question of awareness of the self in considering our two statements. Now it may seem that when I am aware of a moment of consciousness as a particular existent along with other particular existents in the universe I am in a sense aware of a self. But recognizing consciousness as a particular existent is far from being aware of the character of the self and its difference from other objects of consciousness. In order to begin to be conscious of the self in anything like a proper sense I must be conscious that the object of consciousness stands to consciousness in an altogether different relation to that in which other objects stand. When there is consciousness of consciousness the consciousness which is the object can be experienced as something which forms a unity, unique in kind, with the consciousness of which it is the object. Further than this it seems that all acts of consciousness, which are experienced as objects entering into this unique kind of unity with the consciousness of them, themselves constitute a unity. If we ask how this kind of experience of many acts of consciousness is possible, the answer is that it is possible through the direct operation of memory. It is in such consciousness of the unity of many acts of consciousness, for which memory provides the material, that we begin to see something more resembling consciousness of the self. It is obvious that it depends on the mind's capacity of thinking, when it is conscious of an act of consciousness, that other acts of consciousness may stand in the same relation to the apprehending consciousness as the act which it now apprehends, and that the different acts may together be embraced in the unity of the one consciousness of them. This is the justification of the first statement. But along with this original and primitive consciousness of the unity, which we may now begin to call the self, there is something else. The mind can think of acts of consciousness which are not united in this kind of union with its own apprehension or

thought of them. As regards the apprehending mind, they are thought of as being no less independent of it than other objects which are not acts of consciousness. On the other hand, it seems that the mind must in thinking of such acts of consciousness regard them as being different from other objects. When I think of them, I take them to be different in the respect that though they are not united with my consciousness, yet it is their nature to have a unity similar to that of the moments or acts of consciousness which I regard as mine. In other words, I conceive the notion of a consciousness unified as mine is, that is, of a self other than myself. This is the second notion, and it is again original and primitive just as our consciousness of the self is.

So far what we have been considering is only the aspect of the self which may be called its formal unity. This formal unity is the unity of different moments or acts of consciousness regarded as objects and synthesized by the unique relation in which they can stand to a single consciousness apprehending them together. But the unity comprised in the notion of a self is more than a unity of this kind. Such a description pays no regard to the diversified nature of that which is synthesized and ignores the idea of any order or system controlling the diversity. It is here that there is something which we may refer to as the material unity of the self. But before we notice some of the points regarding this aspect of the self we may compare what we have been saying with Kant's doctrine of the synthetic unity of apperception since the basis of the formal unity of the self seems to have some resemblance to this doctrine. We should notice that the way in which Kant thinks of the synthetic unity of apperception differs in two respects from the line of thought we have followed. In the first place, what he thinks of under this head is the unity which consciousness confers on its whole content or the totality of its objects. Such a view does not, it seems, provide a proper basis for our notion of the unity of the self, since the self is only a part of the totality of objects of which we may be conscious. If we sought to take Kant's account of the unity of apperception as the basis of our notion of the unity of the self, it would seem to lead to the view that the self is the unity of the whole which comprises everything of which we are conscious. As against such a view the unity to which we have been referring is that of only certain existents in the field of consciousness, namely moments or acts of consciousness which are separated from other objects by the unique relation in which they stand to

our consciousness of them. In the second place, Kant does not draw the distinction which we have drawn between formal and material unity. It is a distinction which he would not wish to make. His argument is that self-consciousness is only possible through our apprehension of the order or system which belongs to the objects of consciousness. But if we are to think of this order or system as distinguishable from the formal unity of the self, it seems that we can suppose that a certain kind of self-consciousness is possible without the apprehension of it. The distinction therefore interferes with his argument, but this is not a reason for ignoring it.

We can now ask what elements in general enter into our consciousness of a self and what sort of unity they exhibit other than the formal unity to which we have been referring. In referring to our consciousness of moments or acts of consciousness we have only so far considered the relationship which exists between the consciousness which apprehends and the acts of consciousness which are apprehended and the relationship, consequent thereon, of the apprehended acts of consciousness to each other. What we have here to keep in mind is that our self-consciousness is dominated by the recognition of the temporal and spatial limitation of the individual consciousness. The limitation is twofold. On the one hand, the individual consciousness being temporarily determined and also associated with a spatial body appears as one object apprehended along with the other objects which belong to the order of time and space. On the other hand, the temporal and spatial particularity of the individual consciousness affects and limits the contents of such a consciousness. It follows from the last point that if we are to examine the material unity of the self, in contrast to its formal unity, we must look to the content of our acts of consciousness and find some system or unity in them. It is here that there is ultimately to be found the justification for Kant's view that we are aware of the unity of the self in being aware of the unity of objects. The way in which the matter works out seems to be this. The acts of consciousness which we immediately apprehend as standing in a unique relation to our consciousness of them are also apprehended as associated with a physical object, my body, which is one amongst other physical objects, though the others are not thus associated with my consciousness. Not only therefore am I aware of a group or series of acts of consciousness as events forming a certain kind of unity, but I am also aware that

these acts of consciousness, being, as they are, united with an object in space partly physical in its nature, are subject to a system which arises from this union. The way in which the system shows itself is twofold. First, the occurrence of acts of consciousness is partly determined by the physical conditions of my bodily organism and the physical laws by which it is controlled. Thus I cannot be conscious of seeing or hearing or even thinking unless certain physical conditions are fulfilled. Secondly, the content of a given act of consciousness, at least as regards my perceptions, is subject to the relations of my body in time and space to the objects of which I am conscious. The form in which the object appears to me is determined by these relations and here again I am aware of an order or system which is at work.

It is clear that the factors which we have been noticing contribute to our consciousness of the unity of the self, if this unity is taken to include not merely a formal but also a material unity. We can hardly deny that consciousness of the association of the acts of consciousness which I claim as mine with a body which in some form or other can be regarded as continuing to be the same body, is a part of the unity which we attribute to the self.<sup>1</sup> Again we should find the unity of the self deficient if we did not think that our acts of consciousness were affected by the particularity of the body with which they are associated. We need not think in this connexion of differences of form or structure in one body and another, but only of their separateness as exhibited in their incapacity to occupy the same space at the same time. If we thought it possible that two bodies in two different parts of space should have precisely the same perceptual consciousness, it would certainly imply a less close union of our bodies and our consciousness than that which we think exists. But it is interesting to notice at the same time that in so far as we are convinced that there are differences between one consciousness and another which arise from the unity of each with a particular body, this conviction is itself something which depends on our awareness of a system governing the relations of bodies in space and the consciousness which is connected with those relations. When we consider the unity of the self as it is displayed in the individuality of its apprehension of

<sup>1</sup> A question arises about cases of dual consciousness in the same body, but it might take us too far afield to examine it here. It does not seem impossible to reconcile such cases with our main position, particularly in view of what is said later about the imperfect or incomplete nature of the self.

objects, it is evident that its unity in this respect would be impossible if there were no order and system in the temporal and spatial world of which it is conscious. There is a further corollary which we should notice. When we were considering the formal unity of the self we spoke as if our apprehension of the moments of consciousness which enter into the unity of the self was always direct, being either present apprehension or that other form of direct apprehension which we enjoy in the operation of memory. But it seems obvious that not all which we know to belong to the self is either presently experienced or directly remembered. I can know by inference that certain experiences have been mine, and knowledge so derived may be necessary in order that I should understand the unity which the self possesses. Or conversely I may reject what seems to be a memory of certain experiences on the inferential ground that they are incompatible with the principles to which the experience of a self is subject. But either inference is only possible if I understand, in part at any rate, the nature of objects, the principles of individual consciousness, and the necessities of the system in which both are related.

It seems then that Kant is right in supposing that our consciousness of the unity of the self is connected with consciousness of the system controlling the world of objects. But he fails to recognize that the particular unity of the self is that of a consciousness operating under particular conditions which make the objects of such a consciousness in part unique and their system also unique, although there is something common to all consciousness upon which the objects and their system depend. It must be added that that which is common to all consciousness is apprehended by our consciousness and that this universal side of our consciousness is a part also of the self of which we are conscious; but we misrepresent the position unless we attend to what is individual in the self no less than to what is universal.

So far we have been considering the particularity of the self in terms of the particularity of its cognition of objects, but there are of course other aspects of the self than its cognition of objects. Need they concern us here? Without entering on a general discussion of the nature of the self, it seems worth while to notice one or two conclusions about our consciousness of the self, which seem to follow from our reflections on the theory of cognition or to have a bearing upon them. From this point of view we may consider for a moment the element of feeling in consciousness and the aspect of

the self as concerned with action. Let us begin with the first. Our consciousness of the pleasures and pains or of the feelings and sensations generally which belong to our bodies seems to stand at the first remove from cognition of objects. It is akin to consciousness of objects in so far as we think that what we apprehend is something which is a property of our body or of some part of it.<sup>1</sup> Consciousness of feeling or sensation certainly can display a formal unity; for obviously we are conscious that a feeling or sensation and our consciousness of it are united in a way in which external objects and our consciousness of them are not. But if we take a feeling or sensation in its most abstract form, consciousness of it or of any series of such feelings or sensations seems barely to amount to consciousness of a self. It is only when we begin to find some principle of order or system in the series that we seem to have something like consciousness of a self, and it is difficult to see how we can find a principle or system without reference to a wider system than that of the feelings or sensations themselves. It thus seems that here, too, our general line of reflection applies.

Let us turn lastly to the aspect of the self presented in its relation to action. In the first place, we may say a word about its desires or its volitions and purposes. Here the point which is most apparent is that the unity of the self, other than its formal unity, is incomplete and appears as an end to be achieved. This is of course what Kant has in mind in his treatises on morals when he speaks of the legislative activity of the self or of the autonomy of the will. But the point should remind us that the incompleteness of the self is also a feature of it when it is regarded as cognitive consciousness. We are apt to think that it exists fully realized, but we should rather think of it as something the nature or unity of which is only in part and progressively realized. The cognitive consciousness of each self, arising as it does from particular and distinct conditions, aims at a unity which is also particular and distinct, and the working out of such a unity and the consciousness of it constitute a constant process. Kant had something of this in mind when he thought of the synthetic unity of apperception as a process of unification. His account does not seem to work out satisfactorily, as we have noticed above, because he does not draw with sufficient care the limits of what is unified by the unity of apperception. But his conception of the unity of the self as something which the activity

<sup>1</sup> Compare what was said earlier on this subject in another connexion—p. 167 et seq. above.

of the individual consciousness brings into being seems to be true and to apply to the self in all its aspects.

The second point in connexion with the activity of the self to which we may briefly refer is that of the conditions of bodily action. It seems clear that though the movements of an animate body comply up to a point with physical laws and have physical results, their initiation stands on an altogether different footing from that of the initiation of movement in other physical bodies. The movements which we actually observe may be preceded by movements in the physical organism which are not observed and perhaps in some cases are not observable; and we can often suppose that the latter movements are again preceded by other physical movements. But unless we are prepared to deny that mind or consciousness in any way affects the body with which it is associated we must in the last resort say that changes take place in our bodies which cannot be explained by physical antecedents alone. We have noticed before that there are characteristics of animate bodies which are not to be found in other physical objects. The initiation in such bodies of physical changes which are independent of physical causes must be reckoned to be one of the most obvious of these distinctive characteristics, and the more we attribute a real unity to our consciousness and our bodies the less are we likely to have any doubt about it. Now there are certain reflections which this position suggests. The first touches our former question of our awareness of other selves. The question, we may here notice, has two sides. We may ask how it is that we have the concept of another consciousness or self than our own, and we may also ask how we come to be aware of the existence of this or that particular self. In our earlier discussion we tried to see what was the answer to the first part of the question. It seems that if this part is answered we need not make very much difficulty about the second, since the considerations which we have been noticing in regard to the nature of an animate body seem to give us mainly what we want. It does not appear that there is any great difficulty in our recognizing that some other bodies are, like our own, not wholly controlled by physical laws in respect of their movements and behaviour. Granted therefore that we have the conception of other consciousnesses associated as our consciousness is with a physical body, the conclusion is ready to hand that consciousness is associated with those bodies of which the behaviour is not explicable on any other hypothesis. Other subsidiary arguments can doubtless be adduced,

pointing to the differences between the bodies with which we connect and those with which we do not connect, consciousness, but they seem only to confirm a conclusion about which we need already have no doubt.

The other line of thought which arises from reflection on the nature of our bodily activity touches a different point. It touches the relation of individual consciousness and activity to the non-individual consciousness within which we have held that the being of all that is temporal and spatial is maintained. It seems that there is this difficulty to be considered. If we say that that which can be apprehended in common by every consciousness exists in no other way than as the content of a universal consciousness, it is hard to attribute changes in the common world to another source than this universal consciousness. It may be thought that the difficulty is surmounted if individual consciousnesses themselves are regarded as the content of the universal consciousness. But first it does not seem that a genuine spontaneity can properly be attributed to that which is solely the content of consciousness. The content and its changes must issue from the consciousness itself and not from any part of its content. Secondly, it does not seem to be consistent with the nature of consciousness that it should be merely the content of another consciousness. The two points are indeed closely related, because we cannot but think that some kind of spontaneous activity is part of the essential nature of consciousness. Must we then surrender the notion that the common world is the content of one consciousness? We can well enough think of changes being caused in this common world by individual minds, if we regard it as independent of consciousness. But to do so would be to give up the whole doctrine which we have been trying to work out, and we should find ourselves again confronted by the many difficulties which it sought to resolve. There is, however, another alternative. It seems possible to suppose that there may be another kind of unity of universal consciousness and the many individual consciousnesses than that which is represented by the thought that the one embraces the others as its content. We found when we were considering the problems of the individual consciousness that it was necessary to think that it was also universal. It seems that conversely when we are considering the universal consciousness and ask how changes in its content can be initiated by individual consciousness we must think that this consciousness is both one and many and that

individual consciousnesses are neither simply its content nor independent and separate from it. When, therefore, it is said that the content of the universal consciousness is in part initiated by individual consciousnesses the assertion does not carry the conclusion that the initiation is effected by something other than the universal consciousness nor involve the difficulties which arise from such a conclusion. We may, and indeed we should, admit that we cannot properly understand the nature of a unity of this kind, but we need not on that account be any the less convinced that this unimaginable unity exists and that it is with reference to it that the solution of our problems should be sought.

The foregoing points are perhaps enough to show with what views regarding the self and our consciousness of it the general doctrine which we have been working out seems to be most congruent. It may well seem that here as elsewhere in our consideration of the problem of our consciousness of objects we have strayed from point to point and touched on topics, one after another, which might be thought to be far afield from the main subject of our inquiry. But at least it may be claimed that this course, devious though it has been, has been followed deliberately. For it has been followed with the conviction that the problems of the theory of knowledge are not a closed series nor susceptible of separate treatment, that we must be prepared to concern ourselves with many matters which do not at first seem to be relevant, and that finally we must not be deterred even if some of the problems with which we find that we are dealing have the title of Metaphysics and involve its difficulties.



## INDEX

*H and K = See under Hume and Kant*

After-images, 166.  
Animate bodies, 120, 125.  
Regarded as sensibles, 128.  
As condition, not content, of consciousness, 135, 138.  
Location of, 138.  
Connexion with self, 173.  
Appearance, Concept of, 141.  
Berkeley, iii-v, 7, 8, 58, 74, 100, 121, 130  
Common or public objects, 145, *see also* Intelligible objects.  
Communication, *see* Other consciousness.  
Consciousness, localized, 121, 125.  
Non-sensuous, q.v.  
Other, q.v.  
Necessities of, 159.  
Formal unity of, 172.  
Descartes, iv, 63, 133.  
Distant object, Consciousness of, 126.  
Dreams, 13-15, 17, 168.  
Freedom, *see* Spontaneity  
Geometry (K), 124.  
Hallucination, 13-15, 17, 168.  
Hume, Belief, first account of, iii, 3.  
Second account of, 22.  
Relation to doctrine of causality, 30.  
Conceptions and judgements, 37.  
Determination of mind, Impression of, 51.  
Existence and external existence, 4, 19.  
External objects, Consciousness of, iii, 2.  
How related to problems of imagination, belief, and causality, 2, 3, 29.  
Origin of idea of, 22.  
Feeling, Consciousness of reality of, 20.  
Ideas and assent, 8, 11.  
Identity of objects, 24, 27.  
Imaginary and real objects, 5, 12, 19, 161.  
Later doctrine of, 32.  
Impressions, 7, 24, 25.  
Momentariness of, 8.  
Judgements and conceptions, 37.  
Memory, 8, 34.  
Rational thought, 31.  
Reality, *see* Existence, External Objects, Imaginary.  
Self, 60.  
Time, Relation to impressions and ideas, 7.  
Unconscious perceptions, 29.  
Vivacity of impressions and ideas, 3, 11.  
Imagination (H, K), 152.  
Difference from other consciousness, 162.  
Individual consciousness:  
Relation to universal consciousness, 120, 122, 178.  
Localized, 121, 125.  
*See also* Self.  
Intelligible and sensible object, 142, 145.  
Concept of, not final, 150.  
Kant, Apperception, *see* Consciousness.  
Categories as forms of unity, 99.  
Concepts and understanding, 154.  
Consciousness:  
Not a presentation but a form, 97.  
Unity of, How related to unity of objects, 98, 175.  
Formal unity of, 172.  
Geometry, 83, 86.  
Imagination, 67, 153.  
Productive, 159.  
Imaginary and real objects, 70, 82, 95.  
Inner Sense, Determination of, 115.  
Noumena, 73, 112, 132.  
Objects, *see* Presentations.  
Perspective, 93.  
Phenomena, 63, 73, 112, 132.  
Presentations:  
How related to objects:  
    Doctrine of the first-edition  
    Deduction, 61, 65  
    — of the first-edition Refutation, 63  
    — of the Aesthetic, 65.  
    — of the Second Analogy, 66.  
    — of the second-edition Refutation, 68, 137.  
Connexion with doctrine of time and space, 72.  
Connexion with doctrine of phenomenal and noumenal self, 73.  
Doctrine of necessary system of, 71, 99.

Kant, Secondary qualities, 73  
 Self, *see* Presentations, Self-consciousness, Space.  
 Self-consciousness, Two meanings of, 95.  
 Duration of Self in time, 101  
 Consciousness of identity in time, 107  
 Superposition of transfer of consciousness, 108  
 Noumenal Self, 112.  
 Doctrine of second-edition Paralogisms, 114  
 Doctrine of second-edition Deduction, 115.  
 Sensibles, Their relation to space, *see* Space  
 Non-sensuous consciousness of, 88  
 Space, Relation to sensible qualities, 75  
 Pure space, as object of knowledge, 81  
 Spatial concepts and instances, 81  
 Connexion with the imaginary, 82, 95  
 Intelligibility of, 86.  
 Alternative kinds of, 89  
 Connexion with two elements of consciousness, 90  
 Time, Account of space applicable to, 76, *see also* Presentations  
 Universals, *see* Concepts  
 Localized consciousness, 121, 125  
 Memory (H), 154.  
 Non-sensuous consciousness, 152  
 Of sensibles, 154  
 Of sensibles belonging to other minds, 157  
 Noumenon, Concept of (K), 132

Occupants of space.  
 Whether private, 136.  
 Animate bodies, q.v  
 Location of, 139  
*See also* Intelligible object  
 Other consciousnesses, Consciousness of, 127, 130, 132, 157, 177  
 Pains and pleasures localized, 121  
 Perspective, 124  
 Phenomenalism, 129  
 Predetermined harmony, 132  
 Primary and secondary qualities, 166.  
 Public objects, *see* Common objects  
 Scientific account of objects, 147, 150.  
 Self, and Self-consciousness, 169  
 Formal and material unity of, 172.  
 Moral unity of, 176  
 Sensibles, Consciousness of, 127.  
 Universal element in consciousness of, 128  
 Of animate bodies, q.v  
 Non-sensuous consciousness of, q.v.  
 Unrealized, 157  
 Dual nature of, 161  
 Displacement of, 164.  
 Duplication of, 165  
 Space (K)  
 Relation to universal and individual consciousness, 119  
 Spontaneity of physical action, 177  
 Time (H and K), 119, 126, *see also* Localized Consciousness  
 Universal consciousness  
 Relation to individual consciousness, 120, 122, 178  
 — to intelligible object, 149  
 — to sensibles of individual minds, 158  
*See also* Self.

PRINTED IN  
GREAT BRITAIN  
AT THE  
UNIVERSITY PRESS  
OXFORD  
BY  
JOHN JOHNSON  
PRINTER  
TO THE  
UNIVERSITY